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Abstract
The current torture ethics debate comprises a dispute about the moral status of tor-
ture and a parallel dispute about the right way to do ethics. The first dispute receives
much attention, while the the second dispute is obscured or even suppressed. As a
result, scholars have developed highly idiosyncratic approaches to torture ethics that
cannot be meaningfully compared. These moral evaluations of torture rest on contrary
assumptions about the definition of torture, the right way to do ethics, and the facts
of the situation, and therefore they are not really answers to the same moral question.
I respond to this dilemma by analyzing torture ethics as a social rather than ethical
problem. I use Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to reimagine two things:
what kind of conceptual object torture is, and the structure of the social group that is
considering torture. This approach puts disagreeable actors on equal footing, based on
their real associations. It does not force an unjustifiable resolution to their normative
and metaethical differences. I then use the controversies in the torture ethics debate as
raw material for developing new descriptions of torture that do not re-engage propri-
etary ethical frameworks. These advances make possible a more inclusive and robust
political ethics of torture.
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1.1 On What Sort of Problem Torture Is
When Eurystheus sent Heracles to kill the Lernaian Hydra, the hero initially struggled with the
task. The nine-headed beast grew two new heads in the place of each one Heracles destroyed.
Heracles could easily calculate that the Hydra could not be killed with a conventional strategy. He
needed help from his nephew Iolaos, who burned the regenerating stumps so that Heracles could
defeat the Hydra.1 Eurystheus did not even credit Heracles for his labor, because Iolaos had helped.
The real key to defeating the Hydra, however, was not enlisting Iolaos but recognizing and then
countering its head-regenerating ability.
The problem of torture ethics, like the Hydra, only reveals itself to those who step back and
consider it as a whole. In its current high-stakes context of counter-terrorist interrogation, though,
torture provokes strong reactions. Stepping back from it has proven difficult. The danger of the
current torture ethics debate is that failing to properly assess the problem can make things worse,
as it did with the Hydra.
Today’s torture ethics debate focuses on some version of the practical question “is torture
morally permissible?” In more applied terms, the question becomes “is it morally permissible
1In Greek mythology, the slaying of the Hydra was the second of Heracles’s Twelve Labors (Apollodorus and
Hyginus, 2007, 30-33).
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to torture suspected terrorists in order to prevent a terrorist attack?” Since 2001 many scholars
have given their own answers to this question. The premise of this dissertation is that the phrase
“is torture morally permissible?” is not really a single question, nor can it be the origin of any
answer. It is merely the symbolic face of a dense cluster of interrelated questions that can only be
addressed, not answered. I will argue that the question of torture’s moral status has no meaning
in itself, apart from related questions concerning what torture is, the facts of the situation where it
is being considered, and the right way to make ethical judgments. Those are not three additional
questions, but three categories of additional questions. The total number of related questions is
much higher.
The current torture ethics debate focuses on the symbolic question of torture’s moral status,
at the expense of the interrelated questions. When scholars in the torture ethics debate address
related questions about what torture is and the right way to do ethics, they are primarily stating
premises and assumptions rather than arguing the issues. In general, such statements are necessary
and normal preludes to making any argument at all. The reason it causes so much trouble with
torture ethics is that scholars disagree about too many of the related questions in the cluster. As a
result, they can hardly be said to be addressing the same problem. When scholars give one answer
to the definition of torture, two more questions sprout from it like heads from the Hydra. The
same goes for other associated questions, some of which are both arcane and difficult. Are moral
judgments objectively real, or are do they arise in human interaction? That question could occupy
professional philosophers for a long time, and it is not clear what sort of authority exists today that
could validate an answer. This makes the task of addressing torture ethics an almost bottomless
philosophical problem.
Because scholars differ so much on the related questions, there is very little basis for comparing
the results of their different approaches. In an effort to break out of the resulting deadlock, this dis-
sertation addresses the cluster of questions around torture ethics rather than the isolated symbolic
question about torture’s moral status. It simultaneously considers a specific moral judgment and
the disputes about how to make that judgment. The specific moral judgment concerns the moral
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status of torture, and the disputes about how to make that judgment are myriad. In terms of ethical
theory, I tackle the practical ethics, normative theory, and metaethics of torture together, as one
holistic problem. As Heracles did with the Hydra, this requires stepping back from the problem so
it can be understood in a new way, and then responding appropriately to that understanding.
In this dissertation, I argue that the current torture ethics debate comprises a tangle of inter-
related questions. The question of torture’s moral status has no meaning in itself, apart from the
related questions, even though it appears to be the crucial question. The related questions concern,
for example, the definition of torture, the ability of torture to produce information, and the right
sort of normative reasoning to apply. The torture ethics debate is just as much a debate about how
to make ethical judgments—and about the facts of the situation—as it is about the moral status of
torture.
The answers to these questions usually serve as prior assumptions in any particular argument
for torture ethics. I argue that diverse voices answer these questions in ways that are not only
different, but impossible to compare. Each set of answers is incommensurable, meaning that they
cannot be compared to each other.2 This applies to accounts of torture ethics even more than to
the competing scientific paradigms to which the label is usually applied. The cluster of questions
that bear on torture ethics is complex, and the answers vary in ways that “cut across” the major
normative traditions like consequentialism and deontology.3
The headline of every account of torture ethics may well be its verdict on the permissibility of
torture. However, the approaches are so idiosyncratic that they are not really for or against the same
thing at all. For this reason, this dissertation does not attempt to add, improve, or synthesize another
2Thomas Kuhn proposed the “incommensurability thesis” to dispute the scientific standard of falsifiability ad-
vanced by Karl Popper. Incommensurability occurs when “a new paradigm brings new concepts, and, crucially, new
standards for the evaluation of theories” (Larvor, 1998, 42). As a result, “there is no universal yardstick” for comparing
incommensurable theories.
3In this way, the situation in ethics resembles that in International Relations, where major approaches may, as
Jackson and Nexon argue, “lack shared incommensurable content; some of the better candidates for sources of incom-
mensurability in the discipline, by contrast, cut across them” (2009, 908, emphasis in original). In their view, theories
of International Relations like realism or constructivism are not internally consistent enough to be incommensurable
with each other. They argue that this means “we should not use Kuhnian and Lakatosian accounts of theory choice
to evaluate these aggregates” (2009, 908). The review of torture ethics in chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that
approaches to torture ethics are even less consolidated than the major theories of International Relations.
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approach to torture ethics. I also largely avoid debunking or deconstructing others’ approaches.
Instead, it presumes that ethical frameworks will continue to be not just incommensurable, but
highly idiosyncratic.4 The question I do attempt to answer is how a political community can make
ethical choices in the absence of a uniform, or even widely shared, ethical framework. It certainly
seems likely that no existing account of torture ethics will dominate the debate sufficiently to
guide the community’s action. Ethical concerns are thus abandoned to whoever has the power or
functional position to make and implement choices.. In the United States this has come to mean
the Chief executive and associated staff, at least concerning security matters.
Against this, I contend that political communities can still act ethically even with a variety
of conflicting ethical frameworks. This dissertation theorizes how such a political ethics can be
possible for torture. The dissertation also draws the conversation onto common conceptual ground
that accommodates various ethical frameworks, and thereby denies easy exits to self-contained
moral universes. The dissertation is about the torture ethics debate as much as it is about the
morality of torture itself.
To assess torture ethics in this way requires two things. The first is to make torture ethics
sociable, and the second is to make it possible to talk about in shared terms. Making torture ethics
sociable means working toward an ethics that can be shared. This task becomes more complicated
if one assumes, as I do in this dissertation, that the right answers to the associated questions cannot
be imposed on disagreeable members of the political community—at least not as a premise of
torture ethics. Any sociable approach to torture ethics has to presume that a harmony, or even a
decent consensus, is very likely to elude it. Most people who are not professional philosophers do
not even have detailed and firm commitments to specific ethical frameworks, and the more they do
have such commitments, the less likely it is that a harmony or consensus can be achieved.5 One
4The notion that one ethical framework will win a following sufficient to become the framework is far-fetched
in practical terms. The picture of the current torture debate in chapter 2 attests to this. Ethical theories based on
Continental philosophy make an even stronger claim that imposing a “collective ethos” that is “no longer shared”
requires “violent means” (Butler, 2005, 4).
5Of course, most people do have ethical commitments in the sense that they make decisions about whether to do
drugs, vote, get an abortion, pay their taxes, or help their neighbors. What I am saying here is that most people do
not have thoroughly worked out answers to the many questions that bear on their overall moral frameworks. The
discussion of Matthew H. Kramer’s ethical framework in section 2.4.3 goes into this issue more deeply. I am not even
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way to put the central question of this dissertation, then, is to ask how political communities can
make ethical judgments at all, where their members have such diverse ethical frameworks. Another
way to put this is that the dissertation concerns the political ethics of torture.
The second requirement for such a holistic approach to torture ethics is to make it possible
to talk about torture ethics in common terms. The language and concepts that are available now
for talking about torture are often closely connected with the proprietary ethical frameworks men-
tioned above. For example, from the utilitarian perspectives in section 2.1, the most relevant feature
of torture is the quantity of harm that figures in the ethical calculation. Concerns about the tortured
person’s autonomy and rights generally have no relevance to utilitarians, so descriptions of torture
that use rights language and talk about autonomy will not resonate with them. The fact that torture
is illegal in multiple ways further complicates attempts to talk about it. Culpable government of-
ficials rarely consider themselves torturers, even when they present themselves as serious people
who take tough and necessary actions.6 In the minds of officials, whatever they did must not have
been torture. Thus the conceptual and linguistic environment around torture ethics is a challeng-
ing one. The concepts constituting torture may themselves still be serviceable for the analysis I
engage in here. What has to be avoided are differences that render the same concept incompatible
to opponents. To that end, the dissertation develops language about bodies, space, information,
and security that can be shared by people who continue to disagree on the right way to justify (or
prohibit) torture.
1.2 What is in the Dissertation (contents)
The dissertation begins with a review of the past decade or so of torture ethics research. Since
the Abu Ghraib scandal in the spring of 2004, torture scholarship in general has seen explosive
suggesting that fully working out such a framework is feasible or desirable. My point is that most people and groups
choose courses of action on some less elaborate basis than a fully-specified moral framework.
6See for example Hard measures: how Aggressive CIA Actions after 9/11 Saved American Lives by former CIA of-
ficial Jose Rodriguez (2012), who ran the CIA interrogation program but does not consider himself a torturer (Thiessen,
2013).
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growth. For a long time before that, it had been a fringe topic occasionally visited by adventurous
philosophers or political theorists interested in authoritarian regimes. Chapter 2 looks at works that
directly address the question of torture’s moral status. The chapter outlines the major utilitarian
and deontological argument and delves into their complexity.
I critically assess this research at the level of the whole debate, but refrain from too much
specific critique of the individual arguments. Hardly any of these works consider the ethics of
torture as the cluster of questions I have described above. Chapter 2 should give readers a sense
of how problems multiply in these attempts to answer the question of torture’s moral status in its
nonsensical isolated form.
Chapter 3 develops a method for addressing torture ethics as the complex cluster of questions
I am arguing it is. Specifically, I use the work of philosopher Bruno Latour to describe torture as
a complex problem. More importantly, I follow Latour’s lead by resisting the impulse to reduce,
refine, and clarify the problem. Instead, I adopt Latour’s Actor-Network Theory (ANT) for its
strength in handling just such problems.7 Regarding the first task of proposing a sociable ethics of
torture, I use Latour to theorize how people can be united in a political community despite enduring
differences in their ethical frameworks. That is, I assemble the actors as they are—or as we are,
since the network extends to me and to other readers. For the second task of creating concepts and
language that can be shared by such different people, I apply what Graham Harman (2009) has
started calling Latour’s “object-oriented philosophy.” When combined with empirical knowledge
of post-2001 interrogations, this allows me to talk about torture in ways that can be shared with
those who do not share the same ethical framework.8
Although it is difficult to describe in advance, using so much of Latour’s philosophy also
changes what it means to engage critically with the torture debate. By analyzing torture ethics
as a cluster of interrelated questions, I am not setting out to unmask or debunk what other people
7I rely on an array of Latour’s work, but primarily We Have Never Been Modern (1993) and his methodological
treatise Reassembling the Social (2005).
8Such knowledge has become more and more available in the form of leaked and officially released documents. In
chapter 4, for example, I make use of the memorandum that describes the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah by the U.S.
(Bybee and Yoo, 2002).
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have said about it. I do not believe they are wrong, so much as I believe the diversity and variety
that characterize their answers cannot lead the political community anywhere. More precisely,
even if I could point out everything that is wrong with some torture ethics scholarship, I argue that
such understanding would not help in the community facing the ethical choices in concrete cases.
The remaining chapters (4-6) address specific aspects of the torture ethics debate. Chapter
4 uses ANT to trace the connections of people and objects in the current torture debate. I then
use the spatial theory of Henri Lefebvre (1991) and the record of violent interrogation techniques
approved by Bybee and Yoo (2002) to describe what is happening in a torture interrogation. There I
am concerned with what is happening in the torture situation, how the various actors are connected
to it, and how to talk about it. Chapter 5 first examines the different ways of understanding how
bodies relate to life-saving information in torture ethics debate. The chapter asks what participants
in the torture debate think about whether bodies contain, produce, or excrete information.
These areas of concern stem from the central theme of torture in counter-terrorist interroga-
tions, which is that causing pain to certain bodies produces information, that in turn produces se-
curity. The concluding chapter discusses how those developments make possible a political ethics
of torture that overcomes the disadvantages of the current torture ethics debate.
The scope of the dissertation is concentrated on counter-terrorist torture by or on behalf of the
U.S. since 2001. In the future, the arguments developed here can be adapted to other instances
of controversial torture or torture-like treatment, for example in extreme incarceration techniques.
The networked quality of Actor-Network Theory makes it possible to follow links from one con-
troversy to another, and even encourages this.9 The scope of the dissertation is limited for practical
and conventional reasons, while remaining theoretically flexible. In addition, the scope of the
dissertation is somewhat broader than the U.S. counter-terrorist torture because the torture ethics
debate itself is part of the data. Steinhoff (2013), for example, claims to be most concerned about
child kidnapping cases and disdains the current torture debate’s counter-terrorist aspects. Those
who do focus on torture in counter-terror interrogations, too, often define their object of study by
9Ackerman (2015) describes such a connection in the person of Richard Zuley, a notorious Chicago police lieu-
tenant who also worked as an interrogator for the U.S. at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
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distinguishing it from other kinds of torture. Thus while this dissertation is mostly concerned with
the case of interest, these other connections need not be denied.
One final note on terminology. I use the term “torture” in reference to the acts that most readers
are now familiar with. Stress positions, sleep deprivation, waterboarding, and the other techniques
associated with what U.S. officials have called “enhanced interrogation” are, in my view, torture.
I understand that this is still vigorously contested—though mostly by those whose own criminal
culpability is on the line. I hope readers will not be distracted by such a liberal use of the term, and
note that Chapter 4 especially is devoted to describing those acts in terms that can be shared even
by those who disagree about whether the techniques constitute torture. If I am successful, then
everyone will have improved language to use in the ongoing debate over what counts as torture.
However, to avoid the unwieldy strings of phrasing like “torture and enhanced interrogation” or
“torture and contested acts that may or may not be torture,” I generally call it torture throughout
the dissertation.
1.3 What is in the Dissertation (outcomes)
I hope that readers will find value for themselves in reading this dissertation. What’s in it for read-
ers is, firstly, a good grounding in the current torture debate. Readers with an interest in torture
have probably found themselves talking to someone who disagrees with them about it. If my own
experience is any guide, these conversations do not always go very well. Readers who have been
surprised to find that someone they know well is a craven torture supporter—or alternatively, found
that someone is too squeamish about torture to prevent the deaths of thousands of innocents—will
benefit from a deeper understanding of the various arguments and complications. Secondly, the
dissertation provides a new way of engaging torture ethics that puts disagreeable people back on
the same playing field. Like it or not, John Yoo, the CIA interrogators, President Bush, President
Obama, myself, the Center for Constitutional Rights, readers, and even the prisoners still at Guan-
tanamo Bay are all associated in the same network around the issue of torture. This dissertation
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salvages something from that social collection of entities, who can finally dispute torture on shared
terms. Thirdly, and perhaps more ambitiously and speculatively, the dissertation models a way for
dealing with other divisive issues of public ethics. For scholars interested in Bruno Latour’s social
theory, this dissertation begins to theorize an ethics that corresponds to it.
If the United States is going to torture suspected terrorists, it ought to be on the basis of a
vigorous political debate—one that many people can participate in, where the language is not





This chapter reviews literature that directly concerns the moral status of torture. For the most part,
the works cited here were written during the latest chapter of the debate, beginning after the 2001
terrorist attacks in the United States. That event changed everything, as some say. Readers can
use this chapter in a number of ways. The first is to familiarize themselves with the prominent
lines of argumentation about torture ethics—some supporting its use, some opposed, and some
rather ambiguous. Readers may also begin to consider what it might take to say something useful
about the debate as a whole, given the complexity of the views that are relevant to it and the way
these views conflict with each other. Finally, the chapter aims to persuade readers to entertain
something quite different, rather than another argument along the similar lines to the existing ones.
To that end, readers who are already well-versed in the current debate might focus their attention
on certain parts of this chapter: the Critical Assessment (2.3), the latest research (2.4), and the
conclusion (2.6).
The works included here all focus squarely on the moral status of torture. They are trying to
answer the open question of torture ethics. From one point of view the question obviously is open,
as it has been vigorously contested for a decade. However, there are some ways of answering the
associated questions around torture that tend to present the question of torture ethics as settled. For
example, the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) has some positive elements1
1A positive element that suggests the ethical debate is now closed can be found where the declaration states that
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that place the moral status of torture in the past, as well as natural elements2 that place it in the
world or in human beings. In neither sense does torture appear to be a question worthy of further
debate. From the point of view of the UNCAT and other formal instruments like the Geneva Con-
ventions and the torture prohibition in the U.S. Code, the question is indeed closed. Such claims do
rest rather dangerously, however, on meta-ethical assumptions that are not always acknowledged
or well understood in the torture debate—like what sort of truth status a moral judgment can aspire
to, and whether such judgments relate to “facts” given by the world or human nature.3
Of course, that is not the end of the story, as the continuing dispute attests. Indeed, the premise
of this dissertation is that the question is as unsettled as ever, despite the hard work scholars have
been doing to write the final word on torture ethics. Today’s vigorous torture debate features
new reasons to torture and new reasons not to. Transhistorical background beliefs that locate the
resolution of torture ethics in the past tend to detract from the dynamic action of ethical debate in
specific cultural and temporal contexts.4 The current torture debate has links to both the recent and
distant past, but also has its own specific characteristics. With few exceptions, the authors below
address the specific context of torture in counter-terrorist interrogations.5
“Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment throughout the world, Have agreed as follows . . .” (UN, 1984, emphasis added)
2“Recognizing that those rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. . .” (UN, 1984)
3In analytic metaethics, the “truth-aptness” of moral claims divides cognitivists, “who think that moral judgments
are capable of being true or false,” from non-cognitivists, who “think that moral judgments express non-cognitive
states like emotions and desires” (Miller, 2013, 3). Cognitivists themselves disagree about the source of moral truths:
for naturalists, “a moral judgment is rendered true or false by a natural state of affairs,” whereas non-naturalists think
that moral judgments “are not identical with or reducible to natural properties” (3f.). These two questions only hint
at the complexity of meta-ethics entirely within the Anglo-American analytic tradition, and do not even touch on the
additional divergence with ethical approaches based in Continental thought. For example, Judith Butler and Simon
Critchley each independently developed strongly relational visions of ethics that go much further than (for example)
Matthew Kramer’s (2014) inclusion of an agent-centered element in his torture ethics. Butler (2005) argues that ethics
actually arises in the vulnerable encounter between subjects who cannot fully account for themselves, rather than in
a shared ethical ethos. The relational ethics in Critchley (2012) come about because subjects cannot account for the
fundamental ethical commitments they make, and are, in effect, taking on an asymmetrical relation they cannot fulfill.
Ethics are thus Infinitely Demanding, as his title suggests. The sort of talk in which Phil “comes into existence” as an
ethical subject because Sue demands that he account for himself, or as a result of the infinite demand placed on Phil
by the ethical commitment to Sue that he cannot account for, is out of bounds in the kind of philosophy that dominates
the torture ethics debate. The torture ethic arguments reviewed in the rest of this chapter do not generally delve into
the how Phil, Sue, or any of the characters “come into existence,” only what they do to each other. Gordon’s virtue
ethics (2014) and Slahi’s prison memoir (2015) are the two possible exceptions.
4Historian Lisa Silverman notes how treating torture as a “cross-cultural and transhistorical phenomenon” can
cloud analysis by sweeping up puzzles and details into an overly generalized concept (2001, 16-20).
5Uwe Steinhoff (2013) is specifically interested in police interrogations of child kidnappers, and he tries to distance
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What I do not review here are works where something other than the ethical question is most
at issue. This includes the many forensic studies that emerged after Abu Ghraib in 2004, and
again in 2009 when many additional documents had become available. Examples include Christo-
pher Pyle’s (2009) Getting Away with Torture , Karen Greenberg’s (2009) The Least Worst Place:
Guantanamo’s First 100 Days, and Jan Honigsberg’s (2009) Our Nation Unhinged. Pyle details
the emergence of the Bush administration’s detention and interrogation policy, Greenberg focuses
on the military activity establishing the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, and Honigsberg at-
tends to the judicial features and legal events at Guantanamo. In none of these, however, is the
ethical question itself directly addressed. Both Pyle and Honigsberg are professors of law, and
torture remains illegal under U.S. and international law now as it was before 2001. Their works
recount, politically and legally, how the torture prohibition was violated. Greenberg does the same
for the institutional, geographical and architectural part of the story.6
These works and others like them are undoubtedly related to the torture debate. However,
they take the torture prohibition for granted. This can also be the case for works that view torture
and violent interrogation favorably, but because torture is illegal these works must argue that they
describe something short of torture, or argue that the moral and legal prohibitions are somehow
wrong.7 The former interpretation holds that the law has not been broken, so nothing has happened
and no justification is needed. The latter position that U.S. and international law are wrong on
the matter of torture requires some reason why, which means they cannot prefigure their ethical
positions. In other words, pro-torture arguments are refuting a standing legal prohibition, so they
wind up confronting torture ethics even as they try to dismiss the question.
The review in this chapter also skips certain arguments from International Relations scholar-
himself from the U.S. interrogation program. There is no reason to doubt Steinhoff’s sincerity on this point, but I do
not think he is successful. His self-defense argument is compatible with certain ticking-bomb terror scenarios, and can
be appropriated for and circulated in the debate about terrorism and U.S. interrogation techniques.
6Greenberg’s other works—the Torture Papers compilation of original documents edited with Joshua L. Dratel
(2005), and her edited volume The Torture Debate in America (2006)—bear more directly on torture ethics, as a source
of data and collection of argumentation, respectively. For still another perspective—that of an army interrogator under
pressure to use increasingly harsh techniques in Iraq—see Lagouranis (2007).
7The Interrogators (Mackey, 2004) comes to mind as a positive view of interrogations in Afghanistan, as does the
memoir of CIA covert operations chief Jose Rodriguez (2012).
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ship, as well as policy documents at the center of the debate.8 The International Relations schol-
arship is excluded here because the nature of the questions it asks are more complex.9 This IR
scholarship is considered later in the dissertation, during the discussion of social theory and the
torture debate (3.3.1). Policy documents such as the “torture memos” (e.g. Bybee and Yoo, 2002)
do confront the ethical question directly, but were intended for a different audience and have a dif-
ferent status than the scholarly debate. These too play a central role later in the dissertation (4.2).
Official policy documents also must use euphemisms for torture or redefine torture very narrowly,
in order to avoid culpability for criminal action. The actual justifications they use, however, are
well-covered in the scholarly work reviewed below.
The story of torture ethics is a long and complex, even when considering primarily the most
recent chapter that began around 2000. The boundary between works that belong in the torture
ethics debate and works that don’t can be drawn in a number of plausible ways. There is also more
than one way to describe how the debate has unfolded. The following account of the course and
content of the torture ethics debate is meant to reveal some specific features related to the critique
I have sketched out above. The discussion about what to include and exclude will help clarify that
the problem of torture ethics lies not so much in moral evaluation but in the competition between
moral evaluations. The not-quite-linear account should help ground the abstract debate in real
events and show that torture ethics are constantly and openly contested. The non-linear story also
challenges various unacknowledged temporal assumptions about the phenomenon (rather than the
ethics) of torture: that torture is a timeless evil, that it is an outrage from the past reintroduced into
the present, or that it is progressively disappearing from human societies.10 That is not to say that
any of those assumptions are true or false, but rather that they provide another abstract and occluded
question over which scholars can disagree, and which makes their respective accounts of torture
8Following a common convention in the literature, I capitalize “International Relations” or use the abbreviation
“IR” when referring to the academic discipline. I use lowercase “international relations” to refer to the phenomena of
global politics.
9These are on the order of what happened to the anti-torture norm? (Foot, 2006; Linklater, 2007) and how Ameri-
cans might re-connect with the displaced anti-torture norm (Steele, 2008).
10Steven Pinker (2012, 144ff.) makes the last claim—that torture is progressively and sharply declining—as part of
his argument that violence is waning and humanity is improving.
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ethics more and more difficult to compare. These comments about the content and progression of
the torture debate should be kept in mind in the account that follows.
The contemporary torture ethics debate exploded in the spring of 2004 when reports of shock-
ing abuse at the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq began to leak, followed by even more shocking
photographic evidence (Hersh, 2004). Although the Bush administration effectively led the media
to re-frame Abu Ghraib as abuse by a small group of bad soldiers, rather than systematic torture
underwritten by high-level policy changes (Bennett et al., 2006, 478-80), that has not made the
issue go away. Instead, events such as document leaks, legal decisions, the release of government
and non-governmental reports, films, and the publication of officials’ memoirs all serve to periodi-
cally reinvigorate the issue. In the months leading up to this writing, the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence has released the 500+ page summary of its assessment of the CIA interrogation
program (SSCI, 2014), a man tortured and still held at Guantanamo Bay has published a prison
memoir (Slahi, 2015), and the Frontline television series has broadcast a report criticizing the film
Zero Dark Thirty for its close access to CIA officials and their preferred version of the events.11
Although this dissertation was prompted by assessments like my own that the torture ethics debate
is not making progress in its current form, the debate is set to continue as the persistent unresolved
issues repeatedly find their way back into the public discussion.
2.1 Utilitarian-Consequentialist Accounts
2.1.1 Dershowitz
Before the gruesome reality of the Abu Ghraib photographs radically transformed the torture de-
bate in the U.S, the discussion of torture was limited to innuendo and tough talk. Legal scholar
Alan Dershowitz (2002) made an early and prominent case supporting torture for the purposes of
interrogating suspected terrorists and averting terrorist calamities. “Before September 11, 2001,
11The film was directed by Kathryn Bigelow (2013). The Frontline episode “Secretes, Politics, and Torture” was
broadcast on May 19th, 2015 and is now available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/.
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no one thought the issue of torture would ever reemerge as a topic of serious debate” in the U.S.
(134). As his book shows, however, torture had been a serious issue in Israeli counter-terrorism
leading right up to 2000. Dershowitz explains how his own views on torture changed over the
course of his visits to Israel during the 1980s and 1990s (139-42). “In Israel, the use of torture
to prevent terrorism was not hypothetical; it was very real and recurring” (140). In the U.S after
2001, the same seemed to be the case. Despite some concern that official use of torture by the U.S.
would have bigger international implications that Israel’s actions had, his argument carries over the
terror-torture connection and utilitarian logic of the Israeli experience to the post-9/11 U.S. case
(142).
Dershowitz (2002, 8) argues that for years before 9/11 terrorists had been insufficiently deterred—
even coddled—and that terrorism must be denied any and all success. “Not only must terrorism
never be rewarded, the cause of those people who employ it must be made—and must be seen
to be made—worse off as a result of the terrorism than it would have been without it” (23). An
amoral, dictatorial regime could fight terrorism without restraint (107ff.), but countries “that are
truly committed to the rule of law” would have to act with more restraint than dictatorships. They
would still have to make compromises to fight terrorism, but Dershowitz expresses confidence that
“the feel of freedom will persist, even for those whose rights are restricted” (127). Crucially, for
Dershowitz this balanced compromise in democracies can include the torture of a “ticking bomb”
terrorist, though he qualifies the scenario as “both simple and simple minded” (142).
Dershowitz refers to Jeremy Bentham for a utilitarian argument that by now is familiar to most
observers of the torture debate. “If the torture of one guilty person would be justified to prevent
the torture of one hundred innocent persons, it would seem to follow—certainly to Bentham—that
it would also be justified to prevent the murder of thousands of innocent civilians in the ticking
bomb case” (Dershowitz, 2002, 143). He asks readers to speculate what might have happened if
one of the 9/11 hijackers had been subject to torture, and if that image is not convincing enough
he notes that “we can always raise the stakes” of the hypothetical-but-believable scenario (144).
Dershowitz acknowledges that the utilitarian case against torture cuts both ways, since the “legiti-
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mation of torture by the world’s leading democracy would provide a welcome justification for its
more widespread use in other parts of the world” (145). However, Dershowitz agues that the fear
of spreading or worsening torture stems from Bentham’s act utilitarianism, which considers the
relative consequences of isolated incidents (146). Dershowitz says that “the single-case utilitar-
ian justification for torture is simple-minded in that it has no inherent limiting principle,” and that
without limits, “morality by numbers” can justify almost anything—including terrorism (146). He
therefore tries to strengthen his own justification by noting that it is objectively worse to be killed
than tortured, yet killing is legitimized in capital punishment and in some police apprehensions
(148). Still, Dershowitz seems to prefer the harder test provided by rule utilitarianism, which
“considers the implications of establishing a precedent” rather than judging the case (or act) by
itself (Dershowitz, 2002, 146). His main practical recommendation is that governmental agents
contemplating torture should be required to attain judicial warrants. This is consistent with the
rule-utilitarian concern for including the probable precedent in the utilitarian calculation.
Dershowitz cements the link between terrorist threats and the need for torture-like interroga-
tion, and he articulates the basic shape of the utilitarian justification of torture. However crudely
Dershowitz (2002, 144) executes it, a kind of “cost benefit analysis” lies at the core of many
contemporary torture arguments. It communicates very well to the public, who do not have the
resources or patience to work out their own comprehensive ethical frameworks in detail. However,
his proposed judicial torture warrants, which he thought would “maximize civil liberties” in the
likely event that torture would continue to be practiced (141), were not seriously considered by
policy makers.12
Despite the continued popularity of utilitarian torture justifications, Dershowitz’s argument
has a number of vulnerable points. Bentham himself never published the torture justification that
12By the time Dershowitz’s book was published in 2002, the Bush administration had already established a different
orientation toward violent interrogations. The administration’s interrogation program was kept secret and restricted
to narrow groups under executive authority. The CIA sought and received assurances, including Bybee and Yoo
(2002), from the Department of Justice saying that certain desired actions did not violate U.S. laws prohibiting torture.
Dershowitz’s approach would have required Congress to pass a law, which the President would follow in consultation
with the courts. By the time he proposed it, a solution had already been worked out entirely within the executive
branch.
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Dershowitz uses (Morgan, 2000, 192). Bentham’s remarks on torture remained obscure until Twin-
ing and Twining reproduced them in “Bentham on Torture.”13 Rod Morgan (2000, 188) has ob-
jected to Bentham’s version of the utilitarian justification on the grounds (a) that the possession of
life-saving knowledge by the suspect is simply asserted, not known, and (b) torture “corrosively
delegitimizes the state” for anyone who fears being sacrificed to the greater good (193). These
concerns are not addressed by Dershowitz, who focuses on the proliferation problem and proposes
the torture warrant solution.
Whatever the merits of Morgan’s criticisms, one general problem of utilitarian justifications for
torture concerns the inputs, outputs, and structure of the utility calculation. Much of the present
torture ethics debate concerns torture used in interrogations that are intended to prevent calamitous
terrorist attacks. However, assumptions about what a suspected terrorist knows and the probability
and effects the calamity are arguably unreliable.14 In other words, the practical application of
utilitarian torture faces some obstacles in staying true to the rigors of the reasoning that justifies it.
The internal critique among utilitarians about how to judge torture is not, however, one I intend to
press here. They engage in it with each other, as the rest of this section shows. As I show in the
rest of this chapter, that internal utilitarian conflict is one small example of the general problem
with torture ethics that stems from from the wide variety of incommensurable approaches.
2.1.2 Bagaric and Clarke
It is important to remember, though perhaps difficult to recapture, the discursive environment that
Dershowitz was addressing. Neither the abusive torture in the Iraq war, nor the secret CIA torture
that was being narrowly justified behind the scenes by the Justice Department and Bush adminis-
13The Twining and Twining article appears in the Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, Autumn 1973 (cited in Der-
showitz, 2002, 250 fn.).
14This risk of making incorrect judgments about the captive’s knowledge is demonstrated by the case of Abu Zubay-
dah, who is a subject of chapter 4. In their legal defense of the CIA interrogation techniques to be used on Abu Zubay-
dah, Justice Department lawyers restate the facts of the situation as provided by the CIA. These include that “the
interrogation team is certain that he has additional information” about “terrorist networks within the United States”
and “plans to conduct attacks within the United States” (Bybee and Yoo, 2002, 1). However, within a week of applying
those techniques to Zubaydah, the CIA interrogators “stated that it was ’highly unlikely’ that Abu Zubaydah possessed
the information they were seeking” (SSCI, 2014, 42-47).
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tration, were part of the discussion. The vivid confirmation of what was (arguably) torture gave
a new concrete reality to the referent acts of subsequent torture arguments. Because torture was
widely condemned and illegal in a number of ways, it was at least somewhat surprising that the
scholarly response to Abu Ghraib included strong pro-torture arguments. The least ambiguous
of these are “Not Enough Official Torture: The Circumstances in Which Torture is Morally Per-
missible” (2004) by Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke, and their follow-up book Torture: When the
Unthinkable is Morally Permissible (2007).
Bagaric and Clarke (2004, 596) argue that both deontological and consequentialist logic sup-
port the use of torture, but that only the latter can provide guidance on the right justifying circum-
stances. They add that “only consequentialist theories, however, that provide a logical framework
within which it is possible to demarcate the circumstances in which torture is permissible.”15 They
are generally dismissive of deontological ethical theories for that reason, and also because for
them, “the concept of non-consequentialist rights is vacuous at the epistemological level.”16 In-
stead they choose the “most cogent” of the consequentialist theories, which is “hedonistic act util-
itarianism.”17 They acknowledge that utilitarianism has been criticized for failing to “safeguard
fundamental individual interests,” and thus may lead to “horrendous outcomes” (605).
In part, they respond that such situations rarely arise in real life (Bagaric and Clarke, 2004,
606). Their preferred response, however, combines an appeal to a sort of realism with a reassertion
of utilitarian logic. Life, it seems, forces people into tough choices, and utilitarianism at least
provides a basis for judging that is not vacuous.18 Bagaric and Clarke (2004, 608) are satisfied
15See Bagaric and Clarke (2004, 596-97). Another way to put this is that consequentialism provides good tools for
justifying torture.
16The authors use “deontological” and “non-consequentialist” interchangeably. See Bagaric and Clarke (2004, 602)
for their judgment of deontological ethics. However, although they prefer utilitarianism, they do briefly introduce the
idea of a pro-torture deontological argument based on self-defense rights. Uwe Steinhoff (2013) develop that idea
much more extensively (see section 2.4.1 below).
17They describe this as a theory in which “the morally right action is that which produces the greatest amount of
happiness or pleasure and the least amount of pain or unhappiness” (Bagaric and Clarke, 2004, 605).
18The specific people that Bagaric and Clarke (2004, 581) intend to address are not specified. However, both teach
in Melbourne Australia at the Deakin Law School , the article appears in the University of San Francisco Law Review,
and they open by noting concerns about torture of people the U.S. suspects of terrorism (582). Regarding tough
choices, Dershowitz (2002, 132) describes making his law students “choose among evils.” When they object, he says,
“I force them back onto the rails of my hypothetical dilemma.” (133). The assumption, though, is that real life will
generate unavoidable choices among evils. Utilitarianism, of course, positions itself as the ideal way to decide in such
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that “at least the level of harm has been minimized.” They argue that the “decisions we do actually
make in a real life crisis are the best evidence” of the values behind hard decisions (608). In a
crisis, “we do take the utilitarian option,” and “it is felt that this is the option we should take.”19
Satisfied that utilitarianism is the correct approach, Bagaric and Clarke argue confidently for the
moral permissibility—even the requirement—of torture when certain conditions are met, and they
offer a mathematical formula for assessing its permissibility. For utilitarians, the permissibility
of torture is enhanced by factors such as reliably knowing the person to be tortured is guilty, the
number of lives expected to be lost in the calamity, and knowing that the person possesses the
calamity-averting information. The permissibility of torture is reduced when the amount of time
available for averting the calamity is large, and the when other means are available for averting
it.20
When the conditions meet a sufficient threshold, Bagaric and Clarke argue that torture is not
only morally permissible, it is morally required. In fact, they characterize “life-saving torture”
as a “humane practice,” because it minimizes harm (Bagaric and Clarke, 2007, 49). Stubborn
advocates of the lone suspect’s interests do not give sufficient weight to the threatened multitude,
and are derided for their “moral nihilism” (50). The authors wonder what such narrow-minded
torture opponents could offer to the relatives of those who die in a preventable calamities: “A copy
of the Convention against Torture, even if framed, would surely not suffice” (70).
2.1.3 Responses within Utilitarianism
Those who agree with Bagaric and Clarke that hedonistic act utilitarianism is the right approach
to making moral judgments, and with their other assumptions about the suspect and the looming
adverse event, will likewise share their enormous confidence that torture is morally justified.21
conditions.
19They add that the “view that punishing the innocent and torturing individuals is the morally correct action in some
circumstances is consistent with and accords with the decisions we as individuals and societies as a whole readily have
made and continue to make when faced with extreme and desperate circumstances” (Bagaric and Clarke, 2004, 605).
20The formula and its explanation appear in Bagaric and Clarke (2004, 613f.) and Bagaric and Clarke (2007, 38f.)
21Recall that hedonistic act utilitarianism is “the morally right action is that which produces the greatest amount of
happiness or pleasure and the least amount of pain or unhappiness” (Bagaric and Clarke, 2004, 605). Those pleasures
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Indeed, utilitarianism strives to clearly demonstrate the relative value of courses of action, so that
the better choice is apparent to anyone who can “do the math.”22 With torture, though, every
component of the equation is contested: the probability and severity of the expected calamity,
whether the suspect has knowledge, whether the torture will elicit the information, and more.23
Jean Maria Arrigo recognizes that utilitarian thinking is strong among security elites who will
not be responsive to torture prohibitions that depend on deontological principles, especially when
those elites are facing existential threats. She considers four models of information production that
could be at work in a torture interrogation and finds their outputs much more ambiguous than the
confident utilitarian torture supporters have acknowledged (Arrigo, 2004, 562-63). In other words,
“the actual causal mechanism of torture interrogation in curtailing terrorism must be elucidated
by utilitarian advocates rather than simply presumed.” (563, emphasis in original).
Arrigo wants them to show, in other words, that torture produces the necessary information
and that the information curtails terrorism. Good data about how effectively torture extracts life-
saving information, however, is very hard to come by.24 In order to judge the effectiveness of
torture without access to empirical data, John W. Schiemann (2012, 3) developed a formal model
directly from arguments of Dershowitz and Bagaric and Clarke. As a game theorist, Schiemann
can, nevertheless, account for an important empirical condition: uncertainty. The interrogator does
not know if the suspect has information, and the suspect does not know if the torturer will stop
when the information is provided.25 In the conditions for justifiable torture specified by utilitarian
and happiness do not need to be of a base nature, so hedonism here does not necessarily mean self-indulgence or
debauchery.
22The imperative “You do the math” comes from Uwe Steinhoff (2013, 52).
23In the discussion of Dershowitz, I mentioned how the CIA badly overestimated the information Abu Zubaydah
was believed to be withholding. See especially SSCI (2014).
24I am not suggesting that no data at all exists, but that it is very hard to come by in the current torture debate. The
concepts are unclear and contested, and certainly not operationalized as variables. When effectiveness does become
an issue in the torture debate, it is very often as something to be explained, rather than an explanation. In her study of
judicial torture in early modern France, Lisa Silverman treats effectiveness this way (2001, 89-90), even with access
to far better records than can be expected out of the U.S. interrogation program in the foreseeable future.
25The interrogator also does not know whether the suspect who provides information still has more, and is resisting
(Schiemann, 2012, 5). More precisely, Schiemann’s analytical model employs three moments of uncertainty. The
detainee may be strong, weak, or innocent (possessing no information), the interrogator may be pragmatic or sadistic
(not stopping after receiving information), and the detainee may provide information or not provide information (5-6).
In addition, the interrogator may ask leading or open-ended questions (6-7).
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theorists, Schiemann (2012, 15) finds that that innocent detainees who possess no information, and
detainees who have information but provide all of it, will both be tortured—and that even then the
valuable information that is sometimes produced will be mixed with worthless information. His
conclusions challenge the necessary assumptions of effectiveness that Dershowitz (2002, 137) and
Bagaric and Clarke (2007, ch. 6) use to support their utilitarian justifications of torture.26
These works show that contradictory conclusions about torture ethics can reasonably arise en-
tirely within a single normative tradition. Though all the authors employ utilitarian reasoning,
they differ on other important assumptions in ways that have no apparent resolution. Bagaric and
Clarke (2005, 708) dismissed early critics by arguing that “perfect knowledge as a precondition”
for torturing a suspect is an unreasonably and even ridiculously high bar. They argue that the in-
stances of torture condemned by their critics are not consistent with the sort they have justified,
and castigate their “non-responsive” critics for “intellectual sloppiness” and misrepresentation for
questioning their assumptions.27 Schiemann explicitly builds his formal model around exactly
those assumptions, and finds that the “outcome predicted by the pragmatic defenders of interro-
gational torture—valuable information extracted by (the threat of) torture from a knowledgeable
detainee but no torture to innocent detainees—does not occur in equilibrium” (Schiemann, 2012,
15, emphasis added). If torture is justified by utility, it would have to be on the basis of the
less-productive equilibrium outcomes that can actually occur. In Schiemann’s model, only one of
those outcomes produces any valuable information, but “the conditions supporting it are empiri-
cally unlikely” (15). Remarkably, Bagaric and Clarke (2005, 706) concede that the “circumstances
in which lifesaving torture are justifiable will occur infrequently—perhaps never.” They persist
not out of concern for the actual torture that has spurred the contemporary debate, but because
the “supposed ban on torture highlights much that is wrong with contemporary moral thinking,”
namely what they believe is an overly-narrow focus on the rights of the suspect (706).
26A different formal analysis from Wantchekon and Healy (1999) suggests a problem with escalation that might also
affect the outcome. See Mialon et al. (2012) for another model suggesting that torture may displace other important
security measures, thereby reducing security.
27“To our knowledge, no incidents of torture that have been committed would fall within our criteria.” (Bagaric and
Clarke, 2005, 704, emphasis added)
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Despite the persuasive analysis by Schiemann, the utilitarian arguments of Dershowitz and
Bagaric and Clarke remain important in the current torture debate.28 They can still argue that under
the conditions they specify, and according to the normative framework they have adopted, torture
is justified. Schiemann’s analysis shows that their presumed conditions are dubious and their
justifying outcome is impossible, but perhaps only for those who can pay the steep acquisition
price for understanding his game-theoretic analysis. Bagaric and Clarke can maintain that their
critics misunderstand things about utilitarianism, the world, and the details of their proposal. The
normative controversy about the right way do utilitarianism, and the epistemological controversy
about the assumed inputs and outputs of utilitarian torture, are both likely to continue. Ethical
judgments about torture are thus quite idiosyncratic even within the confines of utilitarianism, and
Arrigo’s strategy of challenging utilitarian justifications for torture on utilitarian terms is not the
only approach. When other normative traditions are introduced, the problem of incommensurable
approaches to torture ethics multiplies.
2.1.4 Beccaria: Utilitarian Disagreement across Time
Today’s utilitarians disagree about the way utilitarian judgments should work, which is a question
of normative theory, and they disagree about important facts of the situation. They also disagree
early modern utilitarians who first helped assert individual rights against traditional political pow-
ers. Cesare Beccaria (1995), a political economist, originally published the legal manifesto On
Crimes and Punishments in 1764.29 His opposition to torture fits within a larger project of ratio-
nalizing criminal law, which lagged behind the political and economic “progress we owe to this
enlightened century” (8). Beccaria understood sovereign authority in utilitarian terms that limit
the right to punish (10). Individuals need society but will only give up the minimum amount of
freedom needed to form it. “The sum of these smallest portions constitutes the right to punish;
everything more than that is no longer justice, but abuse” (11). Punishment is for “nothing other
28See also Mialon et al. (2012) for additional challenges to the view that torture can increase utility.
29His first publication was On the Monetary Disorders and their Remedies in the State of Milan in 1762 (Beccaria,
1995, xiii) and his collected papers were published as Elements of Political Economy (xv).
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than to prevent the offender from doing fresh harm to his fellows and to deter others from doing
likewise” (31).
Torture that occurs during judicial processes does not deter. It establishes guilt through the
use of punishment, of the innocent as well as the guilty. That cannot be appropriate for utilitarian
justice, which depends on a precise relationship between crime and punishment. Like Arrigo and
Schiemann, Beccaria casts doubt on torture’s ability to generate truth.30 Torture measures strength
and weakness, not guilt or innocence: the “hardy fellow” will be acquitted and the “feeble fellow”
will be convicted. (Beccaria, 1995, 43) What Beccaria emphasizes more than current utilitarians is
the relationship at the heart of utilitarian ethics. Specifically, its reciprocal character: “whilst every
individual is bound to society, society is likewise bound to every individual member of it by a pact
which, by its very nature, places obligations on both parties” (12). Beccaria does not anticipate the
sort of imminent future crime, perpetrated by a captive, that drives the ticking bomb case. That does
not rebut his concern about the capacity of torture to produce truth, though. Nor does it dismiss
his concern that arbitrary and excessive punishments will destroy social bonds. Beccaria remains
relevant today because parts of his argument endure, and more importantly through contemporary
appropriations of his work that highlight the social theory behind it (see section 3.3.1).
2.2 Torture and Deontology
Dershowitz (2002, 134) noted, perhaps with rose-colored historical glasses, that before 2001 “no
one thought the issue of torture would reemerge,” but by 2004 the United States was fighting ter-
rorist threats and two large wars. It was no longer torture that provoked outrage, but rather any
suggestion of restraint in the prevention of terrorist attacks against the U.S., or finding “the big
piece of intel that would save American and Iraqi lives” in the Iraq war (Lagouranis, 2007, 29). As
prominent utilitarian arguments in favor of counter-terrorist torture emerged in 2002 and intensi-
30The current debate focuses largely on torture that is intended to elicit information from suspected terrorists. The
early modern debate focused on judicial torture intended to produce true testimony in trials. Truth and life-saving
intelligence thus play analogous roles in the forms of information-seeking that characterize different types of torture.
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fied after Abu Ghraib in 2004, some scholars like Arrigo disputed those views in utilitarian terms.
Recall that consequentialist thought, which includes utilitarianism, judges courses of action solely
based on the outcomes or consequences they are expected to produce. Bagaric and Clarke (2004,
605) espouse hedonistic act utilitarianism, in which “the morally right action is that which pro-
duces the greatest amount of happiness or pleasure and the least amount of pain or unhappiness.”
Happiness, measured in pain and pleasure, is the relevant consequence.
Not everyone was moved to adopt utilitarian ethics, either as strategy or because of a perceived
fundamental change in circumstances after 2001. The dominant alternative to consequentialism,31
in ethics generally and particularly with respect to the contemporary torture debate, has been deon-
tological or nonconsequentialist ethics. Very generally, scholars using deontological theories find
the ethics of torture in the act itself, rather than its expected consequences.32 Indeed, torture had
been outlawed using the language of rights, not consequences.33 After 2001, however, public and
policy attention shifted sharply away from rights and toward security. Jeremy Waldron remarks
the strange solitude he experienced when he undertook a defense of the torture prohibition at a
time when the purported “new reality” of 21st-Century wars led other scholars of reputation and
rank to line up—however regrettably—on the side of torture.34 Waldron and others thus found it
necessary to re-articulate, update, and improve their principled objections to torture.
31Other alternative normative approaches that will eventually bear on the torture debate include virtue ethics (Gor-
don, 2014) and those that draw on Continental philosophy (e.g. Butler, 2005; Critchley, 2009, 2012).
32I am not being overly precise here for several reasons. First, there are varieties and disagreements within de-
ontological ethics, just as with utilitarian ethics. Second, although the competition between consequentialism and
deontology has been very important in normative ethics, “in the course of time the line between these two traditions
has become increasingly blurry” (LaFollette and Persson, 2013, 7). This is visibly demonstrated by the “threshold
deontology” approaches of (Kramer, 2014) and Steinhoff (2013) considered below. Third, not every scholar who en-
gages torture ethics fully specifies their ethical framework—in fact, most do not. Finally, this dissertation is heading
toward a critique that emphasizes just how varied and individualized ethical approaches to torture are, and abandons
the project of picking a winner among them in favor of a different approach. In other words, efforts to precisely specify
ethical frameworks are one of the mechanisms by which the particular Hydra of torture ethics grows new heads.
33The United Nations Convention Against Torture (1984, emphasis added) refers to “the principles proclaimed in
the Charter of the United Nations,” the “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,” and “the
inherent dignity of the human person,” but not to consequences or happiness .
34Waldron (2010, 7-10). Jean Bethke Eshtain supports torture in some circumstances, but regrets it (cited in Wal-
dron, 2010, 8).
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2.2.1 David Luban’s Liberal Theory of Torture
David Luban (2005, 1430) zeros in on the puzzling failure of many American liberals to oppose
torture, which “is a microcosm, raised to the highest level of intensity, of the tyrannical political
relationships that liberalism hates the most.” To understand the problem, he develops a “liberal
ideology of torture” that allows liberals to believe torture should be permitted (1427), and proceeds
to show that the liberal approach to torture is not a valid justification but a “dangerous delusion”
(1461).
Luban argues that “putting cruelty first” is an important component of liberalism, and he iden-
tifies four categories of torture that liberals easily rule out.35 These are torture in conflict for the
purpose of “victor’s pleasure,” political torture for the purpose of “terrorizing people into sub-
mission,” torture for the purpose of punishment, and torture for “extracting confessions” (Luban,
2005, 1432-35). Luban argues that liberals are susceptible to the fifth purpose of torture, intelli-
gence gathering. Luban argues that “liberalism’s insistence on limited governments that exercise
their power only for instrumental and pragmatic purposes” at least appears to be compatible with
torture (1436). Liberalism is a complex political philosophy, not a precise ethical framework.
Some of its features, like the abhorrence of cruelty Luban notes, are overtly incompatible with
torture. Yet other features of liberalism have some affinity with the same utilitarian thinking that
underlies the arguments of Dershowitz and Bagaric and Clarke. Eventually, “it will dawn on reluc-
tant liberals that the torturer’s goal of forestalling greater evils is one that liberals share” (1439).
Putting torture in the context of intelligence gathering “transforms and rationalizes the motivation
for torture,” and allows liberals “to think of torture dissociated from cruelty” (1436). Thus even
though liberals have good reasons to oppose torture, they can come to see it as “almost heroic”
(1436). Luban’s “liberal ideology of torture” features torture for intelligence purposes, a looming
catastrophe, and the liberal rationality that provides a point of compatibility with the torturers.36
35Luban (2005, 1428-29). “Putting Cruelty First” is title of the essay in which Judith Shklar (1982) introduces that
idea.
36To clarify, what matters for the liberal theory of torture is its compatibility with the utilitarian defenders of torture,
though Luban does not put it in those terms.
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Luban (2005, 1440) argues that “liberal ideology will crystallize all of these ideas in a sin-
gle, mesmerizing example: the ticking bomb,” that Dershowitz and Bagaric dutifully employ.37
The function of the ticking bomb example is “to force the liberal prohibitionist to admit that yes,
even he or she would agree to torture in at least this one situation,” after which “all that is left is
haggling about the price” (1440). The ticking bomb also ennobles the torturer, who becomes a
“conscientious public servant,” and thus “clinches the divorce between torture and cruelty” (1441).
The ticking bomb scenario is much contested in the torture debate, but Luban doesn’t find the
scenario plausible. Elaborating on an example that Dershowitz (2002, 137) offers as successful
torture in a ticking bomb case, Luban (2005, 1442) notes that the Philippine authorities tortured
the suspect “for weeks, during which time they didn’t know about any specific al Qaeda plot.”
Just as a minority of utilitarians do, Luban questions the empirical plausibility of the ticking bomb
scenario (1442-43). Any assumption that those conditions are commonly-found begins to raise
larger questions about threat and security. When “all military threats and adversaries that menace
American civilians” are considered to be ticking bombs, the concept is considerably weakened
(1443). Therefore, the ticking bomb scenario “should not for the point of reference” in judging the
morality of torture (1444).
Utilitarians and threshold deontologists can respond that Luban has conceded their point.38 If
there really is a ticking bomb scenario, Luban’s empirical objection would not apply. The possibil-
ity of such scenarios, not their probability, satisfies them. Luban (2005, 1446) is left with his social
objection to “the normalization of torture” and the “moral corruption” that comes with it. Note the
difficulty of comparing utilitarian ethics directly to deontological ethics. The “moral corruption”
and “cruelty” that anguish Luban leave the utilitarian unmoved, or even puzzled. Utilitarians think
it is cruel to let thousands of innocents die to protect an evil person from temporary pain. Luban
argues that torture does not produce life-saving truths and entails high social costs. The moral and
37See Dershowitz (2002, 142ff.), Bagaric and Clarke (2007, 583f.), and Bagaric and Clarke (2007, 2f.).
38Pro-torture threshold deontologists like Uwe Steinhoff (2006; 2013) also make this objection. Theoretically, they
cross the threshold because some imminent calamity obviates the principle in question, not to maximize the average
net utility. However, neither the threshold nor the utility can be located with much precision. Ticking bombs lead to
calculations that do not need to be sweated over with pencil & paper.
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legal prohibition of torture should therefore remain in place. Both camps claim the moral high
ground. Neither can answer for the chasm in between.
2.2.2 Oren Gross and Henry Shue Haggle over the Price
Not every deontological approach leads to anti-torture conclusions. As with utilitarianism, it takes
a more detailed set of normative, metaethical, and epistemological assumptions to support a moral
judgment. Oren Gross (2004, 229) recognizes that deontologists and some utilitarians may express
“absolute” opposition to torture. Gross appears to oppose torture, but he is troubled by the poor
quality of the discussion surrounding it. The “absolutist point of view does not accept the permis-
sibility or the usefulness of talking about the possibility of using torture,” in any circumstances
(230). Supporters of an absolute ban on torture have little room for discussion with supporters of
a “conditional ban approach,” who think torture should be banned except in certain circumstances
(231). Gross takes an intermediate position between “absolutists” and “conditionalists.” His pro-
posal keeps the absolute legal ban, but allows for “official disobedience” in extreme cases (231).
These officials might face legal consequences, or they might be “legally (if not morally) excused
ex post” (231).
This is counterintuitive. Gross (2004, 231) argues that “the prospect of extralegal action sup-
ports and strengthens the possibility of formulating (and maintaining) an absolute ban on torture.”
He finds the absolute legal ban desirable, but also impractical and theoretically vulnerable (233).
Gross supports official disobedience of the torture ban as a pragmatic concession in catastrophic
cases. Like Dershowitz, Gross is worries that torture will find its way from extreme cases to ordi-
nary ones. Dershowitz wants to stop that possibility through the legal mechanism of torture war-
rants, but Gross (2004, 240) thinks such official mechanisms are “extremely dangerous” because
they are subject to abuse.39 The official disobedience approach limits torture to real catastrophic
cases through the prudential judgment of public officials, who anticipate the eventual moral and
39Kramer will note that the mechanisms of state violence are already in place. Since state violence is already
institutionalized, the specifics of the rules do not really change the danger.
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legal judgment of their communities.
In Gross’s approach, public officials become tragic heroes who violate law to protect their law-
abiding people. Then they face the possibility of judgment. In light of the past decade, this view
looks somewhat naive. Public officials may have accepted or even sought the role of hero, but they
have eschewed tragedy. They took Hard Measures like those described by former CIA clandestine
service chief Jose Rodriguez (2012), but deny that they broke the law.40 Gross could bolster his
argument by showing in more detail how having the option of official disobedience supports the
legal ban, since it appears to simply do away with it.
Despite its problems, Gross’s argument remains important. By pulling back from “absolute”
opposition, at least in exceptional circumstances, he prefigures the more recent direction of the
debate. That is, he advocates a threshold deontologist account in practice, if not in name. Thresh-
old deontologists make moral judgments on principled constraints rather than consequences,41 but
believe that no principled stand is worth a cataclysmic sacrifice for threshold deontologists.42 The
concession that disasters might trump principles is what make’s Gross’s outlook tragic. As Gross
construes it, this concession might give away more than he hopes. He accepts several assump-
tions of the consequentialist argument, including the concrete reality of the looming calamity and
torture’s ability to avert it. He also views deontological torture opponents as unreasonable, out
of touch. The term “absolutist” will soon devolve into a slur for Steinhoff (2013), or a badge for
Wisnewski (2010, 3), but it clearly divides the debate into disparate camps.
Although Gross tries to chart a middle path between utilitarian support for torture and abso-
40Bush administration officials generally insist on two things about their counter-terrorist interrogation program.
First, they deny that the techniques, including waterboarding, constitute torture. Second, they emphasize their belief
that the techniques produced valuable intelligence. This is apparent from Norah O’Donnell’s April 2009 interview with
Liz Cheney (O’Donnell, 2009a,b). The remarks of Jose Rodriguez, the former Director of the National Clandestine
Service of the CIA, to the American Enterprise Institute in 2013 show the same pattern. Speaking about the film Zero
Dark Thirty, Rodriguez said “I did not like the fact that it made a false link between torture and intelligence successes,
because I also think that torture does not work. And our program worked because it was not torture” (Thiessen, 2013).
Contrast with Gross’s (2003, 1522) presumption that public officials will “consider the possibility of acting outside
the legal order while openly acknowledging their actions and the extralegal nature of such actions.”
41Two more threshold deontologists are considered shortly: Uwe Steinhoff (2006; 2013) and Matthew H. Kramer
(2014).
42“If constraints may sometimes be permissibly transgressed to produce a sufficiently great good, there will be a
threshold to their applicability. This yields what is called ’threshold deontology.”’ (LaFollette and Persson, 2013, 263)
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lute deontological opposition, his concessions to the former are decisive. In his best case, public
officials engage in disobedient torture when they decide circumstances are extraordinary, and then
expose themselves to public and legal consequences. In theory, those consequences restrain the
prudential reasoning of those faced with making decisions about whether or not to use torture. In
practice, officials are keen to avoid such restraints. Much hangs on the judgment of the public
officials and the response of the public.43
Unlike most others, Henry Shue has written in two different eras of the torture ethics debate. In
his article “Torture,” Shue (1978) wonders if torture can still be justified amidst widespread moral
and legal constraints.44 The continued practice of torture, as revealed by groups like Amnesty
International prompts his question.45 Shue seeks to identify the badness of torture with greater
precision than it had been previously. One thing that makes that task difficult is that some things
appear to be obviously worse than torture, and yet they are sometimes permitted. For example, tor-
ture can be compared to justified forms of killing.46 Shue proposes that since killing is sometimes
justified, and most torture is not worse than killing, some justified torture is plausible.47 Shue
deflects the proposal in part by noting that there is more to morality than “the amount of harm
done” (126). He then inquires into whether “torture is sometimes justified, provided that it meets
whichever standards are satisfied by just-combat killing” (126).
43Public officials have some influence on when extraordinary circumstances require unusual action. In the parlance
of the Copenhagen school in International Relations, fighting terrorism allows public officials to “securitize” interro-
gation rules, meaning to place them beyond the reach of normal political action. Securitization theory is generally
a social constructivist approach, in which states of affairs are determined by what people say. However, Michael C.
Williams (2003) shows how securitization melds social constructivist with Realist thought. Gross’s thinking that the
threat really exists, and the public official decides when, is not inconsistent in that light. Such a view, however, puts
great emphasis on the interplay between official claims of extraordinary circumstances and the public reception of
those claims. Gross believes that “the need to obtain ex post ratification from the public” will generate risk for public
official—and therefore prudent reflection. If he is wrong about the need or its effects, public officials will simply be
outside the law.
44The only present-day strictures that were not yet in place in 1978 are the Convention Against Torture (1984) and
the country-level laws that CAT signatories were obliged to pass.
45Shue (1978, 124) cites a 1975 Amnesty report. As Rejali (2007) documents at great length, torture did not
disappear between 1978 and 2007.
46Steinhoff (2013, 18ff.) goes to the greatest lengths, in this regard.
47See Shue (1978, 125-26). Of course, even though it comes up uncontroversially in the torture debate, pacifists
reject the premise of justified killing. Others too might have more to say about the scope and meaning of justification
when it comes to killing. Kramer (2014), below, stands out within the torture debate for his nuanced handling of
competing moral obligations.
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Shue (1978, 127) seeks the “proper conduct of the killing of other people” in the jus in bello
part of the laws of war.48 The laws of war distinguish between good and bad killing based in part
on who is engaging in combat and who is not. Generalizing from the principle of noncombatant
immunity, Shue argues that defenselessness distinguishes bad killing (129). Killing the defenseless
is unfair because they do not have “a reasonable chance to survive by killing instead.”49 Torture
is the continuation of a fight by one party after it is over for the other, and thus “a cruel assault
upon the defenseless” (130). For Shue, this means that torture fails the standard applied to justified
combat killing.
Shue (1978, 130) then considers whether a captive person could be carrying on the fight by
more abstract means. Torturers often want “something beyond the initial surrender” (130). This
does not quite make torture a fair fight, but theoretically this kind of torture is subject to captive’s
actions. This is “constrained” torture in which “the victim of torture must have available an act
of compliance which, if performed, will end the torture” (130). Shue is not persuaded that even
torture constrained in this way can be just. What he calls “terroristic torture” is designed to in-
timidate others, and therefore “there is no particular reason not to make the suffering as great and
as extended as possible” (132).50 Since there is no end to what the torturer may want, this torture
is not constrained and does not give the captive a real chance to end the treatment by complying.
Shue concedes that “interrogational torture” has a “built-in end point” (133). “A pure case of inter-
rogational torture, then, appears able to satisfy the constraint of possible compliance,” so it might
48Jus in bello indicates right conduct in war, and is one of three categories of concerns in the just war tradition; jus
ad bellum concerns the criteria for going to (a just) war, and jus post bello deals with right conduct after a conflict
(Johnson and Patterson, 2015, 1).
49See Shue (1978, 129). I am elaborating Shue’s reasoning, though this point faces some challenges. In some
cases, presumably just combat killings certainly appear to afflict defenseless people. Can an infantry soldier defend
against aerial bombing? And torture victims need not be completely defenseless. Steinhoff (2013, 7-8) imagines a
torture scenario involving a robber with a special pain-inducing device that he uses against an armed jeweler. Appiah
(2008, 197f.) and Pincoffs (1971) warn that employing such scenarios reduces ethics to problem solving. More
realistically, an interrogator might work in wartime conditions where the scene is poorly controlled and where even a
captive enemy still presents some danger. The defenselessness principle also faces criticism from Sjoberg (2006) and
Carpenter (2005) for the uneven ways that noncombatant immunity affects people. In general, I am content to let the
works reviewed here attack each other on this point. My broader point remains that it will be difficult to definitively
choose between them.
50See Shue (1978, 132). Shue’s focus on terroristic torture, practiced for “general intimidation of others, or deter-
rence of dissent,” as the dominant type is a sign of the era that no longer fits today (131). After 2001, emphasis in the
torture debate shifts back to interrogation.
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be justified (134). Shue is still circumspect due to two further concerns. First, the empirical con-
ditions of torture are unlikely to meet his description of “constrained torture.”51 Secondly, Shue
(1978, 135-36) notes that compliance might require self-betrayal, or the betrayal of comrades or a
cause. This undercuts the captive’s ability to choose escape through compliance .
Generally speaking, Shue comes down against torture for these reasons. However, he notes
that his argument from defenselessness is “not the only, or even in all cases the overriding, moral
consideration” (Shue, 1978, 137). In the case of terroristic torture, he finds it implausible that
any “morally good” and “supremely important” purpose would arise that torture was the “least
harmful means” of fulfilling (137). He also finds ideal cases of interrogational very implausible.
Significantly, however, he does find them imaginable (141). In other words, he can imagine the
ticking bomb scenario. And he “can see no way to deny the permissibility of torture in a case just
like this” (141, emphasis in original).
What Shue could probably not have imagined was how radically his concession would be
exploited two decades later. It is a core assumption of nearly every torture justification that no one
would deny that torture is justifiable when the only other option is some enormous harm. Even
deontologists must admit this, lest they be considered moral monsters. Throughout his essay, Shue
sounds more skeptical than Gross about the plausibility of justified torture. Yet in the ticking bomb
case, Shue’s 1978 argument leads to the same conclusion as Gross and the utilitarians. They only
differ in the fine print—where, as Luban puts it, they are haggling over the price.
By 2005 the ticking bomb argument had been thoroughly exploited in torture justifications,
and Shue sought to clarify his argument. Even in 1978, Shue found cases that were “just like” the
ticking bomb enough to justify torture were implausible: “Notice how unlike the circumstances of
an actual choice about torture the philosopher’s example is” (Shue, 1978, 142). Shue did not then
think that real situations would satisfy his assumptions about the victim’s guilt and knowledge, the
predicted calamitous effects of his action, or the clinical conditions specified for justifiable torture
(142). Thus Shue (2005, 232) sees his more pointed later essay “Torture in Dreamland: Disposing
51See Shue (1978, 134-35). Schiemann’s (2012) game-theory analysis makes this point more emphatically.
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of the Ticking Bomb” as a re-statement rather than a change of view.
This more recent essay now states that all torture is inexcusable, and that the ticking bomb
examples “mislead in two different ways that compound the error: idealization and abstraction”
(Shue, 2005, 231). Shue attacks some prominent “idealized” features of the ticking bomb scenario,
including the presumption of having “the right man” who certainly has life-saving information, the
belief that clear and useful information will be quickly obtained through torture, and that the use
of torture will remain “rare and isolated” rather than systemic (233). Shue (2005, 234) now states
emphatically although the high stakes of the ticking bomb scenario are realistic, its “other features
are all too good to be true, especially to be true in conjunction: the right man and the prompt right
result and the judicious decision to refrain from all further torture until the next genuine catastrophe
looms.”
Shue turns the improbability of the ticking-bomb assumptions into an attack on balanced or
reasonable positions on torture, like Gross’s. “The moderate position on torture is an impractical
abstraction—it is torture in dreamland” (Shue, 2005, 237). This statement captures normatively
what Schiemann (2012) found through his formal model. An outcome in which torture produces
some valuable information is “possible, but the conditions supporting it are empirically unlikely”
(15). Even then, “interrogational torture fails to satisfy the necessary reliability condition” (15).
These inefficiencies give torturers incentives to intensify the torture (16). Shue intuitively reasons
his way to a similar conclusion that moderate, useful, limited torture is a fantasy sustained by the
imagery of the ticking bomb scenario. Shue can still be described as a threshold deontologist.52
He is willing to consider compromising his principled opposition to torture in the face of real
catastrophic consequences. However, in 1978 and again more explicitly in 2005, he argues that the
conditions that would make torture justified are patently implausible, existing only in “dreamland.”
For others, it is enough that the conditions could exist.53 Once again, the permissibility of torture
hangs on sharp differences on a related question.
52Neither Shue nor Gross use the term “threshold deontology,” though. Gross (2003, 1488) discusses thresholds,
but only in the context of the boundary between bad treatment and torture.
53Especially Steinhoff (2013).
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2.2.3 Sussman and Self-Betrayal
David Sussman’s principal contribution to the torture debate is his thorough development of the
concept of betrayal. Where Henry Shue talks about betrayal, his main concern is that it cuts off
the tortured person’s possibility of giving the torturer desired information. That analog for escape
might have made torture justified in rare circumstances by making it similar to combat killing.
Shue (1978, 135-36) does not consider betrayal of a true cause to be a real equivalent of escape.
He argues that “betrayal is no escape for a dedicated member” of a group for whom complying
with the torturer would mean “denying his or her highest values” (136). Sussman has a much
deeper concept of betrayal in mind.
Sussman recognizes that after 2001, concerns about terrorism raise the question of torture’s
moral status in a fresh way.54 Like many in the current torture debate, he is primarily concerned
with interrogation: torture as “the sort of violence that can be permissible as part of the prosecution
of a just war or legitimate police action” (Sussman, 2005b, 3). Sussman’s account of what makes
torture a “distinctive kind of wrong” centers on the claim that “torture forces its victim into the
position of colluding against himself through his own affects and emotions, so that he experiences
himself as simultaneously powerless and yet actively complicit in his own violation” (3-4). This
torture as “forced self-betrayal” exceeds, as a concept, the betrayal of comrades or values that Shue
discussed (4).
More than the others, Sussman brings the connection between what torture is and what is
(or isn’t) wrong about it to the surface. In other words, self-betrayal is both what’s wrong with
torture and what makes it different from other kinds of violence. Torture involves the “intentional
infliction of great pain,” but also “a distinctive kind of social setting” (Sussman, 2005b, 6). There
is an almost total asymmetry between the torturer and the tortured, who are “completely at the
mercy of their tormentors” (6). That asymmetrical relationship creates “the experience of a kind of
forced passivity in a context of urgent need” (2005a, 227). In addition to the infliction of intense
pain and the asymmetrical social setting, both the torturer and victim have some awareness of their
54He also mentions kidnapping, a central concern of Steinhoff (2013).
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respective positions (2005b, 6). This mutual recognition sets up a kind of give and take that is,
nevertheless, predetermined by the power asymmetry. Therein lies room for the betrayal.
To help describe what he means by betrayal, Sussman (2005b, 9) places torture in the middle of
a continuum between coercion and brainwashing. He characterizes coercion as “hard bargaining
by means of threats,” while brainwashing does not “appeal to its victim’s rational judgment at all.”
Therefore, coercion involves an overt contest of wills, while brainwashing involves the substitution
of the other’s will for one’s own (10). This distinction has some drawbacks, but it does help
illuminate why torture forces a betrayal.55 Sussman argues that “in torture the victim must confront
his own feelings as a problem, as something he must respond to, where this response is something
for which he may see himself to be in some way accountable” (10). Thus the betrayal Sussman is
talking about exceeds any simple kind of giving in to pressure. Instead, the tortured person reflects
on a “dilemma about submission or resistance” in which they become an active participant (2005b,
10). And the dilemma may become deep and unavoidable, because the torture is able to create
“something like the opposite of life” for the victim, and then sustain that condition (2005a, 230).
Sussman’s argumentation is at times overdrawn. The asymmetry of the relationship is “abso-
lute,” and the victim cannot even “orient himself” in the world (Sussman, 2005a, 228). However,
that does not undermine his finding that the badness of torture is somehow attached to the “forced
self-betrayal” in which the victim winds up “colluding against himself” (2005b, 4). While Stein-
hoff (2013) will make much of Sussman’s excesses, Kramer (2014) will salvage the concept of
betrayal as a central feature of his more sophisticated account. Unlike nearly everyone discussed
so far, Sussman breaks out of the calculations of relative harm that constrain both utilitarian and
(proto-) threshold deontological accounts. Sussman describes the harm suffered by the tortured
person, not in a gratuitous or graphic way, but in a way that gets at what is really loathsome about
55Without a doubt, this is a troublesome distinction, especially in the not-uncommon event that the tortured person
does not really have the information that the interrogator is certain they have. In such cases, it is impossible to make
sense of a “contest of wills,” because the will of the tortured person has been profoundly misunderstood. Coercion
could thus collapse into brainwashing, as the tortured person tries to work out some way to stop their treatment. Both
Slahi (2015) and Asadi (2011) describe their efforts to come up with stories—false to them—that would satisfy their
torturers.
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it.56 Torture uses the materiality of the body to force painfully-considered self-betraying acts by
its victims. Sussman’s description of torture therefore casts some doubt on the magnitude of neg-
ative value that attaches to torturing the victim. In both the utilitarian and threshold deontological
arguments for torture, the quantity of harm to the victim is considered small in comparison with
the calamity to be prevented. By elaborating the quality of the harm to the tortured person—and its
central feature of self-betrayal—Sussman’s work suggests that the quantity of harm must be more
thoroughly considered in the calculations that purport to justify torture.
2.2.4 Waldron: Torture as Legal Archetype
Jeremy Waldron stands apart from the other participants in the torture debate for the scope of his
engagement. The essays collected in Terror, Torture and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White
House (2010) cover torture and several related issues: the security/liberty opposition, terrorism,
the right to security, torture and theology, and international law. Two of the essays, “Torture and
Positive Law” and “Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment: the Words Themselves” deal most
directly with the definition and moral status of torture. Waldron deserves praise for addressing
torture as part of a comprehensive political and ethical vision. Unless that comprehensive view is
widely shared, however, his torture ethics encounter similar difficulties as those already considered:
others may adopt alternative and even incompatible moral visions. Still, Waldron deserves mention
for his novel “legal archetype” argument and his attempts to assert firm meanings for the associated
terms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading.
The legal archetype argument arose out of Waldron’s (2010, 186-87) particular disappointment
that the “legal and political background set by discussions among lawyers and other officials in the
White House” allowed the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, which were just becoming
known when he began the article. Waldron argues that lawyers like Alan Dershowitz, John Yoo,
and Jay Bybee who supported or authorized torture or torture-like interrogations after 2001.57
56Compare to the lengthy, gratuitous digression Steinhoff (2013, 30-32) makes into the effects of bodily decompo-
sition to try to show that death is worse than torture.
57Jay Bybee and John Yoo are the authors of the so-called “torture memos,” one of which (Bybee and Yoo, 2002)
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Waldron argues that the legal and moral status of torture did not change after 9/11, even if security
and political considerations did (1f. and 189). He is critical of attempts to “narrow or modify the
prohibitions on torture” that threaten to damage the legal profession and the “Rule of Law,” and
especially disappointed that this maneuver came from within the professional legal community.58
The notion that legitimizing torture—either by narrowing its definition or enshrining it in law—
might affect the law itself leads Waldron to the archetype argument. He says, first, that torture is
not just bad but “repugnant” to the law (Waldron, 2010, 223). Torture “could be introduced into
our law,” directly or indirectly, but doing so “would be contrary to the ’genius and spirit’ of our
law” (223, emphasis original). Waldron goes further to say that torture can be considered “alien to
any system of law,” at least those existing today (224, emphasis original). For Waldron, the laws
prohibiting torture serve two functions simultaneously. They act as straightforward statutes, and
they also operate in the background as a sort of paradigm of those laws concerned with rights. The
torture prohibition is “one provision in the cluster which by virtue of its force, clarity, and vividness
expresses the spirit that animates the whole area of law” (227). That background function makes
it a legal archetype. As an archetype, the torture prohibition “has its own direct legal effect,” and
also “epitomizes something” beyond itself (229).
Specifically, the torture prohibition “is archetypal of a certain policy having to do with the
relation between law and force, and with law’s forcefulness with regard to the persons it rules”
features centrally in the chapter below on the torture, the body, and space (4). Both men worked in the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), and were asked by various administration and agency officials to provide
interpretations of U.S. and international laws pertaining to prisoner status and treatment, including torture. On the
Bybee-Yoo co-authorship of the memos, see Waldron (2010, 189 fn.)
58See Waldron (2010, 190). Waldron’s professional view of the law thus has a more civic focus. Speaking of the
“particular dismay” that the architects of the Bush Administration interrogation/torture policy “studied and sometimes
teach at the country’s most elite law schools,” Mark Osiel (2009, 430) submits that elite lawyers see the exploitation of
legal uncertainties as their job, not a perversion of their job. “Only at less distinguished law schools” do students learn
to master and apply “a settled body of rules” (430). If memos like Bybee and Yoo (2002) are bad legal products, Osiel
is arguing that it is not because of the way they treat the law. They treat the law just the way elite law schools trained
them to. Regarding John Yoo, Osiel (2009, 431) says “one may question his professional competence here more than
his professional ethics, except perhaps insofar as competence is the first duty of legal ethics.” Osiel usefully cautions
critics of pro-torture (or pro-violent interrogation) lawyers that complaining about “loopholes” is like “accusing a
fellow lawyer of being lawyerly” (423). However, Waldron clearly thinks there is more to the law than exploiting
legal uncertainty to the maximum advantage of one’s client. Some other prominent attorneys agree with Waldron that
the practices legitimized by the torture memos did threaten the legal profession, if not the Rule of Law itself. For an
account of the professional ethics investigation into Bybee and Yoo, see Lauritzen (2013, ch. 3).
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(Waldron, 2010, 232). Remembering that Waldron is addressing a U.S. audience, the principle is
that our sort of law is predicated on is dignity, especially when encountering the force of law. The
torture prohibition “is vividly emblematic of our determination to sever the link between law and
brutality” (233). To weaken or undo the torture prohibition is to risk this essential principle of
American law. Thus the torture prohibition does non-statutory background work in areas like the
rules of punishment and prisons, rights of due process, and the “culture of law enforcement” (236-
42). If torture were an official practice, the “character of our legal system would be corrupted” in
the sense that the “repudiation of torture would become a technical matter, rather than a shining
issue of principle” (246). Since that principle is what makes American law what it is, and that in
part makes the United States what it is, Waldron (2010, 247ff.) laments the decline of the torture
prohibition.
In response, one might charge Waldron with inverting the question without actually saying
what is bad about torture itself. Instead of providing an answer to the question “why is torture
morally bad and legally forbidden?”, he asks what law or morality would mean in the event that
torture was legitimized. For those who agree that torture is wrong, Waldron provides a rich account
of why, as well as new ways of talking about it. For Waldron (2010, 259f.), the legal archetype is
a “way of thinking” through which he reached “a clearer and more substantive sense of what we
aspire to in our jurisprudence: a body of law and a rule of law that renounces savagery.” Whether
others—particularly the utilitarian defenders of torture—are inclined toward such a reflection is
doubtful. It is not clear that there is any basis for forcing them to do so, either, because Waldron’s
principles do not make sense given the way that utilitarians calculate preferred moral outcomes.
Like most of the approaches to torture ethics considered here, Waldron’s is fairly convincing on its




What do these arguments amount to in the aggregate? This section assesses the debate in two
ways. First, I give an informed analysis of the current debate and its relationship to contemporary
torture. Then I discuss the futility of such an analysis, or any other offered along similar lines. I
follow that with a second assessment of the current torture, which outlines its troubling features
that suggest a significantly different approach is needed. The subsequent section (2.4) reviews the
three additional works that have had the advantage of taking in the entire debate from 2001-2013
to see if they overcome the problems I describe here.
2.3.1 Limits of Assessment in the Current Debate
One thing that all of these torture ethics accounts agree on is that calamities need to be dealt with—
prevented if possible, or at least minimized. These authors are all asking if torture is permissible in
cases like the ticking bomb scenario. Some adopt this view for the sake of argument and others, like
Dershowitz, presume it is a feature of frequent real-world decisions about employing torture. The
assumptions that make the ticking bomb scenario possible can be stated in weak terms, but they are
nearly always stated in strong terms. The attack is imminent, the suspect has relevant information
that torture will successfully extract, and the information will save lives. When restating his case,
Shue (2005, 235) argues intuitively that the conditions of such ideal ticking bomb scenarios are
so improbable that treating the scenario as possible is disingenuous: “My honest judgment is that
stories that are too good to be true are not true rarely, but false.” In the decade since then, the
unconvincing evidence offered for torture’s effectiveness has been the further undermined by the
accumulation of more information.59
59After the Obama administration released the “torture memos” in spring of 2009, former Vice President Dick Ch-
eney requested the release of two classified documents that in his view showed the effectiveness of the interrogation
program. The documents “describe several plots disclosed by detainees who were subjected to harsh questioning but
do not specifically attribute the revelations to the use of those techniques” (Smith, 2009). See also United States Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (2012). More recently, the summary report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
has called into question the veracity of the documents Cheney saw as proof of the life-saving effects of violent inter-
rogation (SSCI, 2014). Among other things, the report finds that the CIA “significantly overstated” the importance
and knowledge of terror suspect Abu Zubaydah, whose case is central to the official justification for the program (21).
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These intuitive and empirical judgments are bolstered by Schiemann’s formal analysis. In my
view, Schiemann shows decisively that the principal outcome promised by utilitarian torture justi-
fications does not occur. Under real-world conditions consistent with the ticking bomb scenario,
the utilitarian approach will yield “frequent and harsh torture without much useful information”
(Schiemann, 2012, 16). The same applies to the threshold deontologists who support torture in lim-
ited cases. Threshold deontologists may use judgment rather than calculation to determine when
the threshold is definitively crossed, but the resulting structure of calamity-averting torture is the
same. It is, therefore, subject to the same criticism from Schiemann.
It is not very useful, though, to say that the utilitarian and threshold-deontological cases for
torture are fantasies based on dubious assumptions about the tortured person, the torturer, and
the world. That kind of response plays into a dispute about the relevant facts of the situation,
including some of that are infinitely contestable. Later in this dissertation I will argue for a shift
of attention from “matters of fact” to “matters of concern,” as Bruno Latour (2005) advocates.
For the moment, note that the ease with which holes can be poked in the torture-legitimizing
arguments does not apply universally. For their part, the utilitarian and deontological opponents of
torture have their own vulnerabilities. Chief among these is that a perfect ticking bomb scenario
is imaginable. The photographic images of torture from Abu Ghraib compete with images of the
burning and falling Twin Towers in the memories of relevant observers. For those who find the
latter image to be stronger, the issue of torture may well be securitized, or removed from the normal
arena of political contestation.60 If so, the reasoning that leads me to prefer Schiemann and the
deontological opponents of torture to the utilitarian torture advocates will have little impact on the
public torture ethics debate.
My assessment of the torture debate is limited because, as I said in the introduction, that de-
That the CIA also held Zubaydah for 47 days without questioning undermines claims of imminent threat (27f.). For
reasons I explain later in the methods chapter (3), it is important not to get diverted into an competition of debunking
facts. I note these developments here only to support my initial assessment, which I believe has limited use anyway.
60Michael C. Williams (2003, 525) has noted that the “speech-acts” that can securitize issues “are inextricable from
the image-dominated context in which they take place and through which meaning is communicated.” He thought at
the time that securitization theory’s “presentation of security as a speech-act is potentially too narrow” in the emerging
image-intensive environment (528). That situation has only intensified in the years since his article.
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bate is definitely not restricted to a single question. While the primary question addresses torture’s
moral status, most of the action in the debate concerns other questions about the facts of the situa-
tion, the chosen systems of ethical evaluation (normative theories), and claims about the nature of
moral arguments and statements (metaethics). In order to perform this brief assessment, I have had
to make my own choices about the answers to those associated questions. However, my choices
are just as idiosyncratic as the choices in all of the works featured above. I am not likely to garner
much more agreement than anyone else has.
The bad news for readers, as well as for aspiring torture ethics scholars, is that your own view
faces the same challenge. To anyone who has found themselves discussing and disagreeing about
torture with others, the problem is apparent. If the associated questions are answered on the way
to producing a judgment on torture, there is every likelihood they will lead to different places.
That is why I develop a method in chapter 3 that is designed to apprehend the cluster of associated
questions in the torture debate at once.
2.3.2 Features of the Current Debate
Given the dangers of assessing the current torture ethics debate in the mode of a judgment, an-
other way of assessing them is needed. What is called for is a description of the features of the
debate and its constituent arguments, not a comparison or synthesis of incompatible answers about
torture’s moral status. One feature of the debate is already visible: none of the arguments men-
tioned so far approach the whole cluster of questions around torture ethics together. Instead, most
answers to the associated questions act as premises and assumptions in the background of each
approach to torture ethics. Sometimes this has to do with the identity of the researcher, as Waldron
clearly sees himself as a lawyer and legal philosopher in relation to the law. Bagaric and Clarke
choose consequentialism because in their view deontological rights have no sound foundation.61
Among consequentialist theories they specifically choose hedonistic act utilitarianism because it
61“When examined closely, the concept of non-consequentialist rights is vacuous at the epistemological level”
(Bagaric and Clarke, 2004, 602).
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is the “most cogent” and “most influential” (Bagaric and Clarke, 2004, 605). Arrigo chooses util-
itarianism not because she is one, but because she wants to respond to pro-torture utilitarians on
their own terms. I have called both Gross and Shue proto-threshold deontologists because they
oppose torture in principle (not consequence), and yet both are willing to consider overriding those
principles in the face of a calamity. However, Shue (2005) reiterates his sharp disagreement over
the factual question about the plausibility of the ticking bomb scenario. To simply say that these
thinkers disagree about the moral status of torture is to leave out most of what they disagree about.
They disagree about a full set of answers to a dense complex of questions. The permissibility of
torture is simply the most apparent one.
The torture debate also produces complex and diverse results that defy categorization. Some
utilitarians support torture (Bagaric and Clarke, Dershowitz) while other utilitarians oppose it (Ar-
rigo and Schiemann). Among the utilitarians who support torture, rule utilitarian Dershowitz ad-
vocates torture warrants and act utilitarians Bagaric and Clarke do not. There are deontologists
who oppose torture (Waldron, Shue) and other deontologists who make an exception in the ticking
bomb case. The torture debate ends in this ambiguous outcome even when it is limited to ethical
approaches rooted in Anglo-American analytical philosophy. Adding virtue ethics and approaches
based in Continental philosophy will complicate the picture even more.
To see how this failure is possible, torture ethics must be viewed as a complex cluster of inter-
related questions, not a single question. Firstly, the arguments reviewed above disagree on factual
claims that are their inputs. They disagree on the probability of the expected adverse event, and on
its claimed imminence. They disagree on how the desired information and the adverse event are
related. They disagree on what the torturer knows about the tortured person and vice versa. Wal-
dron and Shue, to some degree, question the entire enterprise of judging torture in the context of
looming catastrophes. Secondly, many of torture ethics approaches disagree on the outputs of tor-
ture interrogations. Ideally, those outputs should include the crucial information and the successful
prevention of the calamity. Without the assumption that torture produces valuable disaster-averting
information, neither the utilitarian justification nor the threshold deontological one could be sus-
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tained. Thus Arrigo’s (2004, 563) demand that utilitarian torture advocates elucidate “the actual
causal mechanism of torture interrogation in curtailing terrorism.” Although Schiemann’s formal
analysis deals a serious blow to the information-producing assumption about torture, some util-
itarians might still disagree. The right piece of information that stops a suitably large calamity
might still achieve a very high utility, even when inefficiently produced through torture. That
would require strong assumptions about the calamity and the prisoner’s information, plus a rather
doctrinaire form of act utilitarianism. However, it is precisely my point that those assumptions
cannot be policed in the torture ethics debate as it is currently formed. Other people will make
their own assumptions. That applies just as well to disagreements concerning different ethical
traditions. Choices of normative tradition, specific approaches within normative traditions, and
meta-ethical justifications all impact the resulting torture ethics, and each person can make many
different choices in the course of their ethical considerations.
The question is torture morally permissible? makes no sense in itself, apart from the cluster of
questions that arise along with it. The above list does not exhaust these disagreements, and they
are not trivial philosophical points. The lack of consensus on torture’s definition is another such
question that causes a practical problem for torture ethics scholars. Given these disagreements,
comparisons of different torture ethics arguments become not only difficult, but also inappropriate.
These scholars only appear to be answering the same question. When the cluster of associated
questions is forced into the background, as it usually is, this hides the ways in which each scholar
is engaged in a somewhat different enterprise. So far, it is not clear that anyone has recognized this
as a problem, much less as the problem of torture ethics. The approach developed in this disser-
tation, beginning with chapter 3, attempts to put everyone on the same footing—not by imposing
some uniform set of answers to the associated questions, but by theorizing the social structure in
which their differences can coexist. Before doing so, however, there are a few more torture ethics
approaches worth considering.
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2.4 The State of the Art in Torture Ethics
The latest torture ethics scholarship has matured, as scholars have benefitted from the accumulation
of previous work for ten years. Having digested all of the above arguments, Steinhoff (2013),
Gordon (2014) and Kramer (2014) can offer both thorough assessments of the previous work and
more mature arguments of their own. Each makes an important contribution, but none addresses
the problem I have begun to outline above. In addition, I consider Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s
(2015) prison memoir. Slahi’s book is not an example of torture ethics itself, but it the voice and
experience of a tortured person to debate that has been lacking it. The contrast between the tortured
persons’s voice and the full range of torture ethics arguments raises the question of how well the
concept of torture in the torture ethics debate fits the phenomenon of torture.
2.4.1 Uwe Steinhoff: Absolute Self-Defense
Uwe Steinhoff’s On the Ethics of Torture (2013) makes an affirmative case for torture based on
the right to self-defense.62 This is a departure from the torture justifications offered by Dershowitz
(2002) and Bagaric and Clarke (2007; 2004). By using a different ethical structure based on rights,
Steinhoff avoids some objections to utilitarianism and forces opponents to respond to the right to
self-defense.63 Steinhoff (2013, 45) identifies as a threshold deontologist, for whom “rights are
trumps, but they are not absolute.” Steinhoff also adopts threshold deontology in a more explicit
way than Shue and Gross by using and explaining the term, rather than just intuitively acknowledg-
ing that their principles can encounter tough limits.64 He emphasizes that for threshold deontolo-
62Steinhoff (2013, ix-x) denies that he or his book are “pro-torture,” but that is a fair characterization of his position
concerning the child-kidnapping and ticking bomb cases that he believes are justified.
63Utilitarians also have to contend with problem of deciding how the utility of outcomes is measured. In contrast
to Dershowitz and Bagaric and Clarke mentioned above, Rod Morgan (2000) makes a utilitarian case against the use
of torture. Calculating the consequences of potential future events is contentious, especially with the charged politics,
security concerns, and secrecy that surround most contemporary torture. For his part, Steinhoff (2013, 46-52), who
does not identify as a utilitarian, presents a terse argument that torture is justified on utilitarian grounds: “You do the
math.”
64The way Steinhoff identifies as a threshold also contrasts with the pragmatic way Arrigo (2004) adopts utilitar-
ianism. Arrigo does so in order to refute torture in terms that utilitarian torture advocates should appreciate. As I
discuss below (5), Arrigo is only partially successful. Her strategic agreement to utilitarian calculus cannot overcome
the factual disagreement over whether or not torture produces life-saving information.
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gists, rights matter, not utility, until the potential outcome becomes so undesirable that it crosses
a threshold (43f.). By maintaining their principles in the face of lower utility, but not calamities,
threshold deontologists try to avoid the perverse outcomes that both cold, unprincipled utilitari-
anism and rights absolutism might lead to. Steinhoff (2013, 7) agrees that ordinarily people have
the right not to be subject to “the knowing infliction of continuous or repeated extreme physical
suffering for other than medical purposes,” as he defines torture, but only up to a point. However,
his book is really about idealized “aggressors” and “defenders” rather than ordinary people, and
he finds that defenders have a strong moral basis for action.65
The central claim of the self defense argument is that people “have a right to defend themselves
or others from wrongful aggression, particularly if the aggression is life-threatening” (Steinhoff,
2013, 11). When under attack, one is permitted to do what is necessary to stop it, and necessity
is generously interpreted.66 Gross disproportionality must be avoided, but there is no strict pro-
portionality requirement (12f.). Self-defense is understood to include other-defense, meaning third
parties can exercise it on behalf of the person who is actually being attacked (12). Finally, an at-
tack may be considered underway even when the attacker is in custody (13). Therefore, Steinhoff
argues the police can justifiably use torture to force kidnappers to disclose the locations of their
victims (14). More generally, for Steinhoff the torture of culpable aggressors is justified by the
self-defense rights of those at whom the aggression is directed. Steinhoff argues for legalization
of the self-defensive torture he has sketched out, but against any thorough institutionalization of
torture, for example torture warrants.67
This deontological rights-based case for torture is a significant innovation. Those who reject
Steinhoff’s conclusion that torture is morally justified in “Dirty Harry” and “ticking bomb” cases
65The reduction of the cast of characters to only aggressors and defenders is most vivid in Steinhoff (2006), but see
also Steinhoff (2013, 75f.).
66Steinhoff (2013, 12) notes that German law “does not require one to retreat from the aggressor if it one could
safely do so.” He does not address controversies surrounding self-defensive justifications for violence arising from
so-called “stand your ground” laws in the United States, for example in Florida (Hundley et al., 2012).
67See Steinhoff (2013) chapters 4 and 5. Recall that torture warrants are a central recommendation of Dershowitz
(2002, 146 and 152f.), in part because his utilitarian argument seems to generate a need for some restricting mecha-
nism, and in part because Dershowitz thinks that legal practice should not be willfully ignorant of or inconsistent with
the de facto practice of torture.
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must now account for rights, including self-defense rights exercised by a third party.68 Steinhoff
also sharpens important points about defenselessness and morally justified killing. Shue (1978,
127ff.) used the defenselessness of tortured persons to distinguish the special badness of torture
from morally justified combat killing. Steinhoff emphasizes those cases in which defenseless
captives still pose threats that activate the self-defense rights of others. Taking the moral force out
of defenselessness makes the comparison of torture to justifiable killing especially relevant again.
For Steinhoff (2013, 18-25), any captive person who poses a significant enough threat to be killed
in self-defense can surely also be tortured. Captives who are still attacking can be treated like any
other attacker, and sometimes killing attackers is just.69 Steinhoff (2013, 54) wields this like a club
throughout the book to show why—if one adopts his premises—torture is justified: “Would you
prefer death to 30 minutes of waterboarding? Or even a whole day of waterboarding?”
In response to Steinhoff, one might question which situations merit characterization as in-
stances of aggression and self-defense. One can also question the characterization of death as
worse than torture. Regarding self-defense, he says that situations “in which it is justified for the
police to torture someone are enormously rare” (67, emphasis in original). On the other hand, he
draws a close parallel between kidnappers and suspected terrorists, as the “ticking-bomb terrorist
and the child kidnapper . . . are attackers” (37, emphasis in original). In practice, ticking-bomb
logic has been broadly applied to suspected terrorists, with no standards of accountability. Stein-
hoff roundly dismisses the need to be certain about threats before justifying self-defense, but says
nothing about how to apply his alternative standards, which are reasonable belief and objective
fact.70
68Dirty Harry is a film in which Clint Eastwood plays a police detective who tortures an admitted child kidnapper in
an attempt to save the child. Steinhoff (2006, 342ff.) adopts Dirty Harry as the name for the child kidnapping cases on
which he focuses. Steinhoff (2013, 13f.) also discusses a real-world case from Germany, in which a police threatened
a kidnapper with torture and he revealed the child’s location. In both the movie and real life, the children were found
dead, though Steinhoff reported the film case as a life-saving triumph in his essay (2006) and had to correct himself
later (2013, 163 fn. 5).
69The ticking bomb scenario encapsulates the idea of a captive who is still attacking. Note that this requires some
displacement of time, matter, and agency. The method I develop later (3) using Bruno Latour’s work is specifically
suited to tracing such displacements, whereas Steinhoff is stuck simply asserting them.
70With respect to reasonable belief, he says “Nothing is certain,” and argues that as instances of self-defense, “the
knowledge requirement can be satisfied in the ticking bomb case, since the interrogators can obviously have a justified
true belief that a suspect has planted a bomb” (142-43, emphasis in original). With respect to objectivity, he says that
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Beyond that, Steinhoff’s torture/death comparison can be challenged by an inquiry into suicide.
Many Guantanamo prisoners have gone on hunger strikes, only to find themselves painfully force-
fed (Savage, 2011). Suicidal urges give torturers new vectors of control, which they can exploit
to deepen the pain and humiliation of their captives. Since the turn to “clean” techniques torture
has been designed to make life unbearable while simultaneously sustaining it.71 In short, despite
Steinhoff’s (2013, 30-32) graphic discussion of bodily decomposition, his insistence that death
is worse than torture is open to question. Kramer (2014) criticizes Steinhoff more narrowly, in
connection with the implications of exceeding a the deontological threshold. In keeping with my
review of earlier works and the contours of my assessment, I do not want to trade blows with
Steinhoff on specific arguments here. What limits Steinhoff’s argument in this context is that it too
cannot refer to any authority regarding his answers to the associated questions. “I am a threshold
deontologist,” says Steinhoff (2013, 45), and good for him. Why anyone else should be, he does
not answer.72
2.4.2 Gordon’s Virtue Ethics: Torture as a False Practice
Rebecca Gordon’s virtue-based approach to torture ethics sets Mainstreaming Torture (2014) apart
from the dominant utilitarian and deontological arguments. Gordon also stands apart for her recog-
nition that the contradictions between approaches make the current torture ethics debate, as a
whole, a different kind of problem. What is not clear, however, is how her alternative virtue
ethics proposal solves that problem.
Focusing on virtue shifts the focus of ethics from the judgment of isolated acts to providing
guidance for living well. Gordon therefore needs to define torture as a practice, and then show
if “the defender is under attack, then necessary and not grossly disproportionate countermeasures are justified” (18).
The emphasis on “is” in the original text shifts the standard of knowledge from belief to objectivity.
71The turn is motivated by human rights monitoring, according to Darius Rejali’s Torture and Democracy (2007,
39ff.).
72Steinhoff (2013, 45-46) does not discover this part of the problem despite his consideration of utilitarian and
strictly deontological arguments. He finds torture justified in both cases, as he did for his preferred approach of
threshold deontology. If in one case he had found that torture was not justified, he might have discovered the problem
to which this dissertation is addressed.
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that United States (her case of interest) has practiced torture by that definition since 2001. While
others have discussed torture as an ordinary practice, Gordon uses the term technically to indicate
community practices designed to sustain and fulfill the purpose of living well.73 Building on
Alasdair MacIntyre’s updated version of virtue ethics, Gordon characterizes torture as an “evil” or
“false” practice—one that destroys rather than creates virtue in the community and its members.
Gordon (2014, 14-35) defines torture at greater length than anyone except Kramer. In her
expanded definition, Gordon is able to add phenomenological and political dimensions to the usual
legal definitions of torture. The phenomenological element introduces the experience of torture
Gordon’s definition, in order to supplement the legal definition that “hardly exhausts the meaning
of the term” (25). Gordon attempts to close the gap between the abstract concept of torture and the
experience of it—an experience that is otherwise largely missing from the torture ethics debate.
However, Gordon’s phenomenological definition is couched in ontological claims- regarding “the
intentional unmaking of a human being’s world” that can expect a chilly reception from analytic
philosophers.74
Gordon (2014, 29f.) also adds a political component missing from many definitions of torture—
particularly those that focus on counter-terrorist interrogations. For Gordon, torture is not simply
an isolated act designed to avert a specific catastrophe. Instead, such catastrophes should be under-
stood within a political context. This political dimension captures, for example, what International
Relations scholars will recognize as struggles over the securitization of catastrophes. Gordon’s
political definition focuses more on domestic political control than international security, but that
does not diminish the relevance of her point: the events that torture interrogations are intended to
avert do not happen in a vacuum.75 Instead, those events are shaped by specific political contexts.
Gordon’s inclusion of political and phenomenological elements in her concept of torture serves as
an implicit critique of the more abstract definitions that fail to consider the political context or the
experience of the tortured person.
73See Arrigo (2004), Shue (2005), Luban (2005) andSussman (2005b).
74See Gordon (2014, 25). Gordon gets this idea from Scarry (1985).
75Gordon (2014, 30ff.) discusses Foucault’s views on punishment and William T. Cavanaugh’s sociological account
of torture in Latin America.
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Gordon then makes the case that the U.S. has used torture, as she has defined it, since 2001.
Since her book was published, more evidence has accrued in the form of the Senate Select Com-
mittee’s report (SSCI, 2014) on CIA interrogations and President Obama’s admission that “we
tortured some folks” (Obama, 2014). This point remains contested, but primarily by those who
insist on different definitions of torture. After arguing that the U.S. has in fact tortured, Gordon
(2014, 80) goes on to review the dominant consequentialist and deontological arguments, as well
as theological and political approaches. She also includes a content analysis of the media debate.
Though the latter element is limited to just two newspapers, it does suggest that the media differs
from both the scholarly debate and public opinion, and thus deserves further analysis in its own
right (91ff.).
Gordon does more than broaden the torture debate to include some previously neglected ele-
ments. Her deeper critique aims at the uncertain outcome of the debate as a whole. While there
are numerous ways to approach the ethics of torture, there seems to be no sufficient authority for
choosing among them. In other words, disagreements over torture ethics are largely metaethical.
Gordon applies Alasdair MacIntyre’s revision of Aristotelian virtue ethics to address the problem.
From this perspective, ethics is a matter of practices that over time produce virtues, which in turn
tend to fulfill a human goal or telos of living well (Gordon, 2014, 104-09). Virtue ethics is not a
matter of judging the rightness of a specific action against standards of principles or utility. Instead,
virtue is a quality of human action that tends to produce the Good in communities that cultivate
it. Telos is a more communal and uniform property of human communities than the individual-
istic calculations and principles operating in utilitarian and deontological ethics. Thus it has the
potential to resolve the chaotic ethics surrounding torture, so long as the community approves of
the telos.
Unfortunately, virtue ethics as conceived by MacIntyre only pertains to practices that pursue
the Good (Gordon, 2014, 118f.), while torture is obviously not good in this context. To apply
MacIntyre’s structured virtue ethics to torture, Gordon must account for a practice that generates a
bad. To do this, Gordon characterizes torture as a “false” practice—one that “is a complex, collab-
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orative, socially and historically embedded human activity that is also a locus of the formation of
habits and character of mind,” like any other practice, but which produces “the opposites” of virtue
(120f.).
Gordon’s virtue ethics contends that torture destroys virtue. It therefore also destroys the pos-
sibility of living well together, which is the telos of any political community.76 Because its basic
structure is rooted in the goal of living well together, a virtue ethics of torture is more explicitly
social than deontological or consequentialist accounts, in which the social is subsumed into the in-
dividual unit. Gordon’s account also militates against reductions in the torture debate that strip both
its political context and the tortured person’s experience. Gordon describes the central dilemma of
the torture debate, which is metaethical disarray and the lack of a common theoretical framework
for the debate. Her virtue ethics of torture offers a possible solution, but they require adopting the
view that communities have purposes. Without wide acceptance of that assumption, virtue ethics
becomes just one more alternative in an already-crowded metaethical environment. Gordon does
well to show that torture is a virtue-destroying practice, but does not show why one should choose
a virtue-based outlook on torture over a deontological or utilitarian one. The adoption of virtue
ethics only resolves the chaotic metaethical situation if one adopts it.
2.4.3 Matthew H. Kramer’s Comprehensive Account
Matthew H. Kramer’s Torture and Moral Integrity (2014) is an ambitious attempt to comprehen-
sively address torture ethics. Kramer begins with a thorough and precise specification of his
metaethical choices and philosophical definitions. Like Steinhoff, Kramer is a threshold deon-
tologist. Unlike Steinhoff, Kramer argues that crossing the threshold does not dismiss the original
moral obligation: “Although the public-safety officials are morally obligated to secure the lives of
citizens against calamities that are preventable and reasonably foreseeable, and although the offi-
cials’ obligations are extremely weighty when the dangers are immense, those obligations do not
76Waldron uses different language to state something similar about torture destroying the rule of law, and thus the
American way of life (see section 2.2.4). However, Waldron focuses on identity, rather than the telos.
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cancel or suspend any moral duties with which they conflict” (13). Kramer does not assume his
work is over once a calamity looms, because calamities do not dismiss the prior moral obligation
against torture. Instead, he works to pinpoint the location of torture’s moral wrongness amidst an
environment of competing yet durable moral claims.
Kramer (2014, ch. 2) devotes 86 pages to defining torture, culminating in a definition that
itself exceeds 180 words. He adopts a strategy for defining torture that is flexible and does not
inadvertently exclude relevant acts by including unnecessary elements.77 Kramer goes beyond
broad categories to build an elaborate taxonomy of torture types, from numerous varieties of inter-
rogational torture, to “extravagantly reckless torture” (74), and even “edifying torture” (98). These
types of torture are constructed around the reasons and circumstances that could potentially justify
the infliction of severe pain in each case. Kramer’s definition centers on the infliction of severe
pain, for various purposes, usually without consent, and outside the control of the tortured person
(114). He makes such features typical rather than required in order to preserve the definition’s
flexibility.78
Having outlined the structure of his moral system and then defined torture, Kramer is finally
in position to isolate the wrongness of torture. He carefully constructs a case against torture using
two elements already present in the debate. First, he stresses the intimate and all-consuming nature
of severe pain. Second, he incorporates the idea that the “distinctive form of self-betrayal that is
forced upon any victim of torture” (Kramer, 2014, 161). Both parts of the argument feature promi-
nently in Sussman (2005b), and many others make severe pain a central feature. Kramer (2014,
168f.) cautions against overstating these claims—which is not uncommon in torture discourse—
because that has the effect of narrowing the applicability of the resulting moral arguments.
For Kramer, this combination of the all-consuming pain with the special self-betrayal of torture
rules out a wide range of torture as impermissible. Still other types of torture were already ruled out
77For example, the UNCAT specifies that torture is done by state agents (UN, 1984). However, Kramer does not
want to exclude possible instances of torture from his ethical inquiry on that basis.
78See Kramer (2014, 114). In contrast, Gordon (2014, 32) excludes private violence from consideration by making
state agency part of her definition. If Gordon also objects to torture by private individuals or non-political groups such
as criminal syndicates, her definition does not cover it.
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due to morally impermissible purposes. Kramer has thus already excluded a very large proportion
of potential torture as illegitimate. However, some non-trivial hard cases still need consideration.
Kramer does not think this combination of arguments alone is sufficient to rule out all instances
of torture. One such case is “ephemerally incapacitative torture” intended to stop a harmful act.79
Kramer therefore bolsters his case against torture with the addition of a perpetrator-focused con-
straint. In other words, torturing is morally wrong for the perpetrator, regardless of the status,
qualities, or situation of the victim (188). This provides the supplemental source of the wrongness
in those marginal but important cases where the all-consuming pain and self-betrayal of the victim
are insufficient.80 Kramer thus rules out much potential torture based on impermissible purposes,
rules out even more potential torture based on the infliction of severe pain and self-betrayal, and
finally rules out the remaining potential cases with the agent-centered argument.
Kramer (2014, 212, emphasis added) thus comes to the conclusion that is at once simple and
complex: moral optimality is possible without moral permissibility. Even in a situation where
torture leads to the optimal outcome, it may not be a good outcome. The optimality of torture in
such cases certainly does not vitiate the moral wrongness of torture. A lesser evil is not a good,
and choosing it does resolve any moral conflicts. The real choice in such a situation is not between
right and wrong, but between two wrongs. One choice is to forego the bad-yet-optimal outcome
by refraining from torture, possibly leading to a calamity. The other choice is to commit a still-
morally-impermissible act by torturing. The latter choice will have moral implications regardless
of its practical outcome, because torture remains immoral. Kramer (2014, 214) directly addresses
Steinhoff as having produced such an optimal-but-impermissible outcome. For his part, Steinhoff
believes torture is justified.
79See Kramer (2014, 186). This would indeed be “self-defensive torture,” though Kramer construes it more narrowly
than Steinhoff. Kramer differs sharply from Steinhoff on the moral relevance of the act/omission distinction, which
Kramer (2014, 77-97) emphasizes and Steinhoff rejects. According to Steinhoff (2013, 81), the “attack has not yet
stopped just because the terrorist is strapped to a chair,” and therefore a “ticking-bomb terrorist is committing a wrong:
not disclosing where the bomb is” (97).
80The idea that “the moral basis for our abstention from the use of torture against wicked terrorists is not about
the terrorists but is instead about us,” which Kramer (2014, 188) borrows from John McCain, is a curious result for
positivist analytic philosophy. At least to me, it resonates more with developments in continental philosophy that
ground the formation of ethical subjects in relation to the other, of which Judith Butler’s Giving an Account of Oneself
(2005) and Simon Critchley’s Infinitely Demanding (2012) are two prominent examples.
52
Still, Kramer’s refutation of Steinhoff, if it can be called that, rests on precise philosophical dis-
tinctions. In fact, no other author comes anywhere near Kramer’s level of detail. Tracing Kramer’s
argument in reverse shows just how fundamental, and even arcane, his differences with Steinhoff
(and with utilitarians) are. Kramer (2014, 28) concludes that “Even in an unimaginably dreadful
situation of urgency where the use by officials of interrogational torture fulfils public-safety obli-
gations that are more stringent than the officials’ duties to eschew any use of such torture, their
actions are seriously wrong.” Kramer believes those officials must be subject to legal sanction,
even if the competing moral obligation mitigates the severity of the sanction (28). That conclu-
sion stems from Kramer’s understanding of the structure of morality. Kramer begins with Michael
Moore’s “tripartite” moral structure, which features a “bottom tier” of consequentialist concerns in
the background that guide a person’s action (25). The second moral layer consists of deontological
principles that compel or restrict action, and unlike the consequentialist concerns, are obligatory
(25). The third and final tier qualifies those deontological principles, where “beyond some un-
specifiable threshold as the consequences of adhering to duty D become more and more dire, D
ceases to be binding” (26). Kramer agrees with Moore about this three-tiered moral structure, ex-
cept for the final claim that D ceases to be binding. Kramer argues that instead, duty D is “locked
in a conflict with a diametrically opposed moral requirement; the deontological duty-not-to-ϕ is
countervailed by a consequentialist duty-to-ϕ” (26). The disagreement with Moore on this point
stems from Kramer’s strongly objective view of morality (14-28). Objective moral obligations
cannot simply go away in the presence of competing consequentialist concerns, even if the latter
are “very weighty.”81 This is also the basis for Kramer’s distinction between “overtopping” and
“overriding” moral obligations. An overridden obligation “involves cancellation or supersession
or suspension,” while an overtopped obligation “retains its full force” even though it is “exceeded
in importance or stringency” (10f.).
The above reflects only a partial account of Kramer’s overall ethical framework. His normative
theory specifies a particular vision of threshold deontology. In turn, his normative theory depends
81See Kramer (2014, 26). Another term for belief in the objectivity of moral claims is moral realism.
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on specific metaethical commitments like the objectivity of moral obligations. In torture ethics,
a great deal can hinge on such a seemingly small disagreement. Steinhoff, for example, clearly
believes that the obligation not to torture is dismissed once a competing moral obligation suffi-
ciently activates someone’s right to self-defense. One can say that their disagreement about the
moral status of torture stems from a disagreement over the objectivity of moral claims. Yet even
philosophers find this point arcane, unless they are ethics specialists. Steinhoff sees no need to
elaborate the “general structure of morality” in the course of justifying torture, even though the
question “can we torture this suspected terrorist?” is non-trivially related to question “are moral
claims features of reality?” If I am correct that the question of torture ethics is not one question but
a cluster of related questions, then the hopes of comparing torture ethics arguments on any kind of
level playing field are dim.
2.5 First-person Accounts
By design, this look at of the current torture ethics debate has focused on works directly concerned
with the moral status of torture. I have also argued that torture is a cluster of associated questions,
not a single question. One very troublesome associated question is just what torture is, or more
narrowly, how torture is defined. The problem of torture’s definition merits a longer treatment in
chapter 3. With respect to the current debate, however, the voice and experience of the tortured
person have been largely absent from everything included so far. Only Gordon (2014, 25) attempts
to include the tortured person, through the phenomenological component of her definition. Other-
wise, the experience of the tortured person has been ignored by the current torture ethics debate.
To the degree it is present in the current debate, the real experience of torture is mediated through
abstract concepts that have more to do with the work of philosophers than with the situation faced
by tortured person. A thorough sense of the current torture ethics debate therefore requires some
exposure to the tortured person. Such works might not answer or even address the cluster of ques-
tions in the torture ethics debate. They do report what happened, however, and they warn scholars
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about a serious gap between their concepts of torture and its reality.
2.5.1 Slahi Speaks from Guantanamo
Mohamedou Ould Slahi is a captive of the United States government, not a moral philosopher.
Guantanamo Diary (2015) has been widely reviewed but not peer-reviewed. The blacked-out
redactions attest to what editor Larry Siems calls “the manuscript’s previous editing process” by
another kind of authority (Siems in Slahi, 2015, xii). Slahi’s prison memoir is empirically valuable
for its first-hand account of American torture after 2001. It also compels researchers to reflect on
the scholarly enterprise of torture ethics. Torture and the voice of a tortured person come through
vividly in this book, despite the heavy editorial hand of the state.
Slahi (2015, xxi-xxv) is a Mauritanian born in 1970 who won a scholarship to study at the
University of Duisberg in Germany. He interrupted his studies in 1991-1992 to fight the communist
regime in Afghanistan, and then finished his degree in Germany. He moved to Montreal in 1999,
where to his great misfortune he attended the same mosque—though not at the same time—as
Ahmed Ressam, the person caught entering the U.S. to execute the “Millennium Plot” in 2000
(xxiv). After Canadian authorities questioned him about the Millennium Plot, Slahi decided to
return to Mauritania. On his way, he was detained and questioned in Senegal and Mauritania, and
also questioned by the FBI (97-104). He was released without charge in February of 2000, arrested
again in late September of 2001, and released again.
He was arrested once more that November, and secretly rendered a week later to Jordan (Slahi,
2015, 120-1). He was interrogated, hidden from the ICRC,82 and threatened with torture.83 Slahi
praises the Jordanians—faintly—as restrained, practical torturers, who “must have reason to prac-
tice heavy physical torture” (178). Slahi was neither charged in Jordan nor sent home to Maurita-
nia, but rendered to Afghanistan and then Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in August of 2002—just days
after the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel had given CIA and White House lawyers
82The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits prisoners under the guidelines of the Geneva Con-
ventions (Slahi, 2015, 168).
83Slahi was told he would be sent to the “Shark Pool,” (Slahi, 2015, 183-4).
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its favorable views about harsh interrogation techniques.84 With little firm evidence against him,
Slahi seems to have been undone by the appearance of his associations with family, acquaintances
from ten years earlier in Afghanistan, and people who attended the Montreal mosque.
He was interrogated for nearly a year at Guantanamo Bay before an especially intense phase
of violent interrogation began in the summer of 2003. As Slahi (2015, 218) puts it, for “the next
seventy days I was denied the sweetness of sleeping: interrogation 24 hours a day, three and
sometimes four shifts a day.” The ICRC was again denied access, as they had been in Jordan
(219). During his continuous interrogation, he was forced to stand for long periods while shackled
to the floor (224-5, 230, 240, 242). Often he was not permitted to pray (231, 235, 246). After his
transfer to Camp Echo he was forbidden to pray at all, and denied the call to prayer and the Kibla
indication that would permit him to face Mecca (265). He was not permitted to fast, and was even
force fed during Ramadan (231). Slahi was badly beaten during a staged abduction that was meant
to suggest he was being rendered again to a Egypt or Jordan.85 During that transfer his body was
packed with ice (259), and at other times he was chilled in cold rooms or soaked in cold water
(242f., 244, 245). He was also sexually assaulted by pair of female interrogators (230). For all
that, Slahi appears to have yielded little or no intelligence—certainly none that averted a terrorist
calamity. He has never been charged.
Slahi’s Guantanamo Diary is less acutely horrifying than Iranian journalist Houshang Asadi’s
Letters to My Torturer, but Asadi (2011) wrote from far beyond the reach of his former captors.
Slahi’s story is more subtle but no less alarming. Scholars and policy makers alike should be most
worried about its implications for truth and justice. Whether one believes Slahi or believes the
government, the grounds for those beliefs are badly compromised. Slahi was interrogated for 18
months, plus the final months of round-the-clock interrogation at Camp Echo, before providing a
very questionable confession. The questions he was repeatedly asked could plausibly have pro-
vided the information Slahi needed for the urgent task of formulating a confession. He understood
that interrogators would not be satisfied with simple admissions: “One of the hardest things to do
84The memo by Bybee and Yoo (2002) is dated August 1, 2002.
85He was actually just moved to the Camp Echo section of Guantanamo Bay (Slahi, 2015, 251f.).
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is to tell an untruthful story and maintain it, and that is exactly where I was stuck” (Slahi, 2015,
232). Somehow, Slahi came up with something that made the torture stop, and the interrogators
got their confession.
To value the information from such a brutally coerced confession requires a belief in a certain
relationship between bodies and truth. I take up that relationship in chapter 5. Slahi’s account
reveals how central and difficult the information issue can be, even at the empirical level. His
continued detention also raises questions of justice and security, particularly for scholars who think
torture can be justified in specific security circumstances. If Slahi’s case does not conform to the
conditions specified in the justifications of Dershowitz, Bagaric and Clarke, or Steinhoff, then they
should be the first to acknowledge it. Otherwise, their pro-torture arguments may be contributing
to abuses they do not really support.
First-person experience is not the best or only way of knowing about torture, but it should be
taken into account. Otherwise, the philosophical concepts circulating in torture ethics become less
and less applicable. Most scholars who tackle torture ethics will not be torturers or tortured persons
themselves, or have ready access to them. Whether scholars find ways to represent those voices, or
instead try to deal with the absence of those voices, the voice of the tortured person has something
to say about torture ethics.
2.6 Final Words on the Current Debate
Despite the advantage of digesting ten years of prior work, the latest research on torture ethics is
not converging on an answer to the key moral question. If anything, the moral status of torture is
becoming more unclear and more divisive. Only Gordon (2014) even recognizes that conflicting
ethical frameworks present a serious problem for torture ethics. Unfortunately, Gordon’s analysis
only raises the issue, and does not make it central. Moreover, Gordon’s approach can only resolve
the incommensurability problem at the cost of insisting that everyone adopt virtue ethics. This is a
cost that others seem loath to pay, and at any rate, the others are busily insisting on the correctness
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of their own approaches. Steinhoff insists on threshold deontology, which differs from Kramer’s.
Bagaric and Clarke insist on hedonistic act utilitarianism, which differs from Dershowitz’s rule
utilitarianism, and so on.
The dilemma persists even though authors of these recent torture ethics works pays much closer
attention to their normative and metaethical commitments than their predecessors did. Steinhoff
identifies threshold deontology specifically. Gordon explains virtue ethics, and then develops it
further by arguing that torture is a false practice. Kramer specifies his moral framework in more
detail than most people will care to absorb. Their resulting arguments are more clearly and firmly
divided than the raft of previous works. When the full range of questions around torture ethics is
considered, these authors are not finding common ground. Instead, they are digging deeper valleys
and finding higher, more disparate peaks on which to plant their respective flags.
At the same time there is a fundamental risk and weakness in the torture debate concerning the
gap between the phenomenon and experience of torture and the concepts scholars use to discuss
it. Kramer’s analysis is at once staggeringly comprehensive and devoid of actual torture. However
fair and competent torture ethics scholars have been, the voice and experience of tortured persons
has eluded them. Gordon’s inclusion of a phenomenological component in her definition of torture
is laudable. However, her account fails to approach the power of Slahi’s (2015) firsthand report.
Scholars need not (and should not) resort to grisly and graphic descriptions of torture. Instead, the
gap I am describing between concept and phenomenon calls for careful reflection by researchers on
what is happening to the tortured person.86 In the event that such first-hand material is inaccessible
or difficult to incorporate in ethics arguments, scholars can at least be more creative and sensitive
to its absence when thinking about what torture is.
The impulse to offer a better ethics of torture—a novel one, or an improvement or synthesis of
the above approaches—should by now be viewed with some apprehension. To proceed in more or
less the same way that other scholars have done will invite similar problems. The most devastating
of those is that because every approach to torture ethics is composed of answers to a complex
86For an explanation of the difference between political science concepts and actual political phenomena, see
Voegelin (1987, ch. 1-2).
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cluster of questions, any new approach will almost certainly be incommensurable with the others.
That has not stopped participants in the debate from criticizing each other. However, shifting
attention to the level of the whole torture ethics debate shows that quite often there is not enough
of a shared theoretical basis to ground those mutual attacks. Only philosophers—and not even all
of those—seem to have thoroughly worked out the details of their ethical frameworks. But political
communities are not made of philosophers. Scholars in other fields, not to mention ordinary people,
are unlikely to hammer out the intricate details of their own metaethics, nor persuade their entire
communities to adopt them.
Part II of this dissertation confronts the likelihood that the members of political communities
cannot be forced to harmonize their complex, idiosyncratic normative and metaethical commit-
ments. Nor can one expect them to agree on answers to the other questions associated with torture
ethics. I contend that it is not only impractical to impose a false uniformity or harmony on metaethi-
cal commitments, it may be unethical. By what right do I insist that you give up utility for threshold
deontology, or vice-versa? Another way to put this is that torture ethics is not an ethical problem.
Given a complete enough set of metaethical principles and factual assumptions, anyone willing to
do the work can formulate an ethics of torture. Torture ethics is instead a social problem, because
idiosyncratic systems of torture ethics are very difficult to socialize. The questions stemming from
this insight include: how to theorize a social group made up of people with disagreeable views on
torture ethics without forcing them into an agreement, how such a group can understand torture,
and how they should decide what to do about it. The rest of this dissertation takes on this task.
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Part II




I have argued so far that the torture ethics debate comprises a large number of highly idiosyncratic
accounts. Each of these accounts is rooted in a different set of answers to the complex cluster of
questions. Sometimes the answers are stated as premises of the torture ethics argument, such as the
claim by Bagaric and Clarke (2004) that the evaluative capability of hedonistic act utilitarianism is
much better than deontology. At other times the answers and premises connected with these related
questions are obscured. The claim that torture can or does produce life-saving information, for ex-
ample, is usually just asserted.1 These different approaches to torture ethics are incommensurable
in a sense that is even more grave than is meant by philosophers of science. Torture ethics argu-
ments are not just difficult to compare. They cannot even be marshaled into internally consistent
categories fit for programmatic comparison.2
The works reviewed in chapter 2, including the rights-based case for torture (Steinhoff, 2013),
the legal archetype argument (Waldron, 2010), and the models of truth production (Arrigo, 2004)
do advance torture ethics. However, each of these advances comes with the drawback that its spe-
1Arrigo (2004) specifically questions this assumption, but others—including those who oppose torture—often
adopt it for the sake of argument, and often without making much of it.
2It will not do, for example, to conceptually consolidate “utilitarian torture ethics” as a research program, and then
judge whether it represents a consistently progressive theoretical shift over a similarly consolidated “deontological
torture ethics.” See Lakatos (1978, 47ff.) for the evaluation of scientific research programs, and Jackson and Nexon
(2009) for the inapplicability of Lakatos’s concepts to unsuitable categories (in Jackson & Nexon’s case, certain
International Relations theories).
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cific premises are in broad and complicated conflict with the premises of the other torture ethics
accounts. Because the torture debate is advancing in different directions based on those different
premises, the debate as a whole provides little guidance for ethical action by the political commu-
nity. Instead, the community divides along the lines of differing ethical frameworks. This problem
cannot be overcome by a more thorough specification of those frameworks. Kramer (2014) out-
lines his ethical and factual commitments more comprehensively than any other contributor, but
this only strengthens his account in light of those specific terms. His thorough treatment of his
ethical framework only multiplies sources of controversy like heads of a Hydra. This makes his
account even more clearly incommensurable with the others, including those who agree with his
conclusion about torture.
This chapter looks for a way forward that still respects the limitations of the torture ethics de-
bate. It proceeds on two assumptions. One is that a uniform ethical framework cannot be imposed
on the torture ethics debate. The other is that despite the lack of a uniform ethical framework,
the resulting approach still has to address the broad community. In other words, it cannot be an-
other approach predicated on terms that are largely incompatible with many others. Within the
constraints of those two injunctions, the rest of this chapter theorizes a new approach to torture
ethics. It must be suited to a community that does not agree about how to do ethics: a disagreeable
community.
To accomplish this task, I first reimagine what kind of object of study torture ethics is. Next, I
work toward a different understanding of the community or group to whom it matters. I rely pri-
marily on the philosophy of Bruno Latour in this effort.3 Finally, I apply the burgeoning approach
to two preliminary questions in need of attention before moving on to talk about torture ethics.
First, I consider the limitations of specifying a definition for torture. Second, I outline the structure
of the ethical debate, and argue for a political conception of ethics.
3Latour is a French philosopher who devoted much of his early work to studying the knowledge-producing practices
of working scientists. Latour departed from the Strong Program of the Edinburgh school of science studies to develop
his own social theory. See David Bloor’s “Anti-Latour” (1999) and Latour’s response (1999a). As will become
evident, Latour’s philosophy goes beyond social theory, and is getting some attention as a philosophical system of
“object-oriented philosophy” (Harman, 2009).
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3.1 Direct Critical Engagement Falters
Characterizing the torture ethics debate this way raises the danger that no standard at all will be
applicable to the torture ethics debate. The purpose of this chapter is to find a way forward that
will facilitate constructive talk about torture ethics, despite the challenging conditions. As long as
torture ethics is nevertheless treated as a means to justify or prohibit torture, critical engagement
will be a repetitive and futile struggle. With respect to torture ethics, direct critical engagement
falters. This is not because critical engagement is too hard, but because it has become too easy.
The authors of all the works in chapter 2 criticize each other extensively, but the debate as a whole
has not progressed because of that struggle. The approach I outline in this chapter is designed to
avoid the pitfalls of endless cycles of critique. It should also allow the recovery of the insights
scholars have worked hard to produce in the current torture ethics debate, but which remain locked
in their proprietary ethical frameworks.
In the works reviewed in chapter 2, torture ethics functions as a way to decide the moral status
of torture. I have argued that the question of torture’s moral status is not a question at all, but a
symbol for a cluster of interrelated questions. The related questions are those such as how to define
torture and how to assert a basis for moral claims. Conceived of in this way, any given approach
to torture ethics is usually also a critique of some other approach. Because each approach answers
the interrelated questions differently, the approaches to torture ethics cannot be compared. In this
way, ordinary critical engagement with torture ethics leads to endless rounds of further critique.
For example, When the Obama administration released the “torture memos” in April of 2009,
Liz Cheney appeared on MSNBC to deny that her father had played a key role in approving the
interrogation techniques described in the memos. Interviewer Norah O’Donnell wanted to discuss
former Vice President Dick Cheney’s role in approving the techniques. Liz Cheney continuously
directed the discussion toward the interrogation program’s “incredible effectiveness” at producing
“very important intelligence” (O’Donnell, 2009b). When O’Donnell used the word “torture”, Ch-
eney immediately interjected: “Well, it wasn’t torture, Norah, so that’s not the right way to lay
out the argument.” Cheney’s points were that first, intelligence was produced, second, the program
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was widely approved, and third, the specified techniques (including waterboarding) are not torture.
Although the first two points about effectiveness and approval are contestable, at least Cheney
is prepared to support them with assertions and anecdotes. That does not matter much, though,
because the third claim that “it wasn’t torture” is a premise of her argument. Cheney’s defini-
tion of torture apparently excludes whatever acts were authorized by Dick Cheney, and therefore
O’Donnell’s entire line of questioning is out of order. I do not mean to pick on pro-torture or
pro-waterboarding arguments for adopting premises in this way. Torture opponents face a similar
challenge in showing that waterboarding is torture. However, as long as O’Donnell and Cheney
do not include a more comprehensive discussion of what counts as torture in their debate, they are
not really talking about the same thing. Their mutual critiques disband the conversation into two
monologues that only seem to be related.
Secondary discussion of the interview shows even more plainly that at least two completely dis-
tinct conversations are taking place. The liberal blog Daily Kos announces that “Norah O’Donnell
breathes fire in torture interview with Liz Cheney” (kat68, 2009). Daily Kos contributor kat68
notes that Cheney “again and again claims torture was effective without giving a single shred of
evidence” (2009, emphasis added). At the conservative Red State blog, however, Cheney “breaks”
O’Donnell in the interview (Lane, 2009), and the American Thinker cheers that “Liz Cheney Gives
a Debate Lesson” (McDevitt and Anderson, 2009). From one point of view, O’Donnell caught Liz
Cheney without evidence, and thus incinerated her. Others observing the same event think Cheney
defeated O’Donnell with her superior debating skills. At the level of the debate as a whole, both
things happened. The mutual critiques are based on asserting different premises, and therefore are
not sociable.
In the limited terms of each individual argument, this is not a mistake. Praising Cheney, Red
State continues: “This is how you do it, by the way. You don’t let them define the agenda; you cer-
tainly don’t let them define the terms; you concede nothing” (Lane, 2009). The American Thinker
team adds that Cheney “refuses to accept the premise of several of the questions” (McDevitt and
Anderson, 2009). Again, I am not painting only the pro-waterboarding arguments as obtuse on this
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count. O’Donnell rejects Cheney’s premises too. Each camp achieves victory specifically by con-
trolling the premises, but the victories remain hollow because no contest has taken place. Neither
side—including both speakers and audiences—concedes the premises of the other.
This applies as much to scholars as it does to journalists and pundits.4 In fact, the live face-to-
face format forces the latter to be more forthcoming with their premises. When the goal of a torture
ethics argument is to strengthen a given position on the use of torture, one should naturally adopt
the premises make the strongest case for that position. A problem arises only when the torture
ethics becomes a matter of public concern, and is thus drawn into a social environment. Then the
adoption of two strong but incompatible sets of premises becomes a serious problem, because there
are two unsociable views of torture ethics trying to socialize. As chapter 2 showed, there are many
more than two unsociable views.
Thus there is a need for critical engagement of the torture ethics debate but no basis for that
engagement. At least, there is not a basis that is sufficiently shared. Too many of the answers to the
relevant questions seem infinitely malleable. In the case of torture ethics, the possibility of critique
has “run out of steam” in the sense meant by Bruno Latour (2004). For Latour, the old critical
tools have become cheap and ubiquitous, and now “what took great effort, occupied huge rooms,
cost a lot of sweat and money, for people like Nietzsche and Benjamin, can be had for nothing”
(2004, 230). That availability has also made those tools less useful, and even dangerous. Latour
worries that while “entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure that good American kids
are learning the hard way that facts are made up,”5 elsewhere “dangerous extremists are using the
very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives”
(227).
Latour argues that critics have been partially mistaken in their approach, especially to criticism
of science and knowledge. The “mistake we made, the mistake I made, was to believe that there
4Liz Cheney is in this case something more than a pundit, but something less than a central policy maker. As her
introduction before the MSNBC interview indicated, she is a former deputy assistant secretary of state (O’Donnell,
2009b). However, her own role in the interrogation program was peripheral, and her presence on the show more had
to do with being the Vice President’s daughter (also noted in the MSNBC introduction).
5It does not appreciably dent Latour’s argument to note that these American kids who are learning that “facts are
made up” are almost certainly not in political science or International Relations PhD programs.
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was no efficient way to criticize matters of fact except by moving away from them and directing
one’s attention toward the conditions that made them possible” (Latour, 2004, 231, emphasis in
original). This is why critique has run out of steam. Latour suggests a renewed or “second em-
piricism” that goes beyond facts. “Matters of fact are only very partial and, I would argue, very
polemical renderings of matters of concern” (232). Scientific facts themselves started out as re-
sources for debunking in their own right, aimed at older authorities. Now they themselves have
been undone by that “debunking impetus.”6
In the torture debate, polemical facts are commonly asserted to squelch what really are persis-
tent controversies: it wasn’t torture, Norah. Each scholar has sufficient resources to debunk their
opponents’ facts while asserting their own. In such an environment it becomes difficult to establish
an ontological fact like the definition of torture, or an ethical fact like the positive prohibition of
torture. The debunking impetus and wide availability critical tools cuts in all directions in the tor-
ture debate. The same documents that debunked the pre-2001 consensus prohibiting torture (e.g.
Bybee and Yoo, 2002) can be debunked themselves, if the political or judicial weather changes sig-
nificantly. The same instability that allowed the torture prohibition to be marginalized after 2001
could swing the other way. This may give some hope to torture opponents, but it can only be an
unstable hope.
For Latour, the current conditions demand that critique be able to establish knowledge, not
just undermine it. With respect to the objects of scientific research, Latour bases his remedy on a
concept that fascinated Heidegger: the “thing.” Latour follows Heidegger in considering the thing
both as an object and as a place of assembly or coming together.7 Latour differs from Heidegger,
6See Latour (2004, 232). Section 3.3 goes into more detail about Latour’s “matters of fact” and “matters of
concern.” Political theorists are perhaps more used to seeing facts distinguished from values, particularly in discussions
about what counts as political science and what makes it scientific. This is the sense of the word “fact” that Leo Strauss
(1988, 18-27) meant when he criticized the fact/value distinction, and especially the way it tended to cast political
philosophy as unscientific. Here, however, Latour uses the word “fact” in a more general sense of a settled piece of
knowledge. This could include things on both sides of Strauss’s fact/value divide. This is important because below I
will reconsider what sort of objects of knowledge “ethical facts” are. While it may seem strange to consider ethical
judgments as facts, this is actually what is happening in the torture ethics debate. For example, “murder is wrong”
is an uncontroversial ethical fact, but things get murkier in other circumstances like war, or Steinhoff’s self-defense
situations.
7“We are now all aware that in all the European languages, including Russian, there is a strong connection between
the words for thing and a quasi-judiciary assembly. Icelanders boast of having the oldest Parliament, which they call
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however, regarding what counts as a thing in this special sense. Heidegger makes “as sharp a
distinction as possible between, on the one hand, objects, Gegenstand, and, on the other hand,
the celebrated Thing” (Latour, 2004, 233). Heidegger only granted the status of “thing” to those
objects “cradled in the respectful idiom of art, craftsmanship, and poetry” (2004, 233). Latour
sees no justification for this limitation. Latour (2004, 233) asks, “What would happen . . . if we
tried to talk about the object of science and technology, the Gegenstand, as if it had the rich and
complicated qualities of the celebrated Thing?” Latour accepts Heidegger’s account of the Thing
but rejects the exclusion of ordinary, industrial, or unromantic objects (233). For Latour every
object is a gathering, is a Thing. We have all probably witnessed “the metamorphosis of an object
into a thing,” like the 2003 disintegration of the space shuttle Columbia:
What else would you call this sudden transformation of a completely mastered, per-
fectly understood, quite forgotten by the media, taken-for-granted, matter-of-factual
projectile into a sudden shower of debris falling on the United States, which thousands
of people tried to salvage in the mud and rain and collect in a huge hall to serve as so
many clues in a judicial scientific investigation? Here, suddenly, in a stroke, an ob-
ject had become a thing, a matter of fact was considered as a matter of great concern.
If a thing is a gathering, as Heidegger says, how striking to see how it can suddenly
disband. (2004, 234)
What Latour suggests about scientific facts, I would like to extend to ethical facts. Torture ethics
may not have been quite “completely mastered,” but periodically the moral reasons not to torture
have appeared to be stable. The United States eventually did ratify the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Torture (UN, 2014). As required, it also embedded the torture prohibition in its own
law (USCode, 1996). The torture prohibition fit the description of a Gegenstand until 2001. Der-
showitz says so, on his way to justifying counter-terrorist torture.8 Like the Columbia disaster, the
Althing, and you can still visit in many Scandinavian countries assembly places that are designated by the word Ding
or Thing” (Latour, 2004, 232ff.).
8“Before September 11, 2001, no one thought the issue of torture would ever reemerge as a topic of serious debate
in this country” (Dershowitz, 2002, 134).
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torture prohibition after 2001 can be aptly described as “a sudden shower of debris falling on the
United States.” Participants in the torture debate—especially those trying to salvage pieces of the
torture prohibition from the mud—commented on how the moral arguments and legal prohibitions
suddenly disbanded.9
This applies to all of the “ethical objects” in the torture debate. The memos and even the public
sentiments that protect the architects and agents of the American enhanced interrogation program
are just as precarious as any taken-for-granted Gegenstand. They too could turn into sudden show-
ers of debris, an unraveling Thing.10 Each release of previously classified documents (SSCI, 2014)
and investigative reports (Kirk, 2015) makes such an unraveling more possible. The goal here,
however, is to say something constructive about torture ethics despite its incessant tendency to-
wards debunking, unraveling, and disbanding. The pressing methodological question is what to do
with an object of study, like torture ethics, that no longer holds together. Following Latour, the first
step is to stop treating it like an unproblematic Gegenstand, when in fact it is a Thing that has gone
to pieces. The methodological questions are then how to conceive of torture as an object of study,
and what to do with it.
3.2 Torture Ethics is an Imbroglio
3.2.1 Imbroglios and the Crisis of Modernity
Today’s torture ethics has specific deficiencies that lead it, at the level of the whole debate, to
unravel. Critically engaging torture ethics in familiar ways aggravates this problem, because the
debate lacks an authority strong enough to resolve the complex disagreements. The torture ethics
9Jeremy Waldron (2010, 1-2) thus acknowledges “some things changed on September 11th, 2001,” but insists that
“some things did not change.” The latter includes the torture prohibition: “The legal prohibition on torture was then
and is now unequivocal and unconditional” (3). The 300-plus pages of Waldron’s book attest to the disintegration
of the torture prohibition, even as Waldron tries to restore it. Brent Steele (2008) also treats torture ethics as a more
complicated sort of object by showing how it is subject to an ongoing competition of American ideals.
10If the CIA did not understand this, the lawyers who provided their legal protections did. “Our advice is based
upon the following facts, which you have provided to us. We also understand that you do not have any facts in your
possession contrary to the facts outlined here, and this opinion is limited to these facts. If these facts were to change,
this advice would not necessarily apply” (Bybee and Yoo, 2002, 1, emphasis added).
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debate does have resources, though. As the review in chapter 2 has shown, the torture ethics debate
has many idiosyncratic, incommensurable frameworks for approaching torture ethics. It also has
a large number of vigorously contested facts that serve as inputs to those ethical arguments. As
an object of study, torture ethics comprises a vast collection of controversial parts. It is a Thing in
the sense that Latour borrows from Heidegger; it is rich set of associations, a contingent coming-
together.
Torture ethics is, in short, and imbroglio. In common usage, an imbroglio is “a confused heap”
a “tangle” or a “delicate and intricate situation.”11 In We Have Never Been Modern (henceforth
WNBM) Latour (1993) uses the term in much the same way to describe the phenomena he studied
as a leading figure in the field of science studies. “Science studies” loosely describes those scholars
who, for want of a better term “call ourselves sociologists, historians, economists, political scien-
tists, philosophers, or anthropologists,” yet always add the term “of science and technology” (3).
The imbroglio concept enters Latour’s philosophy through these interdisciplinary encounters with
science and technology, and his point is broader than simply to extend Heidegger’s notion of the
Thing to all objects. For Latour, imbroglios are implicated in a crisis of modernity. The presence of
so many imbroglios in the scientific fields that he and his colleagues studied shows that something
about modernity is unraveling.
Latour sees the unraveling as a crisis of modernity, but not necessarily an apocalyptic one.
Although real consequences are involved, the crisis of modernity is one of perception. Modernity
is for Latour a way of apprehending the world that is very good at certain things and not as good at
others. Specifically, modernity struggles to deal with “mixed-up affairs” that characterize so many
problems of late modernity (Latour, 1993, 2). He gives a prominent example from 1993:
The smallest AIDS virus takes you from sex to the unconscious, then to Africa, tissue
cultures, and San Francisco, but the analysts, thinkers, and decision-makers will slice
the delicate network traced for you by the virus into tidy compartments where you
will find only science, only economy, only social phenomena, only local news, only
11The American Heritage Dictionary (Evenson and Patwell, 1994, s.v. "imbroglio").
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sentiment, only sex. (1993, 2)
For Latour, the imperative to compartmentalize mixed-up affairs into recognizable categories works
against the nature of contemporary problems. Latour therefore sometimes finds himself attacked
as anti-scientific. Both before and after WNBM, many scientists have erroneously lumped science
studies in with radical critiques of knowledge, and then vigorously re-asserted the authority of sci-
entific categories and rules. Yet science studies scholars find their objects of study exceeding and
overflowing scientific categories and rules at every turn. The scientists, on the other hand, continue
to evaluate science studies on scientific terms—a development that political scientists and Inter-
national Relations scholars will recognize from their own battles over scientific validity.12 The
concern of the scientists is misplaced, since Latour is just as concerned with the goal of generating
useful knowledge as the scientists are. His concern about the faltering power of critique in Latour
(2004) demonstrates this. Nevertheless, years of studying scientists at work on their objects has led
Latour to a re-configuration of objects, actors, and the world that the scientists take as a rejection
of reality.13
Latour describes a two-part crisis of modernity in WNBM. The first part relates to the produc-
tion of knowledge and the other part in political life in late modernity. Imbroglios arise from the
first part of the crisis, in which pressing and interesting topics of study appear to overmatch the nar-
row disciplines that try to take them on. It has been the modern habit to work in deep disciplinary
grooves, and this habit has generated tremendous power throughout modernity.14 The same ways
of working with knowledge that produce that power, however, make imbroglios unintelligible.
The crisis arises because the actual problems of late modernity are mixed-up affairs—imbroglios.
There is for Latour a dangerous mismatch between the knowledge-producing rules that modern
12Compare for example the exchange between Latour (1999a) and David Bloor (1999) with the one between J. Ann
Tickner (2005) and Robert Keohane (1998). Proper scientists often demand that others treat the world and its objects
scientifically.
13Latour opens Pandora’s Hope (1999b, 1-10) by recounting an experience of being asked, “Do you believe in
reality?” See also his discussion with Graham Harman in Latour and Harman (2011).
14According to Wolin (2004, 396), from the early modern time of Francis Bacon, knowledge became identified with
the ability to generate practical power. A new “political theory of science” enabled the “organization of knowledge
and its conversion into practical inventions for the extraction of power from, and over, the material world” (397-98).
Moderns work in disciplinary grooves of organized knowledge because it gets results. See also Latour (1993, 35-37).
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science depends on and the actual problems facing society. Whatever has changed about the re-
lationship of contemporary problems to the late-modern world they inhabit has left the scientific
disciplines unable to cope with their objects. And ethics, at least when it seeks right answers, is a
scientific discipline.
The second part of the crisis is political. Latour points to the rapidly fading dream of post-
Cold War global transformation.15 Related to the first crisis of knowledge, the power of previous
critical stances has become dangerous, because their way of seeing obscures the currently relevant
problems. Although the “liberal West can hardly contain itself for joy” at the fall of the Berlin
Wall and all it symbolized, the “repressed returns” in the form of mass poverty and environmental
danger (Latour, 1993, 8). As early as 1993, Latour sees that the side-effects of the political triumph
over communism and the capitalist triumph over nature pose twin dangers that are unfortunately
“invisible only in the rich Western democracies” (9). Twenty years on, one could add terrorism,
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, failed or precarious revolutions in the Middle East, and sharper
ecological threats to the list of issues that are poorly addressed—and poorly apprehended—by
segmented disciplinary approaches to knowledge.
The crisis of knowledge production and the crisis of political power combine to form a single
crisis: the crisis of modernity.16 For Latour modernity is not an era but a way of perceiving and
living in the world that hinges on a stark conceptual separation of science and politics—of nature
and culture. In WNBM, as in his 2004 essay, the “modern critical stance” plays a role of the crisis.
Latour (1993, 9) finds no solace in the “antimodern” rejections of the ends of modernity, nor
15This may seem like a dead issue over twenty years later, but it still circulates in International Relations. Not only is
there still a crisis in world politics, some scholars think it is the same crisis. Harrison and McLaughlin Mitchell (2013,
1) argue that “The Arab Spring has reopened questions about global political change that have been salient since the
end of the Cold War.” They want to “reconvene interest in the sweeping visions of global order that followed the Cold
War” (21). Outside of International Relations, too, the same problems Latour discusses in 1993 have persisted. Latour
(2013) opens An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, for example, with the mixed-up problem of climate change, politics,
and science.
16I have not capitalized modern because its meaning is too flexible to bear the weight or a proper noun. The ordinary
word without quotes can be thought to refer to all the possibilities it symbolizes. I also have not placed it in quotes,
because neither I nor Latour want to simply debunk modernity. When Latour (1993, 10) asks “what if we had never
been modern?” as I am about to discuss, it is first of all an empirically-motivated question arising from his difficulties
with troublesome objects. Secondly, the thrust of his argument is not so much that modernity is a convention, and
a faltering one at that, but rather that understanding the structure and practices of that convention opens up new
possibilities for studying those difficult sociotechnical objects—which are the only objects we have.
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in the paralyzing indecision of post-modernity, nor in the frenetic delusions required to “remain
resolutely modern.” The antimodern, postmodern, and “resolutely modern” responses all fail to
address the twin crises of science and politics. Instead, those three stances preserve what Latour
sees as the central features of the crisis (9). That is, they all sustain the modern way life that Latour
(1993, 13) calls the “modern Constitution.” This is the case even though antimoderns reject that
Constitution and postmoderns ignore it.17
Ultimately Latour will seek a way out of the modern crisis that is not antimodern, postmodern,
or resolutely modern. There is competition, though, from within the resolutely modern stance that
thinks it holds the solution to the crisis. Latour locates the critical stance within the resolutely
modern, not the antimodern or postmodern.18 He argues that this is not the case. The modern
critical stance has three modes: naturalization, socialization, and deconstruction (6). These modes
each offer powerful but very fractional views. The power of each mode depends on “feeding on the
weaknesses of the other two” (6). For that to happen successfully, the modes have to be kept apart,
such that “the epistemologists, sociologists, and deconstructionists remain at arm’s length” (6).
The modern crisis that Latour is so concerned about has come about in part because the problems,
as imbroglios, now frequently exceed the capabilities of any single mode of the modern critical
stance.
Latour (1993, 10) argues that “the word ’modern’ designates two sets of entirely different prac-
tices which must remain distinct if they are to remain effective, but have recently begun to be con-
fused.” He says that “translation” practices create “mixtures between entirely new types of beings,
hybrids of nature and culture” (10). “Purification” practices, on the other hand, carefully separate
nature and culture, humans and nonhumans, science and politics, into “two entirely distinct onto-
logical zones” (10). The modes of the modern critical stance—naturalization, sociologization, and
17See Latour (1993, 9). Antimoderns become “reactionaries” either by deciding that “We must no longer try to put
an end to man’s domination of man,” or alternatively by deciding “we must no longer try to dominate nature” (9).
What Latour calls “the vague expression of postmodernism” cannot decide between modernism and antimodernism,
and the postmoderns “remain suspended between doubt and belief” (9).
18It may seem odd to characterize critique as modern as Latour (1993, 5) does, because modernity often seems to
be the subject of critiques and postmodernity is popularly associated with criticism. For Latour, the critical impulse
itself is modern, and manifests in scientific, sociological, and linguistic/semiotic modes. While the antimodernism and
postmodernism are critical in the sense that they reject modernism, they do nothing to change it.
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deconstruction—are all purification practices. Latour uses the term “modern Constitution” to refer
to a set of interlocking agreements that perform two important tasks. First, the modern Constitu-
tion keeps nature and culture—non-humans and humans—separate. Secondly, it keeps the work
of purification visible and in the foreground, while hiding the work of translation (13 and 29f.).
These two careful separations—first of nature and culture, and then of translation and purification
practices—are what keeps modernity together. “So long as we consider these two practices of
translation and purification separately, we are truly modern” (11). The modern Constitution holds
modernity together but is seriously challenged by imbroglios that its modes of analysis cannot
understand.
The modern way of looking at the world attempts to clear up, categorize, and straighten out
complex problems instead of treating them as imbroglios. To be modern is to purify in one way
or another, while ignoring the proliferation of hybrids.19 Latour (1993, 12) says “the more we
forbid ourselves to conceive of hybrids, the more possible their interbreeding becomes—such is
the paradox of the moderns.” Moderns have become incredibly good at purification, and achieved
unfathomable things with it. Naturalization, it must be recalled, was once a radical new form
of critique leveled against traditional powers of religion and superstition. “Freed from religious
bondage, the moderns could criticize the obscurantism of the old powers by revealing the material
causality that those powers dissimulated” (35). This had the effect of generating the temporal
break of modernity, between the dark past and the “luminous dawn that cleanly separated material
causality from human fantasy” (35).
In turn, the next mode of the modern critical stance leveraged “the newly-founded social sci-
ences to destroy the excesses of naturalization” (Latour, 1993, 35). The methods of social critique
clarified natural science by making it possible to “distinguish the truly scientific component of
the other sciences from the component attributable to ideology” (35). Moderns are thus “solidly
grounded” in both a “certainty of nature’s laws” and a “certainty that humans make their own
19Latour calls specific mixtures of nature and culture “hybrids.” An imbroglio is a more general situation featuring
a collection of hybrids. This impression should not be viewed too systematically, though, since that would cut against
the spirit of understanding imbroglios.
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destiny” (36). On both counts, they are equipped to “criticize and unveil, denounce and express
indignation at irrational beliefs and indignations” (36). In this way, moderns have made themselves
“invincible” (37f.).
The modern Constitution—which is, again, the separation of nature and culture, plus the sepa-
ration of the work of purification from the work of translation—has “provided the moderns with the
daring to mobilize things and people on a scale that they would otherwise have disallowed” (La-
tour, 1993, 41). Premoderns are distinguished by their mixing of natural and social orders, which
leads to “the impossibility of changing the social order without modifying the natural order—and
vice versa” (42). Modern societies do not have that concern, so they can operate on massive scales.
Premoderns have to worry about changing one order when they change the other. However, from
Latour’s point of view, we have never been modern. The presence of so many imbroglios sug-
gests that the two separations that keep the modern Constitution in place might not remain tenable
anymore.
Latour seems to have nowhere to turn. He does not want to be antimodern, since a firm rejection
of the modern Constitution tends to sustain it. He does not want to be postmodern, since suspension
between modernity and antimodernity is ineffectual. “The antimoderns, like the postmoderns, have
accepted their adversaries playing field” (Latour, 1993, 48). He does not even want to directly
critique the modern Constitution using any of its own tools, since that would only exacerbate the
problem.
Latour’s (1993, 48) innovation is to imagine the “field of nonmodern worlds” that inhabits
the middle ground between non-human and human, between nature and culture. The nonmodern
dimension has apparently always been there, since the division between pre-modern and modern
was invented by the modern Constitution in the first place. The nonmodern dimension is even
familiar to philosophers in the sense that they have struggled for hundreds of years to bridge the
conceptual gap between the “nature pole” and the “subject/society pole” in various ways (51).
According to Latour, dialectics fails at this task because the relation it establishes between subject
and object expands the separation between the work of purification and the work of mediation. By
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“believing that he was abolishing Kant’s separation between things-in-themselves and the subject,
Hegel brought the separation even more fully to life. He raised it to the level of a contradiction,
pushed it to the limit and beyond, then made it the driving force of history.”20 Latour says that
semiotic approaches fail to bridge the nature-society gap because they separate language from both
nature and society. “If one autonomizes discourse by turning nature over to the epistemologists
and giving up society to the sociologists, one makes it impossible to stitch these three resources
back together” (64). He argues that the philosophy of Being fails to bridge the nature-society gap
because it makes being too specialized. Heidegger and “his epigones do not expect to find Being
except along the Black Forest Holzwege” (65).
Latour does not find any of these solutions appealing. They intensify the modern crisis rather
than solve it. Modernizers have “a clear objective” to cleanly separate society from nature, and
“through increasingly terrifying revolutions, they have been able to tear themselves away from the
past.”21 For Latour, there is less tension and more interesting activity in the middle, between the
pole of nature and the pole of society. In other words, he does not denounce the work of purification
in order to praise or substitute the work of mediation. Latour’s solution is not to disavow those
poles but to reinstate the existence of the middle ground, the nonmodern zone populated by hybrids
of nature and society. He gives a precedent for his approach in the field of anthropology.
Latour (1993, 132) wants to retain “everything” from the moderns except their “exclusive con-
fidence” in the work of purification. The Constitution “will need to be amended somewhat to
include its lower half too” (132-33). The lower half means the work of mediation, the proliferation
of hybrids. Purification is a convention that depends on the work of mediation. Latour rejects the
modern insistence on suppressing knowledge of that connection. To overcome the crisis of moder-
20See Latour (1993, 57). He adds that the dialectical philosophers achieve a false kind of mixture: “Hybrids are
indeed accepted, but only as mixtures of pure forms in equal proportion” (56). An example of such mixtures might
well be Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1990, 178-83) highly dialectical concept of “worked matter.” Sartre’s concept of the social
is so rooted in the philosophy of Being, however, that his worked matter remains a “mixture of pure forms” to the
degree that Sartre keeps apart his pole of Matter and pole of Being. Latour explicitly seeks to work in space between
such poles.
21Latour (1993, 130). He adds that once moderns fully break from the past, “we shall all be equally modern” and
that “Certain modernizers continue to speak as if such a fate were possible and desirable.” Such is the view of Harrison
and McLaughlin Mitchell (2013).
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nity, Latour wants to restore symmetrical attention to the two kinds of work, which really amounts
to granting recognition to the work of mediation
3.2.2 Torture Ethics as an Imbroglio
Torture ethics is an imbroglio. The substantive focus on “sociotechnical” objects inherited from
Latour’s early work does not limit the reach of the concept. In WNBM Latour (1993) implicates
imbroglios in a much larger philosophical project. Torture ethics mixes nature and society, non-
human and human, object and subject just as much as any microbes, soil, power plant or trans-
portation system that science studies scholars would more commonly take interest in.
As an object of study, torture ethics is obviously social in that it is concerned with the right
course of action for a political community to take regarding torture. It is even social on multiple
levels. There are additional social interactions between the torturer and the tortured person, and
between the communities in conflict that have given rise to the type of torture that is the focus of
the current torture debate. From any point in the phenomenon of contemporary torture, further
social relationships can be traced to lawyers, writers, protesters, and myriad other relationships.
Torture ethics is also natural. This does not mean that it is “natural” to torture. Torture is natural
in the sense that the non-human realm is involved. Indeed, the notion that torture dehumanizes its
victims means that they are turned into matter. Torture ethics also belongs to the realm of nature
through the factual and scientific claims that circulate through its arguments. The claim that torture
forces people to divulge important information is a claim about the natural world. The stipulation
in the ticking bomb scenario that the person to be tortured has the relevant information is also a
claim about the natural world.
Thus, both natural and social elements are present in torture ethics. However, even the state-
ments above are doing some work of purification, as Latour would say. The kind of mixture that
Latour is talking about is characterized by a mixture of social and natural elements that is hard to
disentangle. It is not a mixture of purities. The more complete presumption in the torture ethics
debate concerns whether certain kinds of bodies, from certain social groups, located in other ge-
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ographic territories, possess relevant life-saving information, and whether that information can be
extracted through the application of intense pain. All of the these elements are mixed up in the
torture ethics imbroglio.
Torture ethics faces a crisis analogous to the crisis of modernity that Latour is addressing. The
problem of torture ethics exceeds the categories of the primary techniques used to attack it. Those
techniques all do the work of purification, and thus express some element of the modern critical
stance. Specifically, each approach reviewed in chapter 2 tries to naturalize torture ethics. The
authors proceed as if there is a correct ethical approach to torture, which they intend to find by
clarifying the issues around it. In the language of Latour’s modern Constitution, they naturalize
torture ethics. The problem, as I described it in chapter 2, is that they each naturalize it in a
different way. The utilitarians purify torture ethics for a world where ethical objects get their
existence from a value comparison. The deontologists purify torture ethics for a world where
actions themselves have moral valences. The lone proponent of virtue ethics purifies torture for
a world where living well together is the highest good. And this is not even the whole story of
purification. The discussion in section 2.3 serves as a warning that many more purifications will
be found within each of these broad ethical traditions.
More work of purification and more denunciations will continue to worsen the crisis of torture
ethics. It will produce more complicated hybrid connections, and those connections will have
to continue to be denied, hidden, and suppressed by the critical techniques of the various torture
ethics approaches. The more those connections are denied, the more the Hydra-like imbroglio of
torture ethics will continue to exceed and overrun the hard work of those trying hardest to wrangle
and settle it.
The crisis of contemporary torture ethics might provoke the same sorts of responses that Latour
saw for the crisis of modernity. Antimoderns might decide that we should “no longer try to put an
end to man’s domination of man” (Latour, 1993, 9). This is at the heart of the vague but powerful
claim that “something changed” on September 11, 2001. For antimoderns, retaliatory violence is
of little concern, since it was a mistake to think the world could be different. That event created
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an opening for selective antimodernism: some people are not of the modern world, and should not
enjoy its protections.
The resolutely modern have become enmeshed in an endless debate about torture ethics. The
chief feature of the debate is the suppression of relevant disagreements about questions associated
with torture ethics. That suppression sustains the illusion that torture ethics scholars are engaging
in a common debate, when in fact they are not even talking about the same thing. Torture and
the question of its moral status both symbolize something slightly different for each torture ethics
scholar. The work of purification does not turn torture ethics into a concrete object of study. It
turns torture ethics into many different objects of study that have the same name and are treated as
one.
The approach taken in this dissertation follows Latour in drawing attention back to the work of
mediation that connects the issues and entities associated with torture ethics. My basic assumption
is that torture is, as an object of study, an imbroglio, and must be worked with as such. That
means looking specifically at those points where the work of torture ethics runs into more and
more controversies that are paradoxically caused by the hard work that is being done to clarify it.
3.3 Social Theory for Social Problems
One way that I have characterized the very diverse views on torture ethics is to say that torture
ethics are not sociable. By this I mean that the ethical course of action as viewed from one
person’s ethical framework is basically not comparable to the right course of action from a different
ethical framework. Imbroglios and the modern crisis that Latour situates them in are useful for
thinking of torture ethics as a different kind of object of study. In other words, following Latour’s
recommendation to recover the work of mediation addresses the torture ethics part of my statement.
The other aspect of the statement is the claim that torture ethics are not sociable. Torture ethics
scholars have demonstrated that it is possible, if difficult, to develop approaches to torture ethics.
They have shown that it is much more difficult, if not impossible, to socialize any one of those
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approaches. Torture ethics needs more than just to be understood as a new kind of object of study.
It needs a new approach to social theory. Without that, the work of re-imagining of torture ethics
will remain at most a philosophical curiosity.
3.3.1 What Kind of Social Theory is Needed
Given what Latour said above about the modern critical stance, however, the turn to social theory
should be taken with caution. Sociologization is one of the three prongs of the modern critical
stance.22 As a means of purification, social theory runs the risk of generating more and more
hybrids and mixtures in the torture ethics debate, and then suppressing them. That has been the
result so far with the naturalization approach, and also with the available sociological approaches
to torture and torture ethics, which I have refrained from discussing up to this point. The existing
encounters between torture and social theory are instructive for shaping a revision of social theory
in torture ethics research. However, the available social approaches have not had the same goal I
am focusing on here, which is to make torture ethics sociable.
A famous intersection of social theory and torture comes from Foucault (1995). In Discipline
and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, Foucault is not engaging torture ethics. He is instead ex-
plaining the emergence and the form of modern penal institutions. The source of explanation he
turns to is a significant change in the configuration of social and political power in early modernity.
More generally, Foucault’s analysis draws attention to the necessary presence of social theory in
any account of torture ethics. Social theory is an important addition to the long list of interrelated
questions associated with torture.
One interesting upshot is that Beccaria and other 18th-century liberal reformers can be re-read
as social theorists. One narrative sees Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments a a bright spot in
his otherwise lackluster career. Monachesi (1955, 440 and 449) separates Beccaria’s penal reform
22Recall that Latour (1993, 10) names sociologization as one of the three modes of the modern critical stance, with
the other two being naturalization and deconstruction. Sociologization roughly corresponds to purifying work (again,
Latour’s term) that invokes abstract aggregate formations as causal explanations. Naturalization roughly corresponds
to science, and deconstruction corresponds to semiotic and linguistic critiques.
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work from his early work on monetary reform that is “of no current significance,” and argue that
“[with] the publication of Dei delitti e delle pene Beccaria’s literary productivity comes rather
abruptly to an end.” Monachesi (1955, 440) separates Crimes from Beccaria’s political economy
and ignores the latter.
Against this reading, Foucault reads Beccaria’s penology as political economy.23 Foucault
(1995, 73ff.) uses torture as a to build his case that early modern liberal punishment demonstrates
a change in the economy of power. Before modernity, torture and public execution decisively
showed the “hand-to-hand fight between the vengeance of the prince and the contained anger of
the people, through the mediation of the executioner.”24 But the danger of openly demonstrating
this confrontation spurred a “rearrangement of the power to punish” in the form of “continuously
distributed effects of public power” (80-81).
This reconfiguration of punishment and power tamed the dangerous and inefficient polarity be-
tween the prince’s “super-power” and the petty criminal’s “infra-power” by constructing a system
of rational, liberal, penal relations between them (Foucault, 1995, 87f.). The rationalization of
power that Beccaria advocated and Foucault describes constitutes a change in the social order. It
was and is designed to strengthen the social power of the sate. “Nothing so weakens the machin-
ery of law than the hope of going unpunished,” so punishments must be known, predictable, and
rational (96).
Although Foucault’s book does not specifically address the ethics of torture, the relationship it
poses between society and torture (or punishment) is instructive. That is, Foucault uses changes
in the social configuration of power to explain the demise of torture executions and the emergence
of rationalized punishment. Torture, or rather its decline, is the thing to be explained. This rela-
tionship of social thought and torture holds little promise for the problem under consideration in
23Another treatment that links Beccaria’s penology with his political economy scholarship and bureaucratic reforms
more fairly comes from Richard Bellamy (in Beccaria, 1995).
24See Foucault (1995, 73). The word modernity here and in Foucault’s book refers to the era—Beccaria’s book was
first published in 1764—and the ideas that distinguished it. Foucault is not giving the word “modern” the technical
sense it picks up through Latour’s philosophy and particularly the “modern Constitution.” Note that the modern penal
reforms Foucault discusses are consistent with the work of purification that Latour talks about, even though Latour’s
work post-dates Foucault.
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this dissertation, though. As I have described at length above, there is no suitable generalization
that can be made with respect to the social group debating torture ethics. The early modern ra-
tionalizing reforms of political power that Foucault refers to may not be entirely uncontroversial,
but they are generally accepted enough for him to use as explanatory resources for his purposes.
In the case of torture ethics, there is no uncontroversial account to accept. Instead, the intensity
of the controversy is what needs to be explained. This dissertation is not trying to explain why
torture is happening or receiving official justification now. Instead, the goal here is to describe the
controversy in a way that makes it possible to imagine a how such disagreeable folks can still come
to an agreement on an ethical course of action.
In William T. Cavanaugh’s Torture and Eucharist (1998), social causes once again explain
torture. In this case, torture serves as evidence of the dominant social form that the military dic-
tatorship in Chile (1973–1990) sought to impose on its citizens. Cavanaugh lived in Chile in the
1980’s, and returned to do research in 1993 (ix, 2). The usual narrative often faults the Catholic
Church in Chile as too closely allied with the state and the Pinochet regime particularly. The
bishops who did object to torture did so reservedly and privately, and the Church’s active resis-
tance came only after the worst abuses. Cavanaugh (1998, ch. 2) complicates this narrative to
draw a parallel between state torture and the Eucharist. Torture is designed to destroy the political
body of Christ—and indeed any body, organization, group, or assembly other than itself, while
the Eucharist re-assembles that body.25 Thus “[state] power is enacted in a liturgy of torture,”
but this can occur without Catholic resistance only because according to Cavanaugh, the Church
misunderstood its social role (34).
Cavanaugh first establishes torture as a problem for the church’s self-understanding. As the
“liturgy” of the oppressive Chilean state, torture “is much more than an assault on the bodies of
individuals; it is rather an assault on social bodies” (Cavanaugh, 1998, 22). A dictatorial regime
like Chile’s needs to be the only social body, in order to retain full state control, and it controls
25See Cavanaugh (1998, 45). According to Cavanaugh, the Christian community gathers for the celebration of the
Eucharist (or mass), which then becomes the “political body” of Christ.
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citizens by fully atomizing them through the elimination of all competing social forms.26 Thus for
Cavanaugh, the state and the church in Chile represented competing social forces and forms. Tor-
ture and the eucharist are engaged in a “larger contest of imaginations” between church and state
(65). Church and state compete over the predominance of two very different worlds: “A crucial
difference in these imaginations is that the imagination of the church is essentially eschatological;
the church is not a rival polis but points to an alternative time and space, a mingling of heaven and
earth” (65).
For Cavanaugh, as for Foucault, social phenomena explain torture. Because Chile was a dic-
tatorship, it required total social control of their individual subjects. The Pinochet regime used
torture to exercise control over individuals, and used the public knowledge of their torture to ex-
ert social control. In order to respond appropriately, the Church, according to Cavanaugh, had to
significantly reinterpret its own role as a social force within Chile. With respect to the problem
under consideration here, Cavanaugh’s social approach to torture is unsuitable. Cavanaugh fea-
tures two social forces rather than the one large shift that Foucault used. But the riot of competing
approaches to torture ethics cannot be socialized under two groups any more than it can under one.
Furthermore, the complex social problem of competing torture ethics approaches is what needs to
be explained.
International Relations scholars have also produced torture scholarship using social theory.
Indeed, the resurgence of the torture debate after 2001 coincided with a period where social theory
was, if not quite ascendant in IR, at least established as a relevant and interesting way of engaging
with world politics.27 It is now acceptable to talk about the role of social norms, in addition to
power and state interests, in studying international conflict. As social norms go, torture is the
paradigmatic case of an imploding norm: something that was thought to be firm and widely held
26One problem with Cavanaugh’s book is that he does not say whether torture is the underlying logic of all temporal
states, and by omission leaves this possibility open. Put more moderately, he bases his argument for the church as a
political body on the worst behavior by the worst kind of state. Clearly not all states are dictatorships that torture.
Cavanaugh (1998, 71) does not say how the church as a political body should relate to a rights-respecting democracy,
only that “the church knows as the body of Christ that it will inevitably come into conflict with the disciplines of the
principalities and powers.”
27Even Thucydides became a constructivist that year (Lebow, 2001), and then realism became compatible with
constructivism (Barkin, 2003).
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crumbled quickly instead. Rosemary Foot (2006) identified this normative collapse as the key issue
issue in the torture debate, while Kennedy-Pipe and Mumford (2007) and Linklater (2007) have
proposed ways to bolster or restore the anti-torture norm.
Ryder McKeown (2009) views the collapse of the torture norm as an important challenge for
constructivist scholarship in International relations. McKeown (2009, 6) argues that constructivist
IR scholars have focused on the emergence and effects of norms, and not paid sufficient attention
to their “conditions of retrogression” or the “domestic processes through which norms either gain
or lose salience.” Using a slightly different social approach, Brent Steele (2008) views the compro-
mised torture norm in terms of ontological security, and develops a different strategy for restoring
the norm by playing competing experiences of national shame off of each other.
These IR scholars use social theory engage the torture ethics debate, but not quite as the kind
of open question I specified to limit the review in chapter 2. The questions they try to answer
concern the role of international norms in the prohibiting torture, unexpected changes in the global
anti-torture norm, how norms can regress or collapse, and how norms might be restored. These
IR works recognize a shift in the anti-torture norm, so in one sense the question of torture’s moral
status is open. In none of them, however, does the moral status of torture really appear to be what is
at stake. Instead, the norm that expresses that moral status in world politics that is what is at issue.
These works exhibit a more complex social landscape than either Foucault or Cavanaugh, and they
are more centrally concerned with torture ethics. Yet they are still social visions that explain what
is happening with torture.
The question I am asking in this dissertation is not about what happened to the torture norm
or how to repair it. I am asking how a community can choose an ethical course of action when
its members adhere to myriad different ethical frameworks. In other words, I seek to explain the
peculiar society formed by people who disagree about torture ethics.28 That explanation could then
facilitate a kind of ethical reasoning appropriate to the environment. Scholarship in which society
28Latour creates a bit of trouble by characterizing the problem as a confusion of the explanatory resource and what
is being explained. As I hope to show in section 3.3.2, the explanation of society that arises actually takes more of a
descriptive form.
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explains something about torture, as is the case with Foucault, Cavanaugh, and the International
Relations scholars mentioned here, can have many merits.29 As described, however, supporting a
torture ethics is not one of them.
3.3.2 Latour’s Actor-Network Theory Approach
Latour (2005) offers an approach to social theory in Reassembling the social (henceforth RS)
that is suitable for the problem I have outlined. Latour (1993) appealed to anthropology as a
model in WNBM because anthropologists proved capable of integrating their analyses of natural
and cultural phenomena—at least so long as they worked outside modern societies.30 In RS he
grounds his approach more fully in social theory. When I described torture ethics as an imbroglio
that is experiencing a crisis similar to the one Latour sees in the modern critical stance, I meant to
illustrate why a new approach is necessary and how torture should be viewed as an object of study.
Here, Reassembling the social provides the method.
The shift from anthropology in WNBM (1993) to social theory in RS (2005) hints at the way
Latour and others have come to understand their imbroglios. They see imbroglios as networks
of associating objects and agencies. In the terms from Latour (2004), the social group comes
together in the Thing. We are gathered together in our objects, and an imbroglio is a collected and
collective object. In that sense, the transformation of objects into imbroglios implies a matching
transformation in social thought.
Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which is the name Latour and his colleagues have given their
approach, focuses on the process of associating and assembling. It differs from more typical so-
ciological work by rejecting the idea of a stable social material that can serve as an explanatory
29To put this in more social-scientific terms, Foucault and Cavanaugh position society as an independent variable,
and punishment (for Foucault) or torture (for Cavanaugh) as the dependent variable. In that arrangement, changes at
the social level explain changes in punishment and torture. The difficulty with using that type of social analysis for
torture ethics is that, as I have argued, the problem has to do with how dissimilar entities come together. From the
point of view that Latour’s ANT affords, the thing to observe is how society comes together. If society is already
presumed, no ANT analysis is possible.
30See Latour (1993, 7). “In the works produced by anthropologists abroad, you will not find a single trait that is
not simultaneously real, social, and narrated” (Latour, 1993, 7). He returns to anthropology in his most recent work
(Latour, 2013), subtitled “an anthropology of the moderns.”
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resource for other phenomena. Latour takes his inspiration from those who “believed sociology
could be a science of how society is held together, instead of using sociology to explain something
else.”31 Chief among these is Gabriel Tarde (14f.). Tarde’s approach differs from Durkheim’s on
the direction of social explanation, and according to Latour, most current sociological approaches
have descended from Durkheim. The approach advocated by Tarde, which focuses on the phe-
nomena of association, has mostly died out. Tarde says, “I explain collective resemblances of the
whole by the massing of minute elementary acts.”32
Latour’s general complaint is that the dominant approach to social explanation obscures the
actual material and activity of associating. Sociology “has confused the explanans with the ex-
planandum: society is the consequence of associations and not their cause” (Latour, 2005, 238).
That makes the dominant mode of social explanation ineffective for controversial issues like his
science studies topics—and torture in this case. The sorts of things that Latour wants to understand
motivate him to adopt this different approach to theorizing the social. Latour calls the dominant
approach, in which sociologists invoke society as a source of explanation, “sociology of the So-
cial.”33
However, Latour is not simply advocating a shift to the local scale. Although “the global has
no concrete existence,” he says, “neither has the local” (Latour, 2005, 192). When local phenom-
ena are closely analyzed, they become as uncertain as the Social, and therefore cannot serve as
explanations in themselves.34 Instead, local phenomena continually open up new connections and
avenues to other actors and places. Therefore explanations that refer to the “individual” are just
as suspect as those appealing to the Social, because face-to-face interactions are always subject
31See Latour (2005, 11, emphasis added). As I mentioned in note 29 above, Foucault (1995) “uses sociology to
explain something else” when he argues that changes in the way political power was understood by early modern
rulers led to the demise of public torture-executions and the rise of prisons.
32Tarde is quoted in Latour (2005, 15). In Latour’s hands the focus on “minute elementary acts,” winds up ruling
out explanations from the Social and the individual, although that is very difficult to grasp in this very abstract sketch.
33Latour (2005, 9). The approach Latour develops from Tarde should not be confused with “critical sociology.”
Critical sociology does not solve the problem Latour is concerned with, which is explaining the ways that things come
to associate. Critical sociology “doesn’t only limit itself to the social but replaces the object to be studied by another
made of social relations.” (Latour, 2005, 9)
34Latour capitalizes “Social” when referring to the sort of presumed aggregates that are not permissible in his
approach.
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to “interference by the action of others” (199). Local interactions seem to be “overflowing in all
directions,” so “the solid ground of the local” also vanishes (202). As a result, “subjectivity and
objectivity are entirely reshuffled” (218). What is often found at the individual level are pointers to
unified (and to Latour, impermissible) social concepts. The liberal individual subject, for example,
contains and expresses a certain image of the social. Latour’s criticism of the way that sociology
of the Social misuses social explanation cannot be overcome simply by transferring the location of
those social concepts to the individual level.
What remains for social investigation, Latour tells us, are three goals. The first is to exploit so-
cial controversies rather than explain them with social concepts (Latour, 2005, 16). The second is
to observe the traces left as actors try to stabilize those controversies, and the third is to “reassem-
ble the social not in a society but in a collective” (16). These three goals form the broad outline of
Latour’s approach to ANT. I apply these elements to the following investigation of torture ethics,
with the emphasis on exploiting controversies and observing traces. By doing so, I reimagine the
social arrangement of disagreeable participants in the debate.
In the first stage of Latour’s ANT, controversies are exploited through a series of five “uncer-
tainties” regarding the nature of groups, the nature of actions, the nature of objects, the nature of
facts, and the type of studies (Latour, 2005, 22). Controversies are usually obstacles to research,
because they prevent the analyst from getting the facts and rules well in hand. For Latour, contro-
versies are actually the stuff the analyst works with.35 Regarding the first source of uncertainty, for
Latour groups cannot be abstract categories with general characteristics. Instead, groups are “the
provisional product of a constant uproar” (31). Society is not defined by any overarching charac-
teristic, boundary, or identity. Instead, the social group consists of anything connected by small
but reliable traces of associations. There is “no relevant group that can be said to make up social
aggregates, no established component that can be used as an incontrovertible starting point” (29).
35For example, the definition of torture is controversial. For most researchers, that controversy is an obstacle that
delays them from getting to what they want to find out or say about torture. The definition needs to be established, or
purified in Latour’s terms. Section 3.4.1 argues that this controversy is more or less endless, and that the ways torture
ethics scholars bracket or limit the scope of the problem leads to other difficulties. For Latour, such controversies
provide enormous amounts of data through the five “uncertainties” discussed here.
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This does not mean that groups don’t exist, only that they continually come into existence through
acts of association. From the ANT point of view, “if you stop making and remaking groups, you
stop having groups” (35).
The second source of uncertainty views action as a radically under-determined phenomenon
(Latour, 2005, 45). For Latour, action is local and particular.36 Society cannot act in the way that
sociology of the Social claims, since predetermined aggregates are ruled out by the first source
of uncertainty. For Latour, action is not simply an exercise of will, but “action should rather be
felt as a node, a knot, and a conglomerate of many forces, many surprising sets of agencies that
have to be slowly disentangled” (44). Latour insists that “we are never alone in carrying out a
course of action” (44). Actors never act alone because action is “overtaken” by other agencies
(45). Crucially, and in keeping with the first source of uncertainty, it is not some general force that
overtakes action. Action is overtaken because it can always be traced back, forward, and across to
other actions and agents. I write these lines not only by my own agency, but in response to other
agencies that work through me. Readers read them for the same reasons. The under-determination
of action prompts ANT researchers to examine the networks of small agencies that come together
in any particular action.
The third source of uncertainty builds on the second by extending agency to non-humans. That
is not to grant “causal agency to technical objects,” but rather to rediscover the real ways that
objects “transport” and modify human actions (Latour, 2005, 70). Because ANT understands the
social as the momentary coming together of entities, the entities themselves that come together are
understood as non-social (65). Humans may be social animals, but for ANT the social is not a
sort of zoo that the social humans live in. It is the contingent and momentary coming together of
those humans. The ANT understanding of the social, therefore, allows for non-human elements to
associate along with the humans. For Latour, “the questions to ask about any agent are simply the
following: Does it make a difference in the course of another agent’s action or not? Is there some
36When Latour (2005, 202) says that the “solid ground of the local” vanishes, as I mentioned above, his emphasis
is on the “solid ground” part, not the “local” part. In a sense, all Latour does is track local phenomena between actors.
What he rules out in the comment just quoted is, instead, any chance of transporting the abstract social forces he’s
trying to avoid into individual or local phenomena.
87
trial that allows someone to detect this difference?”37 Because both humans and non-humans can
be actors, Latour prefers the term “actant” to describe the entities, both humans and objects, that
act (2005, 54f.).
The fourth source of uncertainty substitutes “matters of concern” in the place of contested facts
(Latour, 2005, 114). “After having doubted the ’socio’ in the word socio-logy, we now have to
doubt its ’logy”’ (2005, 88). In his essay on critique, Latour (2004) appropriated Heidegger’s
notion of the thing and made it applicable to all kinds of objects, rather than only the romantic,
rustic, “authentic” objects that appealed to Heidegger. Here, Latour incorporates that argument
into his version of ANT social theory. Facts themselves are associations or “gatherings” (2005,
114). This view transforms matters of fact into matters of concern. It treats facts—objects of
knowledge—as gatherings of material and agency. Facts come together in an act of association
just like a car or a tennis racket gathers together a multitude small acts and pieces of material. This
difference between Latour’s account and the kind of “social construction” familiar in International
Relations is that, due to the first source of uncertainty above, there is no aggregate society that
constructs facts.38 For Latour, the facts themselves are instances association where non-social
entities gather socially.
It is because matters of fact express contingent, momentary comings-together that they become
matters of concern. Facts are just matters of concern whose coming-together is holding up well
against challengers and time. For this reason, Latour’s shift of attention from matters of fact to
matters of concern is fully consistent with his negative view of debunking. Matters of concern
do create an enormous temptation to debunk dubious facts. However, that temptation is not just
37See Latour (2005, 71). In Pandora’s Hope Latour (1999b) gives a more concrete example of a non human actor
that “makes a difference in the course of another agent’s action,” a gun. A gun is not a conscious actor, but when it
comes in contact with a human, both the gun and the person are transformed. The coming together of the human and
the gun facilitates “the creation of a new goal which corresponds to neither agent’s program of action” (1999b, 178).
“Which of them, then, the gun or the citizen, is the actor in this situation? Someone else (a citizen-gun, a gun-citizen)”
(Latour, 1999a, 179).
38Constructivism has been widely debated in IR, and I do not want to divert discussion to IR constructivism here.
It would be an oversimplification to caricature IR constructivists as arguing that an already-aggregated “society”
constructs facts. As I noted above, McKeown (2009, 6) has argued that IR constructivists devote considerable effort
to understanding norm emergence and diffusion, at least internationally. But even granting that IR constructivists
think about emergence of norms, and not just their imposition by social aggregates, Latour’s view here remains utterly
distinctive.
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tempered but fully vacated because all facts are potentially matters of concern. Focusing on matters
of concern does not, therefore, license the wagging of fingers at others’ shoddy facts. The purpose
of focusing on matters of concern is to see what is actually coming together.
Finally, the report itself is the fifth source of uncertainty. For Latour, the “writing down of
accounts” like this dissertation is part of the activity of tracing a networks of social activity (2005,
122). An account “is typically a text, a small ream of paper a few millimeters thick that is darkened
by a laser beam” (122). More colorfully, it is a “report prepared under immense duress on a topic
requested by some colleagues for reasons that will remain for the most part unexplained” (123).
He characterizes “a good account as one that traces a network,” and says “a good ANT account
is a narrative or a description or a proposition where all the actors do something and don’t just sit
there” (128). The risky report is a story of associating actants—human and non-human nodes of
agency and material—coming together and dispersing.
Latour’s instructions for what to do with these sources of uncertainty are as follows. First, it
is necessary to shift attention from the global to the local level. This is not a preference for a kind
of localism, but an insistence on tracing concrete actions: “we have to lay continuous connections
leading from one local interaction to other places, times, and agencies through which the local
site is made to do something” (Latour, 2005, 173f., emphasis in original). The next instruction
is to assess the shape of those connections without resorting to either a local or global frame of
reference.39 After shifting attention from the “global, the contextual, and the structural” to small
nodes, and then making each of those “into the provisional endpoint of some other sites distributed
in time and space,” Latour has arrived at his full and final instruction of tracing networks. For
Latour,
Every time a connection has to be established, a new conduit has to be laid down and
some new type of entity has to be transported through it. What circulates, so to speak,
’inside’ the conduits are the very acts of giving something a dimension. Whenever a
39See Latour (2005, 191ff.). “How far can we maintain a point of view that abstains from ever using the local/global
or the actor/system repertoire? Once again, I am not trying to describe substantively or positively what the landscape
is, but simply finding ways to resist the temptation to make a break in its description” (206, emphasis added).
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locus wishes to act on another locus, it has to go through some medium, transporting
something all the way; to go on acting, it has to maintain some sort of more or less
durable connection. Conversely, every locus is now the target of many such activities,
the crossroads of many such tracks, the provisional repository of many such vehicles.
(Latour, 2005, 221f.)
3.3.3 Applying Latour’s ANT to Torture Ethics
For social science, and especially on the disciplinary occasion of a doctoral dissertation, this is
heady stuff. A report using Latour’s philosophy of imbroglios, non-modernity, uncertainties, ac-
tants and networks ought to come with its own beret and a pack of Gauloises. In my defense, I was
driven into Latour’s arms, more or less, by the stubbornness of torture as a topic. For example,
every good researcher knows that defining terms is an essential and very preliminary task. Yet
defining torture turned out to be immensely difficult, and I eventually came to see it as counterpro-
ductive.
It happens that torture ethics is ideally suited for ANT analysis. It is composed much more of
controversies and uncertainties than of reliable facts. No over-arching social approach to torture
ethics can be imposed on the highly idiosyncratic ethical frameworks of the actors. The failure
of all attempts to impose such a framework is the central problem of torture ethics. Moreover,
that central problem is not susceptible to typical critiques. Instead, a straightforward critique that
stakes a position within the controversies and tries to resolve them will inevitably produce further
controversies that must then also be suppressed. By following Latour’s approach, I can exploit
those controversies rather than trying—in vain—to resolve them. The controversies produce the
content of the social phenomenon of torture ethics; they are what is collected.
Latour’s first source of uncertainty rules out the idea of a pre-existing social aggregate in which
the torture ethics debate could take place. This transforms torture ethics from a disagreement within
a group or between groups into a site where actants come together in a contingent social formation.
The torture ethics debate is the coming together, in a network, of the actors who disagree about
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torture and the materials they bring with them. The second and third sources of uncertainty—the
under-determination of all action, and the inclusion of non-humans as actors/actants—are what
allows the tracing of action in the torture ethics network. Some of these connections are obvious,
but Latour’s thought here allows a whole range of other actants to come to life.
Memoranda, undisclosed locations, and even the extensive black-bar redactions in (for exam-
ple) in Slahi (2015) and the Senate torture report (SSCI, 2014) reveal the network of action around
torture ethics through the visible traces of their constituent acts and associations. To see facts as
matters of concern, following Latour’s fourth source of uncertainty, does not require much effort.
I have already alluded to factual claims circulating in the torture debate that are, one could almost
say objectively, “matters of concern.” The fifth source of uncertainty is this very risky report it-
self. My goal is ultimately to describe the torture ethics debate in such a way that the political
community, despite the disagreements of its members, can make a legitimate ethical choice about
torture.
The object of study, as conceived in this dissertation, is the network of those associations sur-
rounding torture ethics. The chapters that follow explore two areas that have exceptionally rich sup-
plies of those associations. Because the current torture debate focuses on torture that is supposed to
produce life-saving security information from suspected terrorists, I examine what happens to bod-
ies in space during torture, and how bodies are thought to produce life-saving information through
torture. As the discussion in chapter 2 shows, counter-terrorist torture interrogations are the main
focus of the current torture ethics debate.
Networks are by their nature extensible, so the analysis in this dissertation is also relevant to
other kinds of torture that are not the focus here. For example, the analysis could be applied to
extreme incarceration techniques like long-term solitary confinement, restraint devices, and forced
feeding of hunger strikers. However, any such effort would be an additional undertaking since
it has its own agents, objects, and flows of activity, all of which would need to be traced. The
limitation of this dissertation to counter-terrorist interrogation is thus arbitrary and practical, not
theoretical.
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3.4 Imbroglios and ANT in Action
Chapters 4 and 5 examine areas where sources of uncertainty arise in the current debate. In other
words, they deal with counter-terrorist torture in the U.S. wars of the past decade and a half. Before
that, however, there are two remaining general issues to elaborate. One is to explore more thor-
oughly why attempts to define torture fail, and thus also to compensate for the lack of a definition
of torture in this dissertation. The other remaining issue is to state more clearly what is meant by
ethics, how ethics might function in an ANT environment, and why I support a political ethics of
torture.
3.4.1 On the Definition of Torture
When considering torture as an imbroglio, all definitions appear as the work of purification. Even
as they clarify matters, they raise additional issues. According to Latour’s fourth source of uncer-
tainty, definitions should be viewed as matters of concern rather than as facts. An examination of
the contested definitions of torture shows that they are far more consistent and sensible as matters
of concern that they can be as matters of fact.
In his account of self-defensive torture discussed above (2.4.1), Uwe Steinhoff (2013, 7) defines
torture as follows: “Torture is the knowing infliction of continuous or repeated extreme physical
suffering for other than medical purposes.” Steinhoff notes some of the inclusions and exclusions
that mark his definition. For example, he leaves out any reference to “breaking the will of the
victim” because he finds that concept unclear and “incidental” to torture (7). What is most inter-
esting about his definition, however is his imagination of its limits. He supports his choice of an
extremely concise definition by proposing that definitions of torture only vary in one dimension.
A “wider” alternative definition includes more kinds of acts; wider definitions do not impact his
arguments “for obvious logical reasons” (10). That is, those kinds of acts, by logical necessity, are
less severe than the ones he believes his book successfully justifies. A “narrower definition might
try to exclude things” that Steinhoff thinks are justified; he rejects such definitions, especially if
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they incorporate “absolute unjustifiability” as a quality of torture (10). Steinhoff thus concisely
defines torture, and then restricts the possible ways that the definition is allowed to vary. His ap-
proach has a lot of power, and is appropriate for threshold deontologists like himself (as well as
many utilitarians) whose accounts of torture ethics hinge on a comparison of harms.
At the same time Steinhoff’s clarification is giving power to his account of torture ethics, how-
ever, it is also generating innumerable controversies. This is especially so given the brevity of his
definition and its constraining principle. For example, Steinhoff’s definition does not come close
to describing the experience of the tortured person. There is nothing in Steinhoff’s definition that
suggests what it might be like to be shackled at the wrists, waist, and ankles and made to stand
with bent legs for hours upon hours, day after day, for months, as happened to Slahi (2015). Stein-
hoff’s definition also strips away the contextual elements that accompany any particular instances
of torture. Steinhoff excludes “breaking the will” from his definition because he doesn’t see how
it applies, and because he does not want to unnecessarily restrict his definition. However, that
doesn’t mean that all of his exclusions from the definition have such salutary effects.
One whole field that Steinhoff excludes from his definition is the law. He does speak about
the law, but it has no place in his definition.40 In contrast, the legal definitions of torture are
the definitions for law professor Waldron (2010). Waldron begins his analysis with the relevant
international laws and conventions that define torture (191-94). He then criticizes clarifications of
the definition that he finds abusive (198-207). Against those whose purpose is to precisely locate
the line for what counts as torture so that one can get as close as possible to that line, Waldron
offers the following objection: “There are some scales one really shouldn’t be on, and with respect
to which one really does not have a legitimate interest in knowing precisely how far along the scale
one is permitted to go” (205, emphasis original). Finally, Waldron argues against the use of torture
by posing torture as an archetype, which epitomizes “a certain policy having to do with the relation
40Steinhoff does refer to the law, and would probably object to my characterization. Steinhoff refers to German,
British, and American self-defense law primarily to argue how easy it is to meet the self-defensive standard (2013,
12-17). Beyond that, he dispenses with the law and focuses on moral argument (2013, 17). He is, after all, making
an ethical argument, rather than a legal one. But in doing so he suppresses the controversy that arises because torture,
regardless of Steinhoff’s moral justification, is still illegal.
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between law and force” in the United States (232).
In a sense, for Waldron torture defines the law as much as the law defines torture. Waldron sees
torture as a statute that holds some meaning for the entire system of law in which it is embedded.
Beyond that, he sees that system of law as implicated in the entire society that has spent many years
painstakingly building it. All of this is completely lacking from Steinhoff’s definition. Of course,
Waldron’s definitions (the international legal definitions, plus his archetype argument) generate
their own controversies. For example, there is no direct confrontation between self-defense and
the torture prohibition. Instead, Waldron (2010, ch. 2) addresses the liberty/security question in
a separate essay. Because Waldron’s definitions rest on the international treaties and law, they
are silent on non-state torture by groups or private individuals. Finally, as I mentioned in Section
2.2.4 above, Waldron’s move does not resolve controversies about torture’s definition so much as
it inverts them. Making torture into a legal archetype might epitomize the rule of law, but that is
different from defining torture.
Of all the works reviewed, Matthew H. Kramer (2014) goes to the greatest length to define
torture. He devotes an entire 85 page chapter to the task.41 Scholars such as Luban (2005) and
Wisnewski (2010) have recognized the difficulty arising from the many definitions of torture, and
used categories and typologies as ways to get a handle on the problem. Kramer engages the def-
inition thoroughly enough to develop a strategy before constructing his own definition. Kramer
argues for a number of elements in the definition.
The most important of the desirable qualities Kramer (2014, 55) seeks is that of capaciousness.
For example, torture is typically carried out by state agents, but not always. A good definition
of torture can recognize this by including this feature as typical but not necessary. The defini-
tion should also be “expansive” with respect to the qualities of the victim (55). For example,
while scholars are most often concerned with the torture of humans with typical cognitive facul-
ties, Kramer wants to be careful not to exclude consideration of people who cannot consciously
understand what is happening to them—or animals for that matter. In one more move to extend
41See Kramer (2014, 29-114). The first 25 pages of his chapter provide a good critical survey of all the torture
definitions already in circulation.
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the definition of torture, Kramer avoids restricting torture to presumptions of overcoming the re-
sistance of the tortured person (56). Steinhoff made a similar exclusion, but for different reasons.
Steinhoff doubted that the “will of the victim” was a clear or meaningful quality. Kramer is trying
to keep track of potentially-torturous acts that, for whatever reason, do not attempt to “break” the
victim.
In short, three of Kramer’s five guidelines for defining torture intricately expand the types of
cases he can consider. As a result, Kramer sets himself a formidable task of considering a great
many possible outcomes. His taxonomy grows to include varieties that are likely familiar, like in-
timidatory torture, extortionate torture, act-impelling torture, punitive torture, and sadistic torture.
However, it also includes some exotic variants like “extravagantly reckless” torture, “ephemerally
incapacitative” torture, and even “therapeutic” torture (Kramer, 2014, 104).42
Of all the approaches to defining torture, Kramer’s appears to be the least polemical. Kramer
could even be credited with treating the definition much like a matter of concern, along the lines
recommended by Latour. It might appear that he examines all the controversies, or at least as
many as anyone can be expected to address. However, another look shows that every element of
his definition is constructed around philosophical concepts, except for one. Kramer does promi-
nently include the element of deliberate infliction of pain, a quality that pertains to the tortured
person. Other than that, his concerns are about the intentions of the person doing the torturing. His
definition, for all its nuance, expansiveness, and flexibility, is essentially a catalog of the torturer’s
possible goals and motivations.43
42Kramer’s typology is built mainly around features of the torturer that impact the act’s moral quality. Sadism, for
example, has a different moral value than extortion or intimidation. All of those qualities are purposes that the torturer
might be pursuing. Extravagantly reckless torture is a non-purposive quality that might fit the torturer. Some of the
types sound peculiar at first, like “edifying torture,” that might mislead readers to think Kramer approves of torture,
but he does not. Kramer ultimately finds all varieties of torture morally impermissible (2014, ch. 3).
43Kramer’s full definition of torture is this. “Torture, if uninterrupted, consists in the infliction of severe pain or
suffering. Almost always the pain or suffering is induced deliberately as a means or as an end, but in some exceptional
cases it is induced instead through extravagant recklessness. Torture in its many varieties is perpetrated for any of the
purposes enumerated in 2.2 of this chapter and listed in 2.2.13. Typically, the administration of torture lasts either until
the purpose impelling it has been fulfilled or until the unrealizability of the specified purpose through the infliction of
torture has become manifest. Save in some edifying contexts—and perhaps also in some sado-masochistic contexts—
any administration of torture evinces indifference or hostility toward the basic physical and psychological well-being
of its victim. Save in some of the contexts just mentioned, a victim of torture does not genuinely consent to being
afflicted with grievous pain or suffering. Whenever the deliberate or extravagantly reckless infliction of pain amounts
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For an act utilitarian, Kramer’s definition might be problematic because so many of the qualities
he advances make it harder to calculate the relevant utilities. The same applies for comparing
Steinhoff’s definition with Kramer’s. In a sense, Steinhoff is right to insist on brevity, while Kramer
is right to insist on nuance and flexibility. That is because, as I have been arguing, they are not
answering the same question, even though they appear to be. There is no end to these controversies,
except to cut them short with another plausible set of limitations. But then, every such attempt to
cut short the progression of controversies turns the definition of torture into a polemical matter of
fact, in ANT terms. From this point of view, the question what is torture? turns out not to be a
question at all. Like the related question is torture morally permissible? it is instead a location
where controversies about what torture is tend to proliferate. That does not mean that the definition
offered by various scholars are useless or wrong. They all say something about what torture is,
especially as they come together in the controversy of torture ethics.
Rather than define torture, in chapter 4 I develop ways of talking about torture through descrip-
tions of what happens to the body in space. The last preliminary task is to say something about
what I mean by ethics, and how that is affected by my adoption of Latour’s ANT method.
3.4.2 On Ethics and Orders
In philosophical ethics, several categories exist that might apply to the complex questions in the
torture ethics debate. LaFollette and Persson (2013, 2) identify practical ethics as those dealing
with specific concrete situations: “when to tell the truth, under what circumstances can or should
we go to war, how should we relate to the environment and animals?” Normative ethics deal
with “the best way, broadly understood, to live,” and “general principles, rules, guidelines that we
should follow, or virtues that we should inculcate” (2). Metaethics concerns the “status of moral
judgments,” whether they are “statements of fact or expressions of attitudes,” and if they are facts,
whether they are “objective or subjective” (1-2). In his Contemporary Metaethics, Alexander
Miller (2013) makes only a single distinction between normative theory, on one hand, and his
to torture, the victim lacks any genuine control over the duration of the its infliction.” (2014, 114)
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chosen topic of metaethics on the other.
With respect to torture, a question of practical ethics could be “should suspected terrorists be
tortured for information about imminent attacks?” The normative questions around torture should
be very familiar from the discussion in chapter 2. Those disputes play out largely in terms of nor-
mative theory. The preference Bagaric and Clarke (2007) express for hedonistic act utilitarianism
is really a specification of one type of normative theory against others, including other kinds of
utilitarianism. Steinhoff (2013) and Kramer (2014) are both threshold-deontologists but disagree
on the very fine point of what happens when the threshold is exceeded (2.4.3). The metaethical
questions concerning torture are abstract and thus more difficult to perceive, or they are built into
various normative theories. For example, Waldron (2010) works largely in the tradition of positive
law, so for him ethical principles owe their existence to human reason. Kramer (2014) is a moral
realist, meaning that morality exists independently of human mental states; it is objective.
Recall too that many scholars in the torture ethics debate do not specify their full ethical frame-
works in precise detail the way Steinhoff and especially Kramer do. And that is among professional
philosophers, who are not the only people participating in the torture ethics debate. Scholars out-
side of philosophy and ethics will have less comprehensive sets of answers to this wide variety of
ethical questions, especially as that disciplinary distance from philosophy grows large. I am not
arguing that scholars should fully specify their ethical frameworks at all levels before engaging in
the torture ethics debate. Instead, my claim is that the torture ethics debate features controversies
at all levels. I have adopted the ANT approach not to resolve those controversies, but rather to
describe the situations where they arise.
The ANT approach also militates against organizing, clarifying, and systematizing this field of
ethical inquiry. The stratification of ethics into practical, normative, and metaethical divisions was
a dominant feature of 20th century philosophy, but as LaFollette and Persson (2013) note, it did not
figure in the ancient approach to ethics and is less rigidly in force today. International Relations
scholars who are familiar with the work of John G. Gunnell (1998), might consider organizing the
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ethical divisions into “orders of discourse.”44 Practical ethics could then be considered a first-order
practice, since it involves asking and answering practical questions about torture.45 Normative
theory and metaethics could then be considered metapractices, which Gunnell (1998, 20) says
“[gain] their primary identity in terms of the fact that they have another conventional activity as
their subject matter.” Practical ethics, normative theory, and metaethics would then appear to
form a neat hierarchy of ethical discourses, from the first-order practice of interrogation rules, to
a metadiscourse that addresses how to treat enemies, and finally to a meta-meta-discourse about
that metadiscourse. The way to judge the morality of torture might then be to choose a normative
theory, sort out the metaethical issues, and apply it to the practical problem of torturing (or not)
suspected terrorists.
That is, however, more or less a description of what everyone reviewed in chapter 2 is doing.
I reject this temptation for both practical and methodological reasons. Methodologically, ANT
networks cut across all such arbitrary divisions in the torture ethics debate. The practical problem
that motivates that methodological choice is that the complex set of questions in the torture ethics
debate cannot be easily separated. That is what I mean by saying that “is torture morally permissi-
ble?” is not a question. Making any judgment at all about torture’s moral status necessarily gives
rise to normative and metaethical controversies. The entire complex of questions arises at once,
not as first-order, second-order, and third-order, but as a synchronic network of closely associated
questions.46
The networked ANT approach overcomes another issue that normative theory and metaethics
do not address. That is, not every associated in the complex around torture ethics is, strictly
speaking, ethical. Interrogators face a practical problem of “making people talk,” or think they do.
However, the pressing need to make a person talk immediately raises the question of how to do so,
44Schmidt (2002) makes exemplary use of Gunnell’s orders of discourse in his (Schmidt’s) re-examination of the
historiography of the International Relations discipline.
45First-order practices are “modes of activity that are primordial and ’given’ in that their various forms and historical
manifestations represent functionally necessary elements of human activity.” (Gunnell, 1998, 19) Practical torture
ethics would belong to that primordial activity of deciding what to do and not do to suspected terrorists.
46There is an interesting parallel—not to be pursued here—between the synchronic time of Latour’s networked
non-modernity (most notably in Latour 1993) and the combination of past, present, and future in Cavanaugh’s (1998)
understanding of eucharistic eschatology.
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and in the present conversation also the question of whether extreme pain makes people talk. At
the same time, a question arises about the truth-value of statements made under extreme pain. Such
questions abound in the torture ethics debate: when does pain become extreme? what protections
apply to which people? whose interpretation of the moral and legal guidelines is authoritative? is
the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba “in” the United States?
Following ANT, I argue that the best way to apprehend these questions is in a network, and that
the questions that show the most associations with contemporary torture are the ones that belong
most centrally to the part of the network under consideration. ANT allows the practical, normative,
and metaethical questions to mix organically with other practical, theoretical, and metatheoretical
questions. The controversies that swirl around torture ethics do not distinguish between their
ethical dimensions and other factual or theoretical aspects, so neither should the analysis.
3.4.3 A Political Ethics of Torture
I have shown in chapter 2 that the torture ethics debate comprises a wide variety of highly idiosyn-
cratic approaches to justifying or prohibiting torture. I also shown in sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.6 that
the different approaches to torture ethics differ in ways that cannot be resolved through more or
different iterations of the same approach. Torture ethics arguments are highly idiosyncratic, and
even incommensurable.
In sections 3.1 and 3.2 I argued that the complicated situation in torture ethics should prompt
us to treat it as an imbroglio, as Latour advocates. The first step in dealing with imbroglios is to
conceive of them as what they are. That is, imbroglios cannot be handled though techniques that
continually try to reduce and clarify them. Those techniques belong to the work of theoretical
purification, which will continue; but resolving imbroglios takes renewed attention on the work of
mediation.
After having re-imagined torture ethics in the form of an imbroglio, I argued that the second
element needed for addressing torture ethics was a revised social theory. What the torture ethics
debate needed, I thought, was a concept of the social that was capable of assembling the disagree-
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able participants that populated it. This had to be done without any one member, or some entity
at the aggregate level, overruling other individuals regarding their ethical frameworks. I again fol-
lowed Latour in his more mature methodological approach. Section 3.3 elaborates Actor-Network
Theory (ANT). In this section (3.4) I have been been arguing that the definition of torture is an
imbroglio that can best be understood through an ANT approach focusing on the controversies and
uncertainties of torture ethics. I noted an additional benefit that ANT seamlessly integrates ethical
and non-ethical questions. Finally, I have just argued the networked character of the ANT approach
fits contemporary torture ethics much better than the usual ways of clarifying and refining ethical
thought.
It is now possible to sketch what kind of torture ethics is possible. Using ANT will not allow
me to answer the symbolic question of torture’s moral status, nor even the complex set of questions
that I have argued are always implicated by that symbolic question. If that seems disappointing—
even rude—after readers have generously trudged through a hundred pages, I can only offer the
following small consolation: no one else has answered the question either. Or rather, everyone
has an answer. The answers offered for torture ethics range from the most baseless opinion that
causes polite people to recoil at parties to the truly formidable achievement of Kramer’s argument
for moral integrity. Moreover, none of these answers are sociable. Instead, divisions in the social
group open up according to whose answers one finds tolerable.
In the midst of this situation, a political ethics based on ANT offers a few innovations.47 First,
the phenomenon of torture and the ethical arguments surrounding it are permitted to remain as
complex, entangled, and mixed-up as they actually appear. Second, the actors are allowed to
remain as complex, entangled, and mixed-up as they are.48 This means emphatically that the ANT
approach does not force a follower of virtue ethics to become a utilitarian, or make a deontologist
install a threshold. The ANT approach instead traces all the work that is actually being done by the
humans, memos, airplanes, legislatures, contractors, journalists, and philosophers—not to mention
47From here forward in this dissertation, the term “political ethics” refers to the entirety of the approach I have
developed through Latour’s response to imbroglios and his version of ANT.
48Or the actants, if you like: human and non-human agents.
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graduate students and their beleaguered readers.
In other words, imbroglios and ANT do not allow me to propound any torture ethics at all.
What the approach does make possible is a more robust and legitimate political ethics of torture.
A political ethics arises in the coming together of otherwise ethically-disagreeable people around
the question of torture. It differs from the politics of torture ethics, because due to its ANT basis
it lacks both a right answer to the question of torture and an abstract social aggregate to which
that answer could be assigned. An ANT ethics of torture describes the network of action and
material around torture ethics in a way that is accessible to a wide range of people who are caught
up in the network. An accessible description is also actionable. It is something people can do
something with or about. Unlike other actions, though, the ANT approach to ethics is a practical
morality, based on “negotiation or compromise,” and without denunciation (Latour, 1993, 45).
This approach is likely to be “scorned because it does not allow indignation,” but also “active and
generous because it follows the meanderings of situations and networks” (45).
As an anti-torture absolutist myself, a political ethics of torture poses a risk in that my preferred
position may be overwhelmed. However, the risk is small when one considers that my position has
already been so quickly and thoroughly routed that it spawned a massive torture ethics industry.
Torture and violent-interrogation advocates are also at risk in the same way. With ethics, we are all
always at risk of our preferred position unraveling. Rather than triumphantly restoring the global
and American torture prohibition, legally and morally, the more modest goal of this dissertation is
to support a vigorous political contention over torture that uses all the resources available from the
ANT account. The last portion of the dissertation is thus devoted to recounting key portions of the
torture ethics network. Having left the definition of torture indeterminate, the next chapter maps a
set of associations that show what is happening to the tortured person’s body in space. Following
that, I examine the controversies between bodies and information. Referring back to the three
major tasks that Latour sets for social research in RS, these chapters primarily exploit controversies
and observe traces. They then provisionally reassemble the social around each chapter’s particular
corner of the torture ethics debate.
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Chapter 4
The Body in Space: What Torture Is
In section 3.4.1 I showed how defining torture can be perilous and indeterminate. All definitions,
if they accomplish their task, are polemical. In contrast, this ANT-based account of torture ethics
aims to provide the conditions for a political ethics of torture (3.4.3). There is still a need for some
kind of description or account of torture, even if the ANT approach leaves torture’s definition in
its persistent controversial state. For a political ethics of torture to be robust, many members of the
community must be included in the conversation. They need a way to talk about what is happening
in torture without denouncing each others’ views. Such an account of torture requires language
that is not attached to polemical accounts of torture ethics.
This chapter develops concepts and vocabulary for talking about torture that satisfy the require-
ments of ANT and can begin to create conditions conducive for politically contesting torture ethics.
To accomplish this, I turn to one of the so-called “torture memos” that describes the actual course
of conduct that American interrogators wanted to apply to a captured Al Qaeda operative. The full
title of the memo is “Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency: Interrogation of Al Qaeda Operative.” (Bybee and Yoo, 2002) The memo recounts
ten techniques for “enhanced” interrogation, including close confinement and waterboarding, that
are by now familiar to many observers of the torture debate.
In ANT terms, the memo is an actant: it is a material object bristling with traces of associations
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to other human and non-human actants. Actually, it is several material objects, one of which read-
ers can access at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70967/00355_020801_004display.pdf.
Connecting to the actor-network of torture ethics is that simple. The associations in the document
connect government lawyers in Washington, D.C. and at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Virginia
to the wayward suspected terrorist, to a vast collection of factual claims about the suspect and
the techniques, to unnamed experts who supplied those claims, and to elements of American and
international law. The document also brings together a fascinating group of objects and plans of
action. This chapter exploits the document to begin developing an account of what torture is.
To aid in this description the chapter uses spatial theory from Henri Lefebvre (1991) to be-
gin crafting language for talking about the prescribed actions. These description are designed
not to be gratuitous, graphic, or manipulative. Instead, they provide a way of talking about the
controversially-torturous actions that can be shared by people who hold different ethical frame-
works. The language and concepts developed here are intended as resources for the conversation
that can produce a political ethics of torture.
From a conventional point of view, it may be problematic to use this memo and the techniques
it describes as material for a description of torture, since I have not defined torture yet, and have
even renounced the task of defining it. As I argued in 3.4.1, attempts that strive to settle that
question only extend the problem by proliferating controversies. However, the acts described in
the memo are largely the acts at issue. Even though the purpose of the memo is to characterize
them as something other than torture, they are the acts at the heart of the current torture ethics
debate. Whether they “are” torture, or instead they are only enhanced interrogation or abuse, does
not change that. The aim here is to exploit the uncertainty surrounding these actions to reveal what
torture is as a matter of concern.
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4.1 Gathering the network
The memo is addressed to John Rizzo, then the Acting Chief Counsel of the CIA. It is dated August
1, 2002 and bears the signature of Jay S. Bybee, who was then an Assistant Attorney General in
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), a division of the Department of Justice.
I have attributed it to Bybee and also to Bybee’s deputy John Yoo, who is widely regarded as
the principal author of the memo.1 Both Bybee’s signature and Yoo’s authorship link them to the
memo and the actions it legitimizes, so I have credited both by citing the document as Bybee and
Yoo (2002).
The first page of the memo names Abu Zubaydah as the person with whom it is centrally
concerned. Abu Zubaydah is described as “one of the highest ranking members of the Al Qaeda
terrorist organization, with which the United States is currently engaged in an international armed
conflict following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001”
(Bybee and Yoo, 2002, 1). The memo indicates that Rizzo had asked the OLC whether certain
actions would violate Section 2340A of Title 18 of the United States code (USCode, 1996), which
prohibits torture. With respect to the things CIA interrogators wanted to do to Zubaydah, the memo
finds that “the proposed conduct would not violate this prohibition” (Bybee and Yoo, 2002, 1).
The memo also refers to “a new interrogation specialist” as well as a “training psychologist”
from the military Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) program (Bybee and Yoo,
2002, 1). Other unnamed people in the memo include “military personnel” who have undergone
SERE training and “various individuals who have extensive experience with these techniques” (4).
A few of the unnamed military trainees who had negative experiences with the training techniques
are singled out, and explanations are offered as to why those negative experiences do not amount to
evidence that the techniques violate the torture prohibition (4-5). The military trainees come from
the Air Force and the Navy, and yet another unnamed SERE trainer claims to have experience with
more than 10,000 such trainees (5). Another group of trainees who are said to have been subjected
1See Waldron (2010, 189 fn. 9) concerning authorship of the memo. Bybee is now a judge on the 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals, and reportedly “regrets” the memo (Vick, 2009).
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to the techniques is numbered at 26,829 (5). More unnamed mental health experts” also appear
(17). There are of course “terrorist networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia,” among whom
“there is currently a level of ’chatter’ equal to that which preceded the September 11 attacks” (1).
Usama bin Laden makes an appearance, so that Abu Zubaydah can be identified as his “senior
lieutenant” (Bybee and Yoo, 2002, 7). An Inspector General of the CIA appears in the memo, in
connection with incident investigations that, again, find the techniques do not cause serious harm
(5f). Some actants in the report are not only unnamed but excised from it. “[Redacted] concluded
that if there are any long term effects . . . ”; “[redacted] also indicated that he had observed the
use of the waterboard in Navy training” (6). The redactions draw attention to someone who is
not mentioned (perhaps more than one person) but obviously present. That is, in addition to all
the actants just mentioned, some unmentioned person blacked out the portions of text before the
document was released to the public, someone struck the “TOP SECRET” designation at the top
and bottom of every page, and someone had placed that designation there in the first place.
The ANT approach suggests looking at non-human actants involved in the state of affairs as
well. Among the non-human actants, there is an insect that interrogators want to place in the
confinement box with Abu Zubaydah.2 There are many, many assertions of fact in the form of
references to other memoranda (Bybee and Yoo, 2002, 9), case law (16), and most abundantly
in the form of factual claims furnished by the person the memo addresses as “you.” The text
indicates that “you” refers to CIA counsel John Rizzo. It can be taken as referring to the unnamed
psychological consultants too, since they are both Rizzo’s source of information and the ones
carrying out the interrogations. The factual claims have to do with the imminence of terrorist
threats to the U.S. (1), the background of SERE training and how it has never produced effects
that amounted to torture (4-6), Abu Zubaydah’s toughness, cunning, experience, knowledge of
resistance techniques, zeal, and desire to harm Americans (6-8).
The urge to debunk, unmask, and denounce here—and even to perversely enlist the tools of
ANT in the process—is almost irresistible. For example, it is now possible to consult other docu-
2“You would like to place Zubaydah in a cramped confinement box with an insect. You have informed us that he
appears to have a fear of insects” (Bybee and Yoo, 2002, 3).
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ments that identify the unnamed military psychologists as James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen (Risen,
2015), and to learn that they earned $81 million as contractors running the CIA interrogation pro-
gram (SSCI, 2014, preface, p. 11). Furthermore, although “[neither] psychologist had experience
as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa’ida, a background in terror-
ism, or any relevant regional, cultural, or linguistic expertise,” (SSCI, 2014, 21) they became the
primary interrogators of the most wanted terrorist suspects in U.S. custody.
Regrettably, that sort of denunciation is not the goal here. Following the ANT approach, the
purpose of compiling the above list is to begin mapping all the actants who are coming together in
this momentary, contingent social arrangement. The list also shows how the collection of actants,
from John Rizzo to the thousands of military trainees, to the special insect for Abu Zubaydah’s
box, are all present in a single document—a paper object that really exists or existed.
That is only a partial account of the actants collected in this document, but it is a good start.
Now that I am (mostly) refraining from denunciations, the ANT approach proposes a different task:
observe what the gathered actants do with and to each other. The document collects the torturers,
the person to be tortured, and many other actants, as well as one element I have not discussed yet:
the actions themselves.
4.2 A Spatial Description of the Acts
Bybee and Yoo (2002) gives legal advice from the Justice Department, which prosecutes crimes,
to the CIA, whose agents prefer not to be prosecuted. Through the lawyer John Rizzo, the CIA
interrogators are asking what they can do to Abu Zubaydah in light of the U.S. law prohibiting
torture. They ask about ten techniques ranging from the “attention grasp” to waterboarding. From
an ANT perspective, the presentation of the techniques in clubby conversation between the Justice
Department and the CIA cannot be accepted as matters of fact. Yet they also cannot be denounced
as bogus misrepresentations. The ANT approach says to treat such claims as matters of concern.
What is needed is a way to critically engage the descriptions of the interrogation techniques
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that is not beholden to an anti-torture or pro-enhanced-interrogation viewpoint. To accomplish
this, I turn to the social theory of space developed by Henri Lefebvre. In The Production of Space
Lefebvre (1991) re-conceptualizes space, with particular attention to bodies in space. Lefebvre
challenges the Cartesian, scientific, rational concept of space, which he believes serves the hege-
monic discourse of modernity and capitalism. At least in terms of space, he intends to “detonate
this state of affairs” (24). Specifically, Lefebvre argues that the empty, seamless Cartesian spaces
of such hegemonic discourses are actually representations of space (38). This abstract, concep-
tualized space is the “space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers, and social
engineers” and is the “dominant space in any society” (39). From a given origin, any body can
thus be located in space at some coordinates x,y, and z with orientation ρ,θ , and φ.
Against this unified, homogenous space Lefebvre distinguishes two other elements of what
he calls the production of space. Spatial practice is what “secretes that society’s space; it pro-
pounds and presupposes it” (Lefebvre, 1991, 38). Spatial practice produces the real space of a
society–which is not the abstract analytical space usually presumed by planners, engineers, social
scientists, and even ordinary people (i.e. representations of space). Torture, as a policy of state,
contributes to the spatial practices of societies that employ it, and thus to a particular secretion of
space. For example, a place must be designated in which to carry out the torture, and the space
must be arranged to facilitate some techniques. The space may be chosen for its optimal geo-
graphical or jurisdictional isolation. The third element of Lefebvre’s tripartite vision of space is
representational space, “space as directly ’lived’ through its associated images and symbols, and
hence the space of ’inhabitants’ and ’users”’ (39). This space is “dominated” and “overlays physi-
cal space, making symbolic use of its objects”. A jogger, a subway rider, and a tenant of a walk-up
apartment travel through representational space—as does everyone else.
These visions of space–spatial practice, representations of space, and representational spaces–
diversify the possible ways of approaching a tortured body. For (Lefebvre, 1991, 170), space is not
a container that holds objects, some of which happen to be bodies. Instead, Lefebvre argues that
bodies create space. In his view, prior to sustaining itself, affecting its environment, or generating
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offspring, “each living body is space and has space: it produces itself in space and also produces
that space” (176). Each body produces its own specific space, but these spaces may–will–come
into contact, overlap, and penetrate each other. In fact, bodies seem to produce space by interacting
with energies, forces, and objects around them (176). In other words, the abstract representational
space also came with an abstract body, which Lefebvre is keen to complicate. Every body inter-
acts continuously with its space, and is “reflected and refracted in the changes in its ’milieu’ or
’environment’–in other words, in its space” (196).
The ANT approach to torture ethics can now be combined with Lefebvre’s three-part conceptu-
alization of space and the case of Abu Zubaydah’s tortured body. The first two elements are linked
by this risky report to the dense collection of actants and associations evident in the memoran-
dum. It is now possible to describe what is happening to Zubaydah’s body and evaluate its spatial
ordeal—all in terms that should strive not to polemically exclude any participant in the torture
ethics debate.
Abu Zubaydah has a body.3 Its likely location, on the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, is just one of the many problems of Abu Zubaydah’s body. Abu Zubaydah’s body provides
a node, a point of leverage, a raised feature on the texture of the torture ethics debate. Other
documents about other bodies have also been forced into public view, but the memo about Abu
Zubaydah stands out for the density and quality of its agencies and connections, partially listed
above.4
The techniques progress from mild to extreme, but the first one is already spatial. Called the
“attention grasp”, it involves “grasping the individual with both hands, one hand on either side of
the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion (Bybee and Yoo, 2002, 2). In the same motion
as the grasp, “the individual is drawn toward the interrogator” (2). This spatial practice troubles
3Regarding the appropriateness, of using Abu Zubaydah’s experience, I acknowledge that Zubaydah, whatever he
has done, is a human being who has been tortured. He has not agreed to serve as my example, even though he is a
sort of public figure. Put another way, the connection established with Zubaydah through the memo is immediately
troubled, as any connection to torture is likely to be.
4The power of the documents could be seen most dramatically so in Jenny Holzer’s “PROTECT PROTECT”
exhibit at the Whitney Museum of American Art (2009), which featured dozens of oversized facsimile paintings of
such documents.
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the boundaries between the spaces of the interrogator’s and Abu Zubaydah’s bodies. As a play of
two body-spaces, the attention grasp reveals something that is invisible in abstract space: bodies
require more space than is indicated by their biological interiority. Every body needs space outside
of its skin and expects that space to be available. Although the attention grasp is mild, it goes to
work directly on Abu Zubaydah’s space.
The second technique, “walling”, has Abu Zubaydah’s body thrust against a false wall. A false
wall is to be constructed in such a way that it flexes safely away from Abu Zubaydah, though
it should still “create a sound that will make the impact seem far worse than it is” (Bybee and
Yoo, 2002, 2). No instructions are provided for building this unique wall, but construction is a
recognizable element of spatial practice.5 During walling, a rolled towel is to be placed around
Zubaydah’s neck for safety, and his heels are to be placed against the wall before the thrusting.
One wonders what Abu Zubaydah would make of these choreographic instructions as his body
is arranged for the short thrust into the wall, but at this point the important concern is that every
element of the technique, including the loud noise, interferes with Abu Zubaydah’s space.6
The facial hold and insult slap—techniques three and four—continue the attack on Abu Zubay-
dah’s body and space. The “facial hold is used to hold the head immobile. One open palm is placed
on either side of the individual’s face” (Bybee and Yoo, 2002, 2). The insult slap “makes contact
with the area directly between the tip of the individual’s chin and the bottom of the corresponding
earlobe” (2). In both cases, care is taken to avoid the eyes. Noting the spatial character of these
assaults may seem pedantic, but the precision of the spatial instructions does communicate some-
thing. Although the initial attacks are not too intimidating, they escalate in ways that should alarm
Abu Zubaydah. Each technique is more intrusive and painful than the last. The techniques have
5The precise technical language that Bybee and Yoo (2002) use to describe the techniques sometimes obscures
how under-specified the actions are. This applies to the complex dance of the walling procedure, and also to the way
the box sizes are specified. How big a box Abu Zubaydah could “sit down in” is anyone’s guess. Speaking at a panel
discussion about the film Zero Dark Thirty, former CIA official Jose Rodriguez complained particularly about the
portrayal of the small box, which he thought was too small (Thiessen, 2013). To me, the fictional box appeared to
be smaller than a coffin. With apologies for engaging in denunciation, I must point out that if the 92 interrogation
videotapes that Congress had subpoenaed still existed, the actual box could probably be portrayed exactly (see SSCI,
2014, 455).
6Lefebvre complains that the modernist understanding of space forgets that space “is first of all heard (listened to)
and enacted (through physical gestures and movements).” (Lefebvre 1991, 200)
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moved from the collar to the back (in walling), to the head, and now the face. Even if the first four
techniques do not scare him, the spatial progression deeper into Abu Zubaydah’s space is clear.
The fifth technique escalates considerably. Abu Zubaydah will be placed in one of two boxes.
The sizes are specified negatively: “[in] the larger confined space, the individual can stand up or
sit down; the smaller space is large enough for the subject to sit down in” (Bybee and Yoo, 2002,
3). The boxes are also dark, reducing Abu Zubaydah’s visual space. The memos say time in
the boxes should be limited to 18 hours for the large box and two hours for the small one.7 The
boxes invade the space necessary for normal operation of the Abu Zubaydah’s body. In the ninth
technique, which is directly related to the fifth, the “[interrogators] would like to place Zubaydah
in a cramped confinement box with an insect” (3). The insect has access to his body surfaces–skin,
eyes, ears, nose, and mouth–while Abu Zubaydah’s own movement is inhibited by the box.
Wall standing, the sixth technique, puts Abu Zubaydah’s body “about four to five feet from a
wall, with his feet spread approximately to shoulder width.”8 His arms reach forward, with his
“fingers resting on the wall” (3). Though his fingers are resting, they “support all of his body
weight.” He is not allowed to move his hands or feet. This technique, like the others, manipulates
Abu Zubaydah’s body in space in a way he would never create for himself. The seventh technique,
use of stress positions, does the same. In one position, Abu Zubaydah is seated on the floor with
legs outstretched and arms shackled above his head. The other position has him “kneeling on the
floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle” (Bybee and Yoo, 2002, 3). Wall standing and stress
positions reveal another necessary feature of lived, representational spaces: they cannot be static.
The memo’s interrogation techniques exploit the body’s need for movement by forcibly freezing
that movement. Holding a fixed position may appear to be innocuous, but the true point of attack
on Abu Zubaydah’s space is the necessity of movement. In addition, despite the precise-sounding
language these positional techniques are not fully specified. It is not clear which parts of Abu
7See Bybee and Yoo (2002, 3). Different maximum times are provided for the small box on pages 3, 13, and 14 of
the memo.
8Despite the similar terminology, wall standing should not be confused with walling. In walling, interrogators
thrust Abu Zubaydah into the specially designed wall. In wall standing, Abu Zubaydah himself is obliged to hold a
leaning position.
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Zubaydah’s body are supposed to form the 45 degree angle, for example. It will depend on the
agent who implements the instructions.
The two remaining techniques are the most intense. Gone are the stage slaps and cop-show
outtakes. The eighth technique would deprive Abu Zubaydah of sleep for up to 11 days at a
time. In Lefebvre’s diversified concept of space, sleep is spatial. In abstract space a sleeping
body does not differ from a wakened one, except perhaps in its position. One of the orienting
angles might change by 90 degrees, and the rates of change for the other locating variables will be
lower. Lefebvre’s spatial concept of sleep differs. For Lefebvre (1991, 208), sleep is where “the
body gathers itself together, building up its energy reserves by imposing silence on its information
receptors. It closes down, and passes through a moment with its own truth, its own beauty, its
own worth.” Sleep is thus part of the complex space that is constantly and necessarily produced
by every body. Sleep-space also allows dream-space, in which the body’s “broken rhythms are
reconstituted,” and the self is repaired and enjoyed (209). If Lefebvre’s description sounds too
figurative to qualify as space, consider the concrete imperative quality of sleep. The force with
which sleep imposes itself on us does not diminish, even though it lacks visible coordinates and
dimensions.
Sleep deprivation intrudes into a space that is not usually recognized as a space. This helps
the technique appear to be mild from the perspective of abstract space. In the lived space of the
sleep-deprived person, however, the intrusion is real and violent. The tenth technique, called the
waterboard, aims for maximal intrusion into Abu Zubaydah’s body. Here “the body is bound
securely to an inclined bench,” while “the individual’s feet are generally elevated” (Bybee and
Yoo, 2002, 3). Zubaydah’s face is covered with a cloth, and “water is then applied to the cloth in
a controlled manner” for 20-40 seconds (4). Using a “canteen cup or watering can,” the water is
“applied from a height of twelve to twenty-four inches” (4). Waterboarding attacks the intimate
boundary between the human interior and exterior. Lefebvre (1991, 176) argues that although each
body makes itself distinct by separating inside from outside, “this barrier is always relative and,
in the case of membranes, always permeable.” The mouth, airway, and lungs are such sensitive
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membranes that nature has placed them “inside” the body. The interrogators hope that by pressing
on them, they will activate an imperative in Zubaydah to talk.
Torture is a profoundly spatial practice. The interrogators introduce themselves to Zubaydah’s
space with the grasp and walling. They contact his head and face. They restrict his movement with
boxes, and then grant an insect access to Zubaydah’s body while he is immobile. They manipulate
his body in space, intrude on his sleeping interior, and finally touch the most basic, life-supporting
membrane.9
In terms of abstract space, these techniques may appear benign. From the perspective of lived
space—space as produced and required by (Lefebvre, 1991, 176) Zubaydah’s body—the tech-
niques described here progressively intrude to the highest and most intimate degree. The tech-
niques leverage the difference between their relatively benign appearance and the spatial reality,
in order to create and sustain intense pain without violating the body in more recognizable ways.
Waterboarding is only a toothbrush away from appearing hygienic.10 Readers who have bodies
that produce and live in space–that is, all readers–can approach Zubaydah’s experience of torture
through this spatial description. To do so, however, space has to be understood in Lefebvre’s more
complex formulation. Otherwise it is possible to continue overlooking the vector of attack.
4.3 Resources for Political Ethics
This chapter has shown two things. First, the controversial torture/interrogation techniques at the
heart of the current torture debate are connected to large numbers of people and objects by a net-
work of associations. The (contested) torturous acts are not abstract ideas or isolated incidences.
Instead, their activity can be traced by the means of small, reliable associations to a myriad of ac-
tants. These human and non-human actants vary in importance by the number and strength of their
associations. For example, John Rizzo, Jay Bybee, and Abu Zubaydah are the most thoroughly
983 times (Shane, 2009).
10Understanding torture in lived space may help resolve the problem Darius Rejali (2007, 44) identifies as “clean
torture”, wherein states devise new techniques so they can keep torturing even while they appear to be complying with
monitoring and accountability regimes.
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connected actants in the area of the torture ethics network around Bybee and Yoo (2002). The
writer of this report, and readers, are more distantly connected. They are, nevertheless, part of the
network. By following the sturdy, small connections, readers can move from their computers to the
document archive, then to the document itself, the interrogation room and finally Abu Zubaydah’s
body.
Second, the chapter shows how language for describing the techniques can be enriched with
spatial theory. Zubaydah’s lived space is under a sustained, progressive attack by the interrogators.
They press the attack all the way to the most sensitive barrier between his interior and exterior.
Because our imaginations are dominated by representations of space, rather than lived space, it is
easy to miss the power of the spatial attack on Zubaydah. The chapter did not aim at fixing the
problem outlined in section 3.4.1, in which the torture ethics debate fails to arrive at a definition of
torture. Instead, the descriptive resources in this spatial account of torturing a body in space can
be used to reassert how the definition of torture is a matter of concern, and will stay that way.
By avoiding denunciations and polemical assertions, this enrichment of descriptive language
can be accomplished in a way that makes any debate that uses it more inclusive. This chapter
begins to show not only how people with incommensurable ethical frameworks can come together
in a social arrangement, but how they do come together. That is, not in agreement, but in acts of
association (and note that an obstruction or rejection of association is also an association).
The participants in the torture ethics debate can now engage with each other in shared terms.
The network of associations and the spatial description of torture in this chapter cannot be used to
help win the torture ethics debate by leveraging the “right answers” to associated questions about
what torture is. Instead, all participants are drawn onto a small area of shared conceptual ground.
There, matters of concern like how hard to press on suspect bodies, and how far such actions can
be legally distinguished from serious crimes, must be settled politically.
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Chapter 5
Torture, Bodies, and Information
The previous chapter focused on developing a new kind of description for some centrally-contested
techniques in the current torture debate. This chapter shifts the attention to a related matter of con-
cern: the claim that such techniques can produce life-saving information. This claim is absolutely
essential in the current torture ethics debate. Presently, no one is arguing that torture should be
revived for the purposes of public punishment or political control that figure in the accounts by
Foucault (1995) and Cavanaugh (1998), respectively. Without the perception of an enormous need
to obtain life-saving information that has been fueled by the American conflict with al Qaeda (and
just prior to that, Israeli counter-terrorism), torture ethics would probably have remained a marginal
topic of occasional interest to philosophers. The renewed interest in in torture and its ethics stems
directly from claims about how certain bodies are related to life-saving information.
In the ANT account of contemporary torture ethics, the claim that bodies yield information
under torture is a crucial matter of concern. So far, however, it has been incorporated mostly as a
matter of fact. Or rather, a matter of facts. The claim that torture does not produce information can
be asserted as a matter of fact, just like the claim that torture does produce information. That both
facts can be asserted makes it a matter of concern. This chapter revisits the arguments of the current
torture ethics debate discussed in chapter 2, and specifically develops the information-production
claim as a matter of concern. I also discuss related claims in the words of a tortured person (Slahi,
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2015).
5.1 Views of Torture and Truth
Life-saving information is only one kind of utterance that has, over time, been sought by torturers.
It is probably unfair to consider truth and confessions, which have previously been the goal of
torture interrogations, as similar to intelligence. However, the problems are analogous. Life-saving
information, bearing true witness, and giving confessions are all attempts to meet challenges of
validity from some concerned party. The judge hopes for true testimony. The confessor hopes for
a true confession of faith or sins. The counter-terror interrogator hopes for life-saving information.
To develop the connection of torture and information in the current torture ethics debate, it will first
be useful to consider how others have approached the general problem of the validity of tortured
utterances.
According to Augustine (1994, 147), who was a Christian bishop in fourth-century Roman
Africa, jurists are “unable to judge the consciences of those whom they judge.”1 Therefore, judges
“are frequently compelled to investigate the truth by torturing innocent witness concerning a case
that is not even their own” (147). Augustine grants that judges can have the best intentions of
carrying out justice, and yet still “execute, through wretched ignorance, one who is both innocent
and tortured, one whom the judge had tortured in order that he might not execute an innocent
person” (147). Augustine also argues that a criminal with a robust constitution can withstand
torture, while a weak but innocent person might falsely confess (148).
More than 1200 years later, Beccaria (1995) echoes some of these same concerns. However,
unlike Beccaria, Augustine is not advocating reforms to harmonize punishment with rational state
power. Augustine’s goal is to distinguish the earthly, human city from the city of God. It is only
incidental that the deficiency torture as a mode of truth production in justice procedures helps him
illustrate his point. Because Augustine believes that torture is a faulty truth-producing mechanism,
1The entire discussion of torture appears in Augustine’s The City of God, Book XIX, chapter 6. Above I use page
numbers in the cited modern edition.
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he argues that Roman judges are forced to commit sins in the pursuit of justice. Roman judges
torture “because of the necessity imposed by not knowing,” but this produces “the misery of man”
(Augustine, 1994, 148), not justice. He thus refutes the notion that such human justice fulfills any
virtuous purpose.
Augustine’s arguments sound persuasive, especially to myself and other opponents of torture.
I have little doubt about the horror of Roman judicial torture. However, the ANT approach does
not allow Augustine to proffer the failure of torture as a simple matter of fact. From the ANT
point of view, there is actually a matter of concern about the relationship of torture and truth built
into Augustine’s argument. If Roman judges had really doubted that torture produced truth, they
wouldn’t have tortured. The terrible situation Augustine describes actually comes about because
the judges don’t know whether or not torture produces truth. Augustine (1994, 148) resolves the
problem by assigning the realm of justice to God, and lamenting human laws as necessary but
evil. Instead of cutting the Gordian knot in that way, this ANT analysis focuses on those very
controversies.
Lisa Silverman (2001) examines a similar problem of judicial torture in early modern France.
Her analysis is unique in that it discloses and describes how the understanding of the relationship
between bodies, pain, and truth shifted at that time. Silverman argues that “torture was at one time
a meaningful cultural practice as well as a functioning legal practice” (4). Torture “rested on an
implicit consensus concerning the nature of pain, of truth, and of the body,” that broke down over
time (4). When it did, “torture became an indefensible practice” (4).
It was beliefs about the body that had to change for the practice of torture to be undermined.
The chief opponents of torture at that time were Enlightenment writers, who “asserted not that
the will and the truth were opposed, but that the will and the body were opposed, that pain and
personal agency could not coexist in the same body” (Silverman, 2001, 9). The idea that truth
was “a static reality awaiting perception” that could be revealed by torture was institutionalized in
the legal training system that produced court officers in France (63-64). Despite the durability of
tradition in that profession, though, the lawyers “failed to theorize a relationship between” pain,
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the body, and truth that could stand up to the new ideas of the Enlightenment thinkers (68). And
when “pain ceased to produce meaning, torture became a meaningless activity” (68).
One aspect of the problem that preoccupies Silverman is what she sees as the slow and uneven
decline of the practice of judicial torture in 17th and 18th-century Tolouse, where she conducts her
analysis. She does not assume, as some of today’s commenters on violence do, that some kind of
steady progress happened or could be expected.2 The change in thinking that relocated truth from
inside to outside the body took a century, despite the overwhelming ideas of the Enlightenment.
In the case of judicial torture in Toulouse, Silverman (2001, 117) argues that the perceived
relationship of pain and truth was sustained for a time by the exceptionally strong social force of
Catholic lay confraternities. Her documentation shows that a “surprising engagement of parlia-
mentaires,” who comprised the judges, officers, and clerks of the court system, “with elite con-
fraternities of Toulouse” (117). She suggests that “judicial involvement in confraternal life lent
epistemological support to the practice of torture and that as judges gradually abandoned painful
practices in their religious observations . . . so did they gradually abandon painful practices in
their legal work” (150).
Silverman’s analysis does much to reveal the way that perceptions of body-truth relationship
affect torture practices. However, from an ANT perspective it is limited. She makes an argument
from the social aggregate: the social understanding of the body-truth relationship, rather than
individual associations, does most of the work. Silverman’s work is most useful in the types of
social concerns—including the penitent groups—that she considers in explaining the fitful demise
of French judicial torture. In short, Silverman provides the motivation to look at the torture-truth
relationship as a matter of concern, and ANT provides a way to follow that motivation that is
consistent with the goals of this dissertation.
2See Pinker (2012, 144-149).
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5.2 Effectiveness: Torture and Information Today
The current torture ethics debate focuses on life-saving information, rather than judicial testimony
or religious confessions. While today’s debate is dominated by notions of the ticking bomb sce-
nario and similar imminent calamities, that may not mean that scholars adopt the same understand-
ing of how bodies and information are related. Currently, the question of how torture makes bodies
reveal life-saving information falls under the banner of effectiveness.
Utilitarians and those threshold deontologists who support torture argue, or sometimes just as-
sert, that torture effectively produces information. This point is essential to either the utilitarian
calculation of relative harms or the activation of the threshold that overcomes deontological com-
mitments. Bagaric and Clarke (2007, 12f.) say that the “main beneficial feature of torture” is the
production of information, and this feature arises because people “have an intense desire to avoid
pain, no matter how short term, and most will comply with the demands of the torturer to avoid
pain.” They concede that many examples can be found in which torture does not produce infor-
mation (53). In response, they argue first that “None of the instances of torture” their opponents
criticize “are similar to the circumstances” or the means of torture that they advocate (53). In other
words, they are saying that none of the examples advanced by the torture opponents match the cir-
cumstances they have specified for justified torture. One of those circumstances is, of course, that
the person has relevant information. Gathering that information is the purpose of such examples
of torture. Their second response is that “it is easy to give just as many contrary examples where
torture was effective” (54). They dislike comparing anecdotal evidence, even though that is the
best they find available (58f.).
They state their conclusion once with the claim that “all the information from past instances
of torture reveals only the following: sometimes it has resulted in suspects divulging information
to security officials who have used officials to save other people; sometimes it has not” (Bagaric
and Clarke, 2007, 59). Yet another matter of concern makes an appearance here: the claim that
security officials can or do use the information to save lives. They restate their conclusion in two
parts. First, “[there] is no evidence that torture cannot work in the circumstances we outline,” and
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then “[there] is no logical basis for demanding perfect knowledge” (60).
Dershowitz (2002, 137) agrees, saying that the “tragic reality is that torture sometimes works.”
He adds that it is “precisely because torture sometimes works that it still exists in many parts of
the world and has been totally eliminated from none” (138). Like Bagaric and Clarke, he is limited
to anecdotal data. Steinhoff (2013, 17) similarly rejects any certainty requirement for knowing
that the tortured person has relevant life-saving information. Recall that for Steinhoff, when some
situation activates self-defense rights, nearly all other constraints are vacated (see section 2.4.1).
This leads him to argue that “even if torture were highly unreliable, this would not matter” (14).
Arrigo (2004) chooses exactly this issue—the information-producing ability of torture—to fo-
cus her argument. In lieu of the unsatisfying anecdotal comparisons that the other utilitarians
and Steinhoff complain about, Arrigo engages four different models of information production.
The “animal instinct” model is thought to produce information when the “animal instinct of the
subject overrides the human will or reason of the subject,” who then complies with the torturer
(547). However, the “animal instinct model ultimately fails because the physiological experience
of pain is mediated by individual and cultural interpretation.” In the “cognitive failure model of
truth telling,” the tortured person divulges information when they become so overwhelmed by
their treatment that they cannot mentally organize their own resistance (550). The “data process-
ing model” depends on large numbers of interrogations to generate sufficient data for a large scale
analysis (554). Arrigo provides counter arguments for each of these potential mechanisms of in-
formation production. By focusing on the potential causal mechanisms that would allow torture to
produce information, Arrigo adopts a different standard of reasoning about the effectiveness of tor-
ture.3 Effectiveness remains a matter of concern, however, because she may not be able to impose
those standards on others. Steinhoff, for example, does not particularly care: once self-defense is
invoked, the person who is being attacked has very wide latitude to try almost anything.
As I mentioned in section 2.1.3, John W. Schiemann’s game theory analysis of torture shows
some promise in answering the utilitarian arguments for torture, even in the form of a modern
3In Arrigo’s analysis, none of the potential causal mechanisms support the claim that torture produces information
(Arrigo, 2004, 546).
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critical approach. The reason is that Schiemann explicitly adopts the utilitarian conditions for his
analysis in a way that Arrigo does not. Arrigo uses utilitarianism as a strategy for responding
to utilitarians. However, she differs from the other utilitarians in a fairly subtle way. She uses a
different standard for judging whether or not torture produces information. If her animal instinct,
cognitive failure, and data processing models do not interest her opponents, her response is un-
likely to persuade them. Schiemann, on the other hand, builds his model around the formula and
conditions proposed by Bagaric and Clarke.4
I argued in section 2.3.1 that Schiemann seems to have the utilitarians cornered here. It would
be difficult, if not impossible, for them to argue Schiemann did not adopt their exact conditions.
From an ANT perspective, however, what matters is that Schiemann’s argument, like all arguments,
is rife with closures and clarifications that someone who really wishes to disagree could exploit.
For example, his view of rationality or the parameters he uses to assess the reliability of information
that might be provided. Also, Steinhoff insists that as a threshold deontologist his argument is
simply not susceptible to utility calculations, including Schiemann’s. Steinhoff is not interested in
utility functions at all—as soon as a person is attacked, they may respond in almost any way they
wish that is not grossly disproportionate.
Gordon’s virtue ethics account (2.4.2) eschews torture for reasons unrelated to effectiveness.
For Gordon, torture is an evil practice. It is wrong because it destroys the virtues conducive to
living well in the community. Kramer rules out the vast majority of torture types for moral reasons
not related to effectiveness. For Kramer, the wrongness of torture itself is robust enough to stand
up to the reasons advanced for using it. Kramer’s theory accommodates moral conflicts, and the
torture prohibition is rarely overridden. When faced with calls for ephemerally-incapacitating
torture to prevent calamities, Kramer objects to torture on agent-centered grounds. Kramer and
Gordon differ from the others in that their torture ethics arguments do not fundamentally depend
on the claimed information-producing capability of torture.
After examining the various ways that torture ethics scholars work to close off the question
4See Bagaric and Clarke (2007, 38) and Schiemann (2012, 3 and 5-7).
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of whether torture produces information. The utilitarians argue that the anecdotal evidence is in-
conclusive, and therefore torture should be understood as sometimes effective. This seems to be
enough for them. Because Steinhoff argues from self-defense rights, his standards for effective-
ness are very low. People under attack may defend themselves even by ineffective means, in his
view. Arrigo challenges the information-production function on terms that other utilitarians seem
unlikely to accept. Schiemann challenges the utilitarian assumptions of torture’s effectiveness on
terms they probably have to accept, because he adopts exactly their terms in good faith, more or
less. However, one can still hope to avoid what one cannot accept. They may decline to engage
Schiemann’s arguments.
By using an ANT approach to make torture’s ability to produce information a matter of con-
cern, rather than a matter of fact, this analysis actually shows the power of the modern critical
stance. For moderns, there are high stakes in establishing effectiveness as a matter of fact. If one
can establish as a fact that torture is ineffective, honest utilitarians would abandon torture imme-
diately, as Bagaric and Clarke freely admit.5 If one can establish as a fact that torture effectively
produces life-saving information, then deontological opponents of torture become the cartoonish
moral monsters they are sometimes painted as, polishing their principles while blood runs in the
streets.
On the other hand, from the ANT perspective it is possible to see the high costs points scored
using polemical facts. They shatter the community that is ostensibly trying to make an ethical deci-
sion. Getting one’s facts in order makes one’s case stronger but also narrower and more exclusive.
It cuts off access to those disagreeable people who are fashioning their own stronger, narrower
arguments from their own facts.
In the actual practice of torture, fighting over facts can actually turn them into matters of con-
cern related to bodies and information, perhaps irrevocably. Mohamedou Slahi (2.5.1) embodies
several distinct but related matters of concern. There is a dispute over whether or not he has
engaged in terrorist acts, another dispute over whether he knows or knew any relevant life-saving
5“Certainly if this objection was valid we would change our minds and not countenancet orture in any circum-
stances.” (Bagaric and Clarke, 2007, 53)
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information, and finally a dispute over the truthfulness of the information he did eventually provide
after being tortured.
Recall that Slahi had been interrogated continuously for a year and a half before the most inten-
sive torture techniques were applied. Under pressure from weeks of round-the-clock interrogation,
Slahi was consumed with making the treatment stop. As he understood it, what he needed to do
to please his interrogators was “tell an untruthful story and maintain it,” which he found difficult
to do (Slahi, 2015, 232). It is neither hyperbole nor advocacy when Larry Siems writes in the
introduction to Slahi’s book that the “truth is confusion” (Siems in Slahi, 2015, xxxii).
For adherents of the modern critical stance, Slahi’s book is instructive. It was written by the
tortured person but also delayed and redacted by CIA editors. The CIA still has physical control
of Slahi today. As torture accounts go, the Slahi book offers very high quality empirical data. Yet
it really is impossible to determine whether Slahi is telling the truth or the CIA is. In an almost
objective sense, all that is left in the Slahi case, with respect to the truth, is a matter of concern.
5.3 Torture and Information as a Matter of Concern
No ANT account of torture ethics can stipulate an answer about the effectiveness of torture in
producing information, in either direction. In ANT torture ethics this is not even desirable. Instead,
a sustained engagement with the effectiveness question as a matter of concern begins to show the
features of the issue. The ANT account of this matter of concern gathers together a collection of
disagreeable people and their facts. One thing that is apparent from this view is how little interest
the human actants have had in engaging others on shareable terms. Arrigo does strive for shareable
terms on one important count by adopting utilitarian framework, but she misses on another by
questioning the information-producing ability of torture. Schiemann stands out as doing well in
this regard. The others express little interest in debating on truly shared terms.
In the spirit of ANT, I do not say this to chastise the participants in the torture ethics debate.
Within the modern critical stance, they have been doing their jobs to marshal matters of fact—about
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the ability of torture to produce information, in this case—and strengthen their own approaches to
torture ethics. What they cannot see from that stance is how their hard work narrows the appeal of
their strengthened torture ethics arguments and alienates the others to whom they find themselves
politically connected.
From the ANT perspective, one can also see from this analysis how the facts being asserted in
this particular area are pretty shabby all around. Only Schiemann’s facts have much punch, and he
achieves that effect by adopting assumptions that others already share—their exact assumptions,
actually. ANT is not in the business of proving anything, but the analysis at least suggests that
long and intense fights over matters of fact might yield only very beleaguered and compromised
facts. The matter of of torture’s information-generating power can only lead to more division and
disagreement when treated as a pursuit of fact. The ANT approach feeds off beleaguered facts and
turns them into matters of concern—which become resources for politically contesting the issue
of effectiveness. In other words, an ANT analysis along the lines of the above can be used to
establish a shared ground for politically contesting torture in a way that respects each disagree-
able person’s ethical principles. To accomplish this, people must recognize their connection in a
political community, and be willing to dispute torture ethics politically and on shared terms.
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Chapter 6
Considerations for a Political Ethics of
Torture
6.1 From the Politics of Ethics to Political Ethics
The foregoing account has described the problem of torture ethics in a new way. I have argued
for revised concepts of both what torture ethics is as an object of study, and also for a new un-
derstanding of the social structure in which the torture ethics debate takes place. An important
consideration throughout the dissertation has been the fragmented landscape of torture ethics. The
trend to date has been that each person charts a fairly unique path through many complicated issues
before arriving at a moral judgment of torture. As a result, I have aspired to develop an approach
to torture ethics that includes disagreeable members of the community in a single conversation
without imposing an unjustifiable order on their ethical frameworks.
The strategic decision behind the dissertation has been to trade away the possibility of a scien-
tifically or philosophically correct moral evaluation of torture for the possibility of a better political
evaluation of torture. By better I do not mean that the answer goes one particular way or the other,
although I personally oppose torture. Better, in this context, means a more inclusive, thorough,
and informed political debate about the use of torture. The ANT approach makes that possible
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by disclosing the number and character of the competing torture ethics approaches, by showing
community members how they remain associated with each other even when they would rather
dissociate into separate sub-groups with matching ethical frameworks, and by providing language
and concepts for the conversation that are not subordinate to any particular ethical framework.
I call this sort of torture ethics a political ethics of torture. It grows out of and is supported
by the ANT approach. In this political ethics, the actants are on equal ground with respect to
their ethical frameworks and the language they use to speak about torture and torture ethics. The
actants involved in political ethics can even be described as stuck on equal ground. They see the
costs of trying to exit the networked conversation among disagreeable equals and returning to the
old denunciations. The political ethics of torture emerges as a better option when people begin
to doubt the old denunciations, which have lost their bite because using them cuts the association
with whomever they want to attack. Instead, the actants working toward a political ethics of torture
work toward a compromise using shared concepts and language. They do not have to agree with
each other on all the related normative, metaethical, and other metatheoretical question, nor can
they require others to adopt a different ethical framework.
I am not introducing the political ethics of torture as a technical term, a new concept, or a piece
of jargon. Instead, I use it as a descriptive term for what is left over once one accepts that the battle
over torture ethics cannot be decisively won in philosophy or related scientific disciplines. The
term “political ethics” here indicates that the political community must choose a course of action
without a right answer. I am arguing that, at least in the case of torture, that is the truest ethics to
which political communities can aspire. Everything else is at best out of reach, and at worst the
continued pursuit of such a right answer—validated by something more than a legitimate political
process—creates additional serious problems. In a sense, this amounts to a claim that as torture
ethics are only political.
Political ethics of torture is my alternative to what I think has been going on. I call that
currently-dominant view politics of torture ethics. In politics of torture ethics, a number of power-
ful and refined torture ethics arguments compete for victory as the right course of action. Because
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these arguments cannot really be evaluated against each other, they vie for supremacy by denying
the worlds in which the competing arguments live. Each approach rests on its own highly idiosyn-
cratic ethical framework and set of factual assumptions. As the individual approaches to torture
ethics get stronger and more clear, the politics of torture ethics undermines the community’s ability
to make the ethical choice that was at issue to begin with. Instead, sub-communities form around
the different approaches and engage in conflict. Again, I do not wish to invent a piece of jargon or
a technical term here. By calling this view the politics of torture ethics, I want to bring attention
to the relationship of politics and ethics. In this case, the assumption is that there is a right moral
evaluation of torture out there, independent of politics. In the politics of torture ethics, politics is
merely the arena in which people champion their own right answer. The goal is victory rather than
compromise.
Since 2001, scholars, policy makers, journalists, and the public have been engaged in the pol-
itics of torture ethics. This is hardly a criticism, since as I mentioned above, for many of these
people their job demands that they do so. Jeremy Waldron should be commended for his efforts
to restore the moral and legal prohibition against torture. Uwe Steinhoff, for his part, has pointed
out important weaknesses and inconsistencies in some anti-torture arguments. My motivation for
writing this dissertation has been the growing sense that powerful thinkers like Waldron, Steinhoff,
Gordon, and Kramer appeared to be moving further apart as their respective arguments got more
clear and more forceful. I have written the dissertation out of despair for any political choice about
torture, and in hopes of restoring one.
6.2 Objections
There are at least three sorts of objections that apply to this overall argument. First, important
elements of the argument are not yet fully developed. The approach in this dissertation is not
an easy alternative to follow in any case, and in particular, the “reassembly” aspect is lacking.
The second objection comes from those who maintain that a right answer is still possible torture
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ethics, at the group level as well as the individual level. Because a political ethics of torture
makes political processes the determining factor for the ethical course of action, those holding out
for a right answer may object that political ethics constitute moral relativism. Depending on the
community, a political ethics of torture can be seen as an “anything goes” approach. The third sort
of objection is that the ANT approach and resulting political ethics of torture do not overcome the
same criticism that undermines the torture ethics debate generally. Just as there is no authoritative
reason to choose Gordon’s virtue ethics over Steinhoff’s self-defense argument, or Waldron’s legal
archetype over Bagaric and Clarke’s hedonistic act utilitarianism, there is no authoritative reason
to choose ANT.
6.2.1 Relativism and Lack of Clarity
The first objection is accurate and compelling. As presented in this dissertation, the spatial anal-
ysis of torture and the inquiry into the body-information relationship do not quite offer a clear
picture of what each controversy means in the torture debate. They do not reassemble the social
very effectively, and therefore might only create additional confusion. Also, there is at least one
other significant area of controversy that bears on the torture ethics debate: the relationship of
information to security.
However, chapters 4 and 5 do show the potential of the ANT approach. In particular, they begin
to show how controversies can be more illuminating than right answers. The description of torture
as a certain kind of action on a body in space develops language for talking about torture-like
acts that is not gratuitously manipulative. That language also avoids strategically reducing the acts
to hide aspects of the experience. Of all the works discussed in chapter 2, only Kramer pursues
inclusiveness to a similar degree. Kramer is a threshold deontologist and moral realist, and his
approach still cannot be socialized with some others that disagree on important but obscure points.
Only the ANT approach grants people their own moral frameworks.
The conversation about effectiveness that features in chapter 5 can play an important role in the
current debate, too. As readers now know, there is a great deal more to the story than the competing
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claims that torture does not produce information and that it does. The issues that come up around
this controversy are bound to be informative. For example, there seems to be very little information
all around about this issue, yet it is absolutely central to most torture justifications circulating today.
It simply has to be true for torture to have any chance of moral legitimacy. With such high stakes
in the torture ethics debate, and especially after years of actually torturing people for information,
readers might consider what knowledge (and perhaps beliefs) are required for the body-information
connection to hold. The over-stressed relationship of bodies and information also raises questions
about other ways of discovering security information that have recently been sidelined, and also
about other factors (besides information) that affect security.These brief responses do not make up
for the failure to fully realize the ANT approach, but they offer some evidence that more work will
be productive—and more work is the way to overcome this objection.
The objection that a political ethics of torture leads to moral relativism is less troubling. A
political ethics of torture might indeed degenerate into what the community thinks should be done
about torture. However, I am not sure that this is as bad a problem as it seems. Recall that Latour’s
second source of uncertainty (3.3.2) considers action to be radically underdetermined, and his third
source of uncertainty lets objects be agents. The actants in the political group cannot simply do
whatever they want, because each one is subject to the agency of many other actors and objects.
At any rate, the risk currently does not appear to lie with the mob. Instead, the implosion of the
anti-torture norm in the United States after 2001 was an elite coup carried out by some other elites
who happened to be in charge. It happened over the objections of many others the former group was
able to sideline and marginalize.1 At the moment, torture ethics are subject to change at the whim
of the president and the security services. If the Senate Select Committee report (2014), then the
result can fairly be described as abundant official torture, against the law, with no accountability.
It is not clear that the mob could do worse. The political ethics of torture is relativist in the sense
that real associations between members of the political community are relative. From the ANT
point of view, the mob is an impermissible concept in the sense that it emphasizes an invisible
1Christopher Pyle (2009) and Peter Jan Honigsberg (2009) both offer forensic analyses of how this legal change
came about in the case of recent U.S. torture.
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social aggregate over the observable, traceable, and thus real actions among actants.
6.2.2 Why Bother with ANT?
The most serious objection that can be leveled at the political ethics of torture facilitated by ANT
is that it is nothing special, and there is no reason to adopt it. This is an immanent critique of ANT
ethics that subjects it to the same criticism as all the works in chapter 2. I cannot argue that there
is no authoritative reason to adopt Steinhoff’s approach or Dershowitz’s, and then argue that there
is an authoritative reason to adopt ANT. I have argued against the existence of such authorities, or
at least I did not find any circulating in the current torture ethics debate. The modes of the modern
critical stance that Latour talks about in WNBM operate not through the discovery of authorities
but by cleverly cutting off the world in areas where authorities cannot be found. Like it or not,
ANT and the political ethics of torture are subject to the same problem. I cannot coerce followers
by saying that God, or Reason, or the General Will are on the side of ANT. Because this objection
is so powerful, I deal with it here at some length. My response has two parts: first, by showing that
there is something about ANT that allows it to function without a theoretical authority, and second
by considering what the alternatives are if ANT fails in the same way as the other approaches.
6.2.3 Persuasion
Although ANT is equal to the torture ethics approaches found in chapter 2 2 in that it too cannot
appeal to an external source of authority in its quest to become the right approach. ANT differs
from those other approaches because it does not need to make such an appeal. Indeed, ANT is
designed to operate without it. ANT is designed for persuasion in a way that other approaches,
which continue to employ the modes of the modern critical stance, are not. As I argue in section
2.6, the tactics that other approaches use to strengthen themselves wind up restricting the range of
people who can agree with them.
For example, a torture ethics argument that depends on a belief in the objectivity of moral
claims loses some power with anyone who is skeptical of that requirement. Unlike Kramer, who
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is moral realist, I do not believe that moral claims exist objectively in the world. Thus I admire
Kramer because he makes a good argument and I agree with his final judgment on torture, not
because we share a moral framework. If Kramer advocated torture, I might even attack him on that
basis.
ANT-based ethics, on the other hand, get their authority from the density of their associations
and from their inclusiveness. Latour (1999a, 158) says that an “entity gains in reality if it is
associated with many others that are viewed as collaborating with it. It loses reality if, on the
contrary, it has to shed associations or collaborators (human or non-human).” All of the standard
approaches to torture ethics are forced to shed collaborators as they strengthen their arguments.
Steinhoff shifts decisively toward self-defense rights in part because he finds them better supported
by the law. However he loses any potential converts who support both the right not to be tortured
and the right to self-defense, as soon as they realize that for Steinhoff, the latter totally overrides the
former. ANT-based ethics accommodate incompatible ethical frameworks in a way that the other
approaches. The other approaches to torture ethics invalidate divergent moral frameworks—in fact,
that is their principal mode of persuasion. Therefore they exclude possible adherents through the
theoretical moves that strengthen their arguments.
An aptness for persuasion may not be a good standard for ethics, though. In Gorgias, Plato
(1987) criticizes oratory—or rhetoric, the art of persuasion—as a “knack” rather than a “craft” or
technē. Plato recounts how Socrates criticizes the orator Gorgias, Gorigias’s students, and derides
oratory in general as a “kind of flattery” that has no beneficial content (463a). Socrates calls
oratory flattery because it substitutes the appearance of a good what is actually good. Cosmetics,
for example, make the body look deceptively good, while the practice of gymnastics is concerned
with what is actually good for the body (464b). Because oratory has no content of its own, it can
be used “defend injustice,” and is therefore “of no use” (480c).
Later in Gorgias, Socrates argues with the character Gorgias’s student Callicles about how to
know what is just. Callicles that it is just for “the superior to take by force what belongs to the
inferior,” and that “the better should rule the worse” (488b). Socrates counters that strength cannot
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be a standard basis of justice, because strength can secure both good and evil pleasures. In a
straightforward reading of Gorgias, Socrates criticizes the arts of persuasion because they cannot
distinguish what is really good, and are thus fully compatible with an “insatiable, undisciplined
life” (493c).
Latour (1999a, 218-35) counters with an unconventional reading of Gorgias. Latour argues
that while Callicles and Socrates appear to argue over “Might and Right,” respectively, that “we
forget to notice that Socrates and Callicles have a common enemy: the people of Athens” (219).
The fight between Callicles and Socrates is actually bargain between two kinds of elites to stave off
the threat that political rule in Athens will revert to the great mass of people. Between Callicles’
appeal to strength and Socrates philosophical pursuit of the Truth, “the contest is about how to shut
the mouths of the people faster and tighter” (229). Although the two characters are fighting, their
fight actually hides the deal they have made to divide up the spoils of rule between themselves,
while excluding the people (234).
If one adopts Latour’s odd reading of Gorgias, the same triangular structure can be applied to
the torture ethics debate.2 Political leaders have position similar to Callicles. Aided by secrecy,
they can often decide what to do with captured terrorist suspects. Scholars working to understand
torture ethics play a role similar to Socrates, at least to the degree that they seek the right answer
about torture’s moral status. What has been ruled out in the contest between the Might answer,
in which security officials do what they will, and the Right answer, in which they do what expert
knowledge says is the ethical course of action, is a political engagement with torture ethics. If one
doubts the settlement of Might and Right in the current torture ethics debate, recall that it is the
seal of the Department of Justice that authorized the brutal torture of Abu Zubaydah, Slahi, and so
many others in recent years.
The ANT approach is designed to facilitate a sociable ethics of torture, and to do so it re-
engages all the actants and the disreputable (at least to philosophers) art of persuasion. The justifi-
cation doing this is that the settlement, if it can be called that, between security officials doing what
2See Latour (1999a, 228) the “triangular contest.”
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they will and scholars arguing over the right answer has broken down. The Socrates’ of today’s
torture ethics debate cannot say what should be done about it any more than the Callicles’. The
path offered by ANT ethics is to return the problem to the people—not as a mystical aggregate, but
as an ongoing, contingent coming-together of actants associated with the problem of torture.
6.2.4 Alienation
The alternative to the ANT path of persuasion is alienation—not in a Marxist sense, but in the
sense Carl Schmitt uses when discussing friends and enemies. Schmitt (2007, 26) says that the
“political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend
and enemy.” Schmitt is talking about national groups, not sub-national groups divided by their
views on torture. However, there is a sense in which the distinction fits the torture ethics debate.
For Schmitt (2007, 27), the enemy is defined not by evil but by its strangeness. The enemy is “in
a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien” (27). And while neither the
national level where Schmitt locates political conflicts, nor the concrete requirement that friend
and enemy arise in combat apply here, the sense of extreme otherness is a characteristic of the
torture ethics debate.
To my knowledge, no corner of the torture ethics debate has devolved into actual combat. How-
ever, at a more genteel level it is certainly possible to separate intellectual friend and enemy along
the lines of someone’s torture ethics. There is often something nearly impossible to understand
about an opponent in the debate who reasons to an opposite conclusion about torture. Especially
when this transgresses previously established feelings of respect, it prompts the question of how
the other person could possibly even think that. In the torture ethics debate, intellectual friend and
enemy divide along the lines of what other ethical frameworks each person can tolerate.
Proceeding as usual in the torture ethics debate, then, Uwe Steinhoff believes that self-defense
rights authorize torture even with a wide range of uncertainty about the facts. To those he calls
“anti-torture absolutists,” Steinhoff might appear monstrous. However, to him, they are the moral
monsters: they would let a child die while their cherished principles protect a despicable kidnapper
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or molester. The endless rounds of mutual denunciation, that Latour encourages us to put to an
end, make the offender an alien in one’s chosen world. The works of sophisticated torture ethics
scholarship in section 2.4 gets their individual power through specifying ethical worlds that are
becoming more and more incompatible with each other. This is the best that the current debate can
offer, not because the scholarship is bad, but because it is good.
6.2.5 Proceeding Without ANT
If one rejects the view that ANT overcomes lack of external authority by its facility for persuasion,
then one falls back on the analysis in chapter 2. In other words, if ANT itself falls to the immanent
critique, then that only confirms the fall of all the other options in the current torture ethics debate.
The failure of ANT to offer anything new becomes a general failure of the torture ethics debate.
That leaves two unattractive options.
One is to declare a winner in the torture ethics debate, or at least carry on as if there is a winner.
The other is to withdraw from the question. There are a number of problems with declaring a
winner. One is that the winning torture ethics position must then be enforced, which is not easy.
Torture opponents lost a great deal of ground in the early 2000s by assuming the prohibition would
simply retain its force. But enforcement in the absence of a widely-shared ethical framework leads
to what Judith Butler (2005, 3-9) calls ethical violence: what is not shared must be imposed, even
if it is “ethical.” If I have been successful outlining ANT ethics above, it should be clear that the
dissemination of a normative theory across a complex landscape of incompatible ethical frame-
works would be violent, would require violence. This option does not appear to be appreciably
better than endlessly arguing about torture ethics or, perhaps, trying the ANT approach.
The other option is to withdraw from the question. This is not difficult to do, since the difficulty
of the question fends off many potential inquiries anyway. What Latour doesn’t mention in his
alternative reading of Gorgias is the possibility that the people are in on the settlement that Might
and Right have arranged. That is, there is another settlement that grants Might and Right their
battle, as long as certain conditions are met for the people. “Let the security services do what they
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do, and let the scholars say why the security services are right or wrong, but don’t bother us,” the
people might say. In a sense, the people are not even invited to the discussion. That was partly the
point of re-drawing the associations in section 4.1.
However, just as the Might-Right settlement is foundering, the elements that encourage the
people to accept that settlement are no longer satisfying. The way of persuasion is at least worth a
serious attempt. One can always return to denunciation later.
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